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Cultural Experimentation as Regulatory Mechanism in Response to Events of War and 
Revolution in Russia (1914-1940) 
Anita Tárnai 
From 1914 to 1940 Russia lived through a series of traumatic events: World War I, the 
Bolshevik revolution, the Civil War, famine, and the Bolshevik and subsequently Stalinist terror. 
These events precipitated and facilitated a complete breakdown of the status quo associated with 
the tsarist regime and led to the emergence and eventual pervasive presence of a culture of 
violence propagated by the Bolshevik regime. This dissertation explores how the ongoing 
exposure to trauma impaired ordinary perception and everyday language use, which, in turn, 
informed literary language use in the writings of Viktor Shklovsky, the prominent Formalist 
theoretician, and of the avant-garde writer, Daniil Kharms. While trauma studies usually focus 
on the reconstructive and redeeming features of trauma narratives, I invite readers to explore the 
structural features of literary language and how these features parallel mechanisms of cognitive 
processing, established by medical research, that take place in the mind affected by traumatic 
encounters. Central to my analysis are Shklovsky’s memoir A Sentimental Journey and his early 
articles on the theory of prose “Art as Device” and “The Relationship between Devices of Plot 
Construction and General Devices of Style” and Daniil Karms’s theoretical writings on the 
concepts of “nothingness,” “circle,” and “zero,” and his prose work written in the 1930s. My 
analysis probes into various modes in which trauma can present itself in a text, in forms other 
than semantic content, and points to what distinguishes a modernist text from one written under 
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“The continuous world is a world of vision. 
The discontinuous world is a world of recognition.”1 
  Shklovsky 
 
When Viktor Shklovsky, the eminent Formalist critic, wrote in 1923, “We have known 
no other way of life than that of war and revolution. It may be harming us, but we cannot escape 
it,” he spoke on behalf of a generation that had experienced three cataclysmic events in 
succession -- the First World War, the Bolshevik revolution, and the Civil War -- within a 
decade.2 Despite the traumas and other forms of stress inflicted on society and the individual by 
the direct experience with violence and with more subtle effects of the perpetual shift in key 
actors, agendas and values, there was still a remarkably vibrant cultural scene propagated by an 
unusually large number of very talented artists, thinkers coming together in Russia’s urban 
centers from all segments of society. They created a large body of work, commonly referred to as 
the Russian avant-garde, which no doubt can be considered one of the greatest contributions 
Russia made during the twentieth century to Western art and literary history and criticism.  
                                                
1 Viktor Shklovsky, Literature and Cinematography, trans. Irina Masinovsky, intro. Richard Sheldon (Champaign 
and London: Dalkey Archive Press, 2008), 30. 
 
2 Viktor Shklovsky, Zoo or Letters Not about Love, trans. and intro. Richard Sheldon (Chicago and Normal, Illinois: 




It has often been claimed that, historically speaking, culture is a result of a surplus that 
civilization has produced at the cost of the self-effacing labor of the lower classes. What is 
implied here is that the emancipation of a group of men or a certain class (i.e. the artists and the 
intelligentsia) can only come into being when the basic needs of a society are met and there is a 
surplus produced that makes it possible for certain individuals or classes free from daily labor to 
occupy themselves with non-physical, mental labor only. This approach, while one cannot deny 
its historical validity, is commonly advocated amongst those who believe that socio-economic 
needs not only affect but also precede the human need for creative expression.  While the 
bourgeois connections of the Russian urban intelligentsia (either in terms of social origin or 
acquired status or cultural connections) are beyond doubt, the example of the Russian avant-
garde that flourished at a time—the 1910s-1930s in Russia—when life consisted mostly of a 
struggle to survive both in a physical and in a spiritual sense, casts doubt on the universality of 
this explanation. I shall also note that the Russian intelligentsia, and I would include artists in 
this category as well, has never enjoyed a secure position in society, and was subject to mistrust 
both from the Tsarist and from the Bolshevik regimes; thus, even in a socioeconomic sense, it 
occupied a marginal and marginalized position and benefited little from whatever material 
surplus was available. In that sense, the Russian intelligentsia, if we do not take into 
consideration the minority of individuals who were independently wealthy, could be defined 
more by its unmet needs than by those that were met.  
There are countless examples of artistic output generated under the harshest conditions 
when no surplus whatsoever was available in a material sense: literature conceived in the 
Holocaust or in forced labor camps in the Soviet Union, on slave plantations, under colonial and 




under extreme conditions it is possible to be artistically productive – that is, to generate a surplus 
in a cognitive and spiritual sense literally at death’s door. Moreover, it seems there is a direct 
correlation in such texts between the desire to survive and the production of these works.  It may, 
therefore, not be unfounded to examine the motivation of Russian avant-garde authors in the 
context of the traumatic experiences of the times and consider to what extent they, too, were 
motivated by their own desire for spiritual survival; and to what extent their work thereby bears 
signs of the effects of World War I, the Bolshevik Revolution, the Civil War, the ensuing famine 
and epidemic, and the decades of most brutal forms of terror. 
Marten deVries, in his essay “Trauma in Cultural Perspective,” defines culture as: “[A] 
health maintenance system whose function is to assure the adequate distribution of goods, as 
well as physical and social resources for maintaining social relationships and structure…Culture 
is…geared toward providing the homeostatic processes that allow the group and the individual to 
survive under a wide range of stressful conditions.”3 Cultures, asserts deVries, “are powerfully 
resilient to the stresses of the environment and resistant to change.”4 Culture thus, according to 
the author, acts as a regulatory mechanism that buffers its members from the stresses of their 
environment and is fundamentally conservative, that is gravitating toward the state of status quo 
or immobility.  
DeVries’ description of culture is analogous, and is ontologically related, to Freud’s 
notion of the “protective shield” in the context of personal trauma. The role of the protective 
shield is to provide protection against stimuli, against the effects of the external world that Freud 
                                                
3 Marten W. deVries, “Trauma in Cultural Perspective” in Traumatic Stress, eds. Bessel A. Van der Kolk, Alexander 
C. McFarlane, Lars Weisaeth (New York, London: The Guilford Press), 401.   
 




sees as primarily hostile to the individual.5 Likewise and perhaps not incidentally, deVries’ 
vision of the primary motivation behind the sustenance of culture is strongly reminiscent of 
Freud’s understanding of the instinct, which in Freud’s definition is “an urge inherent in organic 
life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under 
the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or to put it 
another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life.”6  
When an event of traumatic dimensions occurs, it, as deVries claims:  
profoundly alters the basic structure not just of the individual, but of the cultural system 
as a whole. Society will never be the same again. Homeostatic mechanisms…no longer 
suffice to restore a sense of safety and belonging, and other forms of organization or lack 
of organization need to take place.  In analogy to PTSD at the individual level, a 
posttraumatic cultural reaction may best be viewed as an abnormal response to an 
extraordinary event.7   
 
Under this assumption, culture acts as a protective shield, which breaks down when it is 
breached. For us to be able to speak of trauma in cultural context, conversely, both an act of 
violation and the symptoms of cultural breakdown must be present. Characteristic of this 
breakdown, as deVries points out, is the emergence either of new, substitute, forms of 
organization that replace the old, or of a lack of organization. The first offers a new framework 
within which people belonging to a culture can adjust and organize (then integrate) the events 
that are incompatible with previous modes of organization and systems of beliefs; in case of the 
latter, an absence (or erosion) of previous organizational laws frees the events from their 
traditional interpretation. Either way, new forms of organization or the absence of previously 
                                                
5 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, trans. and ed. James Strachey, intro. Gregory Zilboorg, 
biographical intro. Peter Gay (New York, London: W. W. Norton and Company, 1989), 30. 
 
6 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 43. 
 




existing organizational functions in the context of trauma, that is, when the existence of cultural 
trauma can be asserted, is or can be ontologically related to the fact that old modes of 
organization become inefficient and inadequate as well as to the desire to re-master the situation 
by introducing new organizational principles. While deVries talks about organizational forms 
that take place on a cultural level, I would argue that these forms are inseparable from and a 
direct result of individual efforts that bear testimony to individual and collective needs to live in 
a world that exhibits some forms of consistency on a perceptual level. 
Freud, like deVries, built his notion of trauma around the issue of breach when saying 
“we describe as ‘traumatic’ any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break 
through the protective shield…Such an event as an external trauma is bound to provoke a 
disturbance on a large scale in the functioning of the organism’s energy and to set in motion 
every possible defensive measure.”8 Freud observes that when an organism is in danger, the 
pleasure principle—towards which the organism gravitates when in stability—is temporarily put 
out of action, and the organism focuses on the avoidance of unpleasure as opposed to the 
production of pleasure. At times of exposure to traumatic experiences, Freud claims: “There is 
no longer any possibility of preventing the mental apparatus from being flooded with large 
amount of stimulus, and another problem arises instead—the problem of mastering [emphasis 
added] the amounts of stimulus which have broken in and of binding them, in the physical sense, 
so that they may be disposed of.”9 It is important to highlight in Freud’s sentence that response to 
trauma is motivated by the organism’s desire to “master” the stimuli as a prerequisite to any 
possibility of further disposal, overcoming of the traumatic event, as well as the fact that the 
                                                
8 Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, 33. 
 




primary occupation is no longer the pursuit of pleasure, that is of full participation in what life 
has to offer, but the avoidance of pain, a retreat to a world that is secure from the disturbing 
impacts of the outside world. Freud thus recognizes the individual’s need to master the effects of 
the trauma and constrict in the face of the trauma to a psychological space that is safe and can 
provide protection from the pain of the outside world. DeVries’ asserts that when the 
organizational principles of a culture have been destroyed or prove inadequate (an incident of 
trauma on a collective scale), a cultural compulsion ensues to create new forms of organization 
that fills the void the elimination of the old forms of organization generates. If under the effects 
of trauma both the elements of withdrawal to a safer place and the desire to create new forms of 
organization and “self-organization” occur, as Freud and deVries claims, it is possible to assert 
that cultural experimentation (which probes into undiscovered organizational principles) and a 
retreat to cultural activities (as opposed to more direct engagement with society building) in the 
face of extreme forms of cultural traumas can legitimately be considered as a response to, and 
effort to master, overwhelming events. 
In light of Freud and deVries’ premises that trauma fundamentally affects a person’s and 
culture’s operational system, and that both culture and person exhibit a retrograde tendency that 
seeks to avoid the tension that entered the homeostasis of the organism when encountering 
trauma, there emerges another possible theory of culture, that seems to suggest that the origin of 
culture can be accounted for, at least to a degree, by a desire to dissociate from the traumatic 
events or conditions that surround artists and thinkers. Culture, especially that which is born in 
the context of extreme stress factors, is driven not so much by material surplus, but by a “deficit” 
or need to survive, by the desire to master the onslaught of events in a mental construct that 




active involvement inasmuch as it seeks to create organizational principles that amend the 
breakdown of previous laws. 
When Shklovsky, in his characteristically flamboyant language, claims: “In the life of 
Pushkin, the only unnecessary thing was d’Anthès’s bullet. But terror and oppression were 
necessary,” he is probing into very similar territory, assuming a connection between creativity 
and the experience of some form of trauma, here terror and oppression.10 It is not clear whether 
Shklovksy implies that in Pushkin’s work [here we may take Pushkin as “the author” in general], 
terror and oppression were somehow ontologically necessary, that they necessitated the work, or 
if Shklovsky means that art is somehow inseparable from or marked by the phenomenon of 
external constraints, here referenced as terror and oppression, both incidentally forms of 
traumatic experiences. It is a curious fact that Shklovsky singled out “terror and oppression” as 
necessary events or contributing factors to one’s artistic oeuvre-- the very same Shklovksy who, 
in his theoretical work, rejected any exploration into psychological motivations in literary 
studies. Shklovsky’s statement about Pushkin’s working conditions as an artist reflects at least as 
much on those of Shklovsky himself, who wrote all his work while exposed to the extreme terror 
and oppression of the Bolsheviks. 
The question as to the extent “terror and oppression,” or in psychological terminology, 
the experience of trauma or breach in an individual’s experience of oneness with the world, is 
essential to and leaves an imprint on the life of a cultural product is the primary question that I 
intend to explore in my dissertation. I focus on areas wherein the mechanisms that operate at the 
intersection of cultural production and cultural trauma are exposed. In the literary context, this 
                                                
10 Victor Erlich, Modernism and Revolution: Russian Literature in Transition (Cambridge: Harvard University 




entails an exploration into features that show parallels between the aesthetic preferences and 
structural experiments of the Russian avant-garde and the psychodynamic mechanisms that are 
set in motion when one is exposed to a series of traumatic events like the wars and revolution in 
early twentieth century Russia. To provide a complex reading of the issues at stake, I shall 
attempt to give both a diachronic and synchronic reading of these mechanisms. This entails a 
consideration of three generations of the avant-garde artists and theoreticians, the Futurists, the 
Formalists and the Structuralists, exploring (1) how each school responded to the traumatic 
events at a given period, and (2) how the three stages of cultural experiments evolved in the 
larger context of Russia’s transition from the time of the dissolution of the Tsarist empire to that 
of the consolidation of the Bolshevik state. The purpose of the latter component of my analysis is 
to see if a correlation can be established between the shift in the locus of experimentation in the 
three avant-garde schools in question and the shift that researchers of trauma describe as taking 
place over time in the mind, as the mind becomes more efficient in mastering trauma. More 
precisely, the question I seek to answer is to what extent the shift in aesthetics can be accounted 
for or established in parallel with a gradual acceptance or “mastering” of the traumatic event of 
the Bolshevik Revolution and its effects, and with the inception of and emerging need to 
integrate a different form of trauma, the Stalinist terror. 
Central to my argument are the studies of the Formalists, the work of Viktor Shklovsky 
written between the years of 1917-1923 in particular, and the prose work of Daniil Kharms 
written during the 1930s. Both Shklovsky and Kharms wrote under strenuous circumstances. 
Shklovsky, who led an active and nomadic lifestyle at the time in question, wrote his articles and 
theoretical work on the fronts of the First World War and Civil War, and subsequently while 




fled to avoid arrest and prosecution by the Cheka for his Socialist Revolutionary activities. 
Kharms wrote during the height of the purges of the 1930s, was himself arrested three times, and 
died in 1941 in a psychiatric ward as a direct result of his last arrest. He, too, battled starvation 
and persecution for most of the last decade of his life.  Both authors’ continuous exposure to 
various forms of trauma and their struggle to survive is well documented. Therefore, their 
writings provide rich material for the analysis of the impact of trauma on culture. Not 
incidentally, as I hope to demonstrate, they also shared a keen interest in the role of method in 
the arts, manifested by the formal experiments of the avant-garde and the central position method 
occupied in the literary studies of the Formalists. Their work, when looked at in succession, thus 
illustrates well the shift of focus and transition in modes and “meanings” of experimentation in 
the artistic credos of subsequent schools of thought, of Futurism, Formalism and Structuralism.  I 
use the terminology of Futurism, Formalism and Structuralism to highlight a propensity in these 
works toward a certain aesthetics that I see as dominant in each author’s and school’s work. It is 
not my objective to enter into terminological discussions or to give an overview of the schools in 
question. Futurism is essential to my discussion only inasmuch as it serves as a point of 
departure for my argument, a point where elements of a modernist discourse can be delineated 
from elements of a discourse affected by the traumas inflicted by the experiences of the Great 
War, the Bolshevik Revolution and later, the Stalinist terror. My discussion of Formalism, 
likewise, is limited to what I consider essential for my explorations of the key concepts 
Shklovsky developed and contributed to the school’s body of work. 
While trying to refrain from using Shklovsky (and the Futurists) and Kharms as types 
representing their respective generations, and from exploiting their work for a metanarrative that 




these authors, in their work, represent tendencies that are indicative of processes that took place 
in the evolution of the Russian avant-garde. The works of Shklovsky and Kharms highlight both 
a synchronic tendency to overcome the traumas of their time (each on their own facing their 
distinct challenges), and an overarching diachronic tendency mirroring successive stages of 
traumatic processing in response to the initial impact of the Bolshevik revolution.  
In this sense Shklovksy’s and Kharms’ works can be looked at as individual efforts to 
generate meaning in response to their traumatic experiences as well as adaptive and 
corresponding stages of a collective meaning-generation mechanism in response to the 
paradigmatic shift that took place as pre-revolutionary tsarist Russia was replaced by Stalinist 
Russia. The period spanning from 1910 to 1940 in general, and Shklovsky’s and Kharms’s 
writings in particular, offer a close look at how narrative construction in response to traumatic 
stressors evolves from a “non-syntactic” to a syntactic state.  This transition can be traced from 
the Futurists’ emphasis on phonetics and the “word,” to the Formalists’ claim that function of 
language in literature brought about by various literary devices is more important than semantics 
and story, and at last, in the case of Kharms, to a state where device becomes both function (an 
organizing principle) and content: that is, where both structural and communicative functions of 
language become integrated and regarded as important. What happens, as I hope to show, is that 
the formal experiment of the avant-garde runs its course concurrently and most likely in direct 
correlation with a multigenerational trauma processing mechanism, where, in accordance with 
trauma theories, the integration of a highly fragmented vision of the world gradually and over 
time gains a narrative that is capable of syntactic or verbal formulation, here of a story as well as 
a plot. Such an intellectual undertaking can not only shed fresh light on the motivations behind 




studies that are primarily content-based, namely, those that explore the story line of trauma-
related texts, and bypass structural features that are salient to cognitive mechanisms imparted by 




















The Impact of War Traumas on the Individual and Language Use 
 
 “The wind blows from the East, the wind blows                       
from the West, and on its circuits the wind returns.”11 
 
 
I. The Historical Context (1914-1940) 
 
 Conditions in Pre-revolutionary Russia were far from ideal for the majority of its 
population, which lived under critical conditions and without certain political and economic 
rights that the lower classes in Western Europe had gradually secured during the course of the 
19th century for themselves. At the same time, there were cultural mechanisms in place, 
communal values, a functioning legal system, and a more or less predictable life in terms of what 
the population could or could not expect from the autocratic regime. Externally, there was 
continuity, four hundred years of the rule of a single dynasty, the Romanovs; a stable system of 
hierarchy among the social classes; and a belief system, Russian Orthodoxy, that provided 
cohesion and spiritual comfort.   
At the time Russia entered the 20th century as one of the most powerful empires of 
Europe, its semi-feudalistic social, economic and political conditions (which had been essential 
                                                
11 Viktor Shklovsky, A Sentimental Journey: Memoirs, 1917-1922, trans. and lit. intro. Richard Sheldon, hist. intro. 




to conserving the rule of the Romanovs) began to impede Russia’s basic functioning and pointed 
to questions regarding the long-term viability of the regime. The weakness of the Romanov 
dynasty and its thinning social support became evident in its military defeats, i.e. in the Russo-
Japanese war in 1905; in the growing number of protests and strikes of the peasantry and the 
workers; in the increasing prevalence of mutinies in the army during and immediately following 
the war; and in the growing dissent among the members of the ruling elite. Tsar Nikolai II 
entered World War in 1914 hoping to unite the disgruntled nation against the common enemy 
and pacify his subjects with military successes at the front. Within two years it became clear, 
however, that the Russian economy could not sustain the war efforts and that its military 
leadership was poorly prepared to conduct the troops to victory. Generally, the troops suffered 
tremendous losses as a result of bad military decisions, inadequate training and poor equipment, 
and the overall lack of a cohesive sense of patriotism and thus motivation to fight the war. While 
the anger of the population was mostly due to economic hardship, there was also a growing 
dissatisfaction amongst the members of the political elite, and an increasing demand for 
constitutional reforms advocated by liberals and radicals alike.  
On February 24, 1917, a spontaneous strike broke out in Peterburg mostly supported by 
factory workers who demanded food and an end to the war. Under the order of the Tsar to restore 
stability, on February 26, the Pavlovskii Guard Regiment fired on the crowd killing about 40 
civilians. This enraged soldiers stationed in the Petrograd garrison as well as members of the 
Pavlovskii Guard not implicated in the massacre. Many of the city’s regiments turned against 
their officers, broke into arsenals and stole weapons and armored vehicles, while the crowd 




the Tsar in return dissolved the Duma. On the ashes of the Duma, a new government was 
formed, titled the Provisional Committee, later renamed the Provisional Government.  
On the same day (February 28, 1917), the Petrograd Soviet, an organ that consisted of 
delegates from factories and military units, was formed. The Petrograd Soviet and other soviets 
that were formed subsequently were organs of representation, but they had no executive 
function. It was the Executive Committee (or Ispolkom, later CEC), made up of members of the 
socialist parties that became the organ that coordinated all the soviets and increasingly began to 
act in their name. Because the soviets refused to send delegates to the Provisional Government, a 
dual power existed, the Provisional Government being the official state governing agency, and 
the organs of Ispolkom and the soviets, that followed their own legislative and executive 
directives.  
Nikolai, fearing that the events would lead to complete disintegration and Russia’s loss in 
the war, abdicated on March 2, 1917. Within a day, on March 3, Ispolkom ordered the arrest of 
the Tsar’s family. Thus in a matter of three days (February 28-March 3, 1917), the Tsarist 
regime, and with it the undisputable status quo for centuries, came to an end. Vasily Rozanov 
describes the general astonishment over the events in the following words:  
Russia wilted in two days. At the very most, three. Even [the newspaper] The New Times 
could not have been shut down as quickly as Russia shut down. It is amazing how she 
suddenly fell apart, all of her, down to particles, to pieces. Indeed, such an upheaval had 
never occurred before, not excluding the “Great Migration of Peoples.”…There was no 
Empire, no Church, no army, no working class. And what remained? Strange to say, 
literally nothing. The base masses remained.12 
 
                                                
12 Quoted in Richard Pipes, A Concise History of the Russian Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, A Division of 




On the day the Petrograd Soviet ordered the arrest of the Tsar’s family, Lenin returned 
from his exile and gave a speech in which he asserted that the bourgeois phase of the revolution 
could be accomplished in weeks and not years, and called for the radicalization of the events and 
an immediate transition to the socialist phase. While such a stance may have seemed delusional, 
as Sheila Fitzpatrick notes, the Bolsheviks’ radicalism may have been the best available 
strategies at the time:  
It may well be that the Bolsheviks’ greatest strength in 1917 was not strict party 
organization and discipline…but rather the party’s stance of intransigent radicalism on 
the extreme left of the political spectrum. While other socialists and liberal groups jostled 
in the Provisional Government and Petrograd Soviet, the Bolsheviks refused to be co-
opted and denounced the politics of coalition and compromise.13 
 
Their unified front and open hostility toward other parties helped them to foster a strong 
identity whereby they gradually became the only political entity in contradistinction to the tsarist 
regime, thus with time, the only apparent, organized alternative and heir to the regime.  
Between April and November, Lenin made several attempts to bring down the 
Provisional Government by inciting riots.  He carried out propaganda in the rear country and at 
the fronts and began to urge the Bolshevik leadership to armed insurrection.  
 During the night of October 24-25, forces of the Soviet’s Revolutionary Committee, 
meeting little resistance, successfully occupied key government institutions, the central railway 
and telegraph stations, and took over the Winter Palace, where the Provisional Government was 
holding a meeting.  The governmental functions formerly fulfilled by the Provisional 
Government were shifted to the Council of the Commissariat, all of whose members were from 
the Bolshevik party. Lenin became the head of the new government.   
                                                




The following examples can attest to the fact that violence (and the use of terror) was not 
only an inevitable byproduct of the events following the November coup in 1917, but was also 
systematically sought out as a preferred method of obtaining and securing power by the 
Bolsheviks.  
Shortly after the coup, the Bolsheviks dissolved the courts and the judiciary system, 
which resulted in the dismissal of legal professionals at large. It was not until 1922 that Lenin 
issued a Criminal Code. In the interim the Bolsheviks created an unprecedented situation where 
the country operated without legal system for nearly five years, thus with complete impunity in 
the hands of those who administered “justice.” During these years citizens were tried for crimes 
that were nowhere defined and issued penalties that, likewise, were not set by a norm, but 
entirely left up to whoever was in a position to dispense justice.   
In February 1918, Lenin issued a decree called “The Socialist Fatherland” which gave the 
Cheka, the party’s security police established in December 1917, unchecked license to kill. The 
decree sanctioned the creation of forced batallions at the front from members of the bourgeoisie, 
who were to dig trenches and support military operations, and who, if they resisted, could be shot 
on the spot. It called for the execution without trial of anyone suspected of being a speculator, a 
deserter, a German spy, a criminal, or if the person was a military officer and the assigned 
commissar, he could be executed at the slightest suspicion of not doing his jobs as expected. 
The Bolsheviks’ desire to seize power by all means and on their own terms manifested 
itself from the outset in their uncompromising attitude toward the various factions of the liberal 




reforms. This struggle played a direct role in the outbreak of the Civil War that lasted from 1917-
1921.  
Sheila Fitzpatrick argues that the experience of the Civil War (1917-22) played a critical 
role, even larger than did ideology, in creating the culture of coercion and terror that later 
became a dominant characteristic of the Bolsheviks leadership. It was during these years that the 
foundations of the Bolshevik government were established; thus, these foundations inevitably 
reflected a militant outlook and militaristic traits. She states: “[T]he Civil War experience 
militarized the revolutionary political culture of the Bolshevik movement, leaving a heritage that 
included readiness to resort to coercion, rule by administrative fiat (administrirovanie), 
centralized administration [and] summary justice.”14 Both Fitzpatrick and Pipes agree that while 
terror was rampant in areas controlled by the Whites--who similarly executed, forcefully 
recruited, requisitioned--it was nothing like the terror of the Bolsheviks. Fitzpatrick echoes 
Pipes’ assertion when saying:  
[T]he Bolsheviks were forthright about their own use of terror (which implies not only 
summary justice but also random punishment, unrelated to individual guilt, whose 
purpose is the intimidation of a specific group or the population as a whole); and they 
took pride in being tough-minded about violence, avoiding the mealy-mouthed hypocrisy 
of the bourgeoisie and admitting that the rule of any class, including the proletariat, 
involves coercion of other classes.15  
 
It is commonly agreed that the Bolsheviks exploited the situation in service of advocating 
class warfare and eliminating their enemies. To enforce their objectives, the Bolsheviks held the 
families of Red Army officers as hostages. As I have mentioned, deserters were often executed, 
officers were often shot if they did not perform as expected, soldiers were shot if they failed to 
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carry out orders, or even complained about food shortages. Rape, looting, and forced 
conscriptions were all too common. In Fitzpatrick’s account “[a]ccording to Bolshevik figures 
for twenty provinces of European Russia in 1918 and the first half of 1919, at least 8,389 persons 
were shot without trials by the Cheka, and 87,000 arrested.”16 
The measures of terror introduced during the Civil War set a precedent for future 
practices and introduced into the collective conscience until then unprecedented practices of 
terror as the norm and accepted instrument of governing. At first acts of violence were directed 
at well-defined segments of society (i.e, the bourgeoisie, military deserters, German spies, and so 
on) but gradually the circle of targets became nearly all-encompassing and the punishment meted 
out increasingly erratic and not in proportion to the nature of the crime.  
A particular episode during the Civil War is especially worth exploring as it is indicative 
that the Bolsheviks’ resorted to the means of terror not only for the purpose of eliminating 
opposition but also for holding the entire nation in a grip of fear. This is the execution of the 
Tsar’s family. Their execution in July 1918 signaled a turning point in the use of terror; a point 
when terror ceased to serve the purpose of administering “justice” and became the ultimate 
method of ruling, a method above and beyond any need for justification. Terror on this level 
serves only one purpose: to organize a nation into a collective of individuals, each fearful for his 
own survival and incapable of solidarity with the other, for fear of not knowing when it will be 
his turn to go under and who will be the perpetrator. Trotsky’s explanation of the need to murder 
the Tsar’s family attests that the purpose of the application of terror was, by the summer of 1918, 
primarily no longer a judicial but an organizational matter. He recalls that the execution of the 
Tsar’s family  
                                                




was not only expedient but necessary. The severity of this punishment showed everyone 
that we would continue to fight mercilessly, stopping at nothing. The execution of the 
Tsar’s family was needed not only to frighten, horrify, and instill a send of hopelessness 
in the enemy but also to shake up our own ranks, to demonstrate that there was no 
retreating, that ahead lay either total victory or total doom.17 
 
This passage underlines the careful tactic behind the murder of the imperial family and the intent 
to ensure that not only those hostile to the party but also those within its own ranks would fear 
the leadership. The Tsar’s family did not pose any real political threat since they had no intention 
of returning to rule, nor had they been accused of any personal crime or faced public demand that 
they be prosecuted. Their murder was a significant departure from previously killings (even if at 
times committed randomly), which had focused on some type of enemies and therefore, to a 
degree, could be rhetorically justifiable. The killing of the Tsar’s family indicated a commitment 
to killing at all costs, regardless of the actual role of the individual in events. The fact that such a 
practice could be embraced and become the norm had an effect of displacing in the collective 
consciousness any possibility of orientation when making value judgments, which under normal 
circumstances would follow some form of mutually-agreed-upon and -observed ethical 
reasoning, in accordance with the laws. Random killing not only affects the victim whose life is 
in no causal relationship with the fate he earns, but also affects the society within which 
individuals are set against one another, forever fearing the worst without knowing, 
understanding, or being able to predict what is to happen to them.  As a result, ongoing fear of 
death becomes one of the underlying emotions of the individual, and all previous understanding 
of “reality” is questioned from the point of view of the victim and/or of the collective. Arendt 
highlights that the motivation behind inciting fear is to eliminate the capacity of the individual to 
act:  
                                                




under conditions of total terror not even fear can any longer serve as an advisor of how to 
behave, because terror chooses its victims without reference to individual actions or 
thoughts, exclusively in accordance with the [claimed] objective necessity of the natural 
or historic process. Under totalitarian conditions, fear probably is more widespread than 
ever before; but fear has lost its practical usefulness when actions are guided by it can no 
longer help to avoid the dangers one fears. 18 
 
Over the course of the Bolshevik revolution, violence became the general framework 
within which the world was perceived, orders were executed, and goals were framed.  It 
penetrated not only all levels of social encounter, but also the very core of identity formations of 
an emerging nation and of its citizens. While in the earlier state of the formation of the Bolshevik 
power, violence was used to eliminate segments of society and threaten enemies or perceived 
enemies, with time, violence in the form of terror became the essence of government and a 
crucial binding for an otherwise fragmented society.  
Following the gradual elimination of its perceived enemies, the Bolshevik party took to 
purging the liberal left, their former allies. The Party used an assassination attempt on Lenin in 
September 1918 by Fanni Kaplan, a Socialist Revolutionary, as an opportunity to eliminate 
Social Revolutionary Party members by arresting all members they could get their hands on. In a 
decree issued and authorized by Lenin, the party ordered that 
All Right SRs known to local soviets must be immediately arrested. It is necessary to take 
from among the bourgeoisie and officers numerous hostages. In the event of the least 
attempts at resistance or the least stir in White Guard Circles, resort must be had at once 
to mass executions…Not the slightest hesitation, not the slightest indecisiveness, in the 
application of mass terror.19 
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Pipes claims that Trotsky raised the issue of establishing concentration camps for the 
Bolsheviks’ enemies as early as mid-1918, and in August 1918 Lenin finally ordered the 
construction of the camps. By the end of 1923, Russia had 315 camps and 70,000 prisoners. The 
prisoners were to perform physical labor, which would cover the cost of the operation of these 
camps. 
An unfortunate byproduct of the atrocities committed by the Bolsheviks during the Civil 
War were the Jewish pogroms that served as an outlet for anti-Bolshevik resentments and a form 
of retaliation that became widespread during the civil war years in the European part of Russia. 
The resentment toward the Jewish population stemmed from the perceived association of the 
Jews with the Bolshevik regime which did have a relatively high number of Jews in its ranks. 
Numbers are hard to estimate, but Pipes suggests that the number of pogrom victims was 
somewhere between 50,000-100,000.20 
 The Bolsheviks’ consolidation of power and their victory in the Civil War came at an 
enormous human price. The effects of the war devastated the economy and destroyed the fabric 
of society. Shortages in food supply had begun to be felt as early as 1916 in the towns. The 
situation worsened as a result of the fighting in the Civil War and of the forced requisition of 
grains by Whites and Bolsheviks alike.  A famine of epic dimensions ensued, along with a 
cholera epidemic that cost an estimated 5 million lives between the years of 1918 and 1921.  
In an effort to cope with the challenges it faced, the party increased party discipline to 
limit any dissent within the party and began purging the non-Bolshevik members of the 
government. The Bolsheviks arrested thousands of Mensheviks, staged a trial in 1922 of 
                                                




prominent Socialist Revolutionaries, began their attacks on the clergy, and started to eliminate 
factions within the party. At the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921, Lenin approved a 
resolution “On Party Unity” that disbanded the existing factions, essentially outlawed further 
dissent.  
The ongoing liquidation, as Arendt claims, is “fitted into a historical process [proclaimed 
by party ideology] in which man only does or suffers what, according to immutable laws, is 
bound to happen anyway. As soon as the execution of the victims has been carried out, the 
‘prophecy’ becomes a retrospective alibi: nothing happened but what had already been 
predicted.”21 As a result, there is no remedy for the death of an individual who has been 
sacrificed on the altar of the highest goal of history. While, in retrospect, the pretext of historical 
necessity may seem an argument of causality, the fact that anything could happen regardless of 
one’s own actions, and that one could be penalized at any time for constantly shifting reasons 
and by parties that themselves were constantly under ongoing evaluation, introduced an 
unprecedented degree of unpredictability and thus incomprehensibility both in the political and 
social life of the individual. As the regime gradually isolates and eliminates factors that had 
contributed to the victim’s understanding of his/her life, it increasingly asserts a fictitious reality 
of ideology over the reality of the victim. This fictitious world need not be complex; on the 
contrary, the more simple it is, the more effective it is in winning over the masses. Arendt 
argues: 
What distinguishes the totalitarian leaders and dictators is rather the simple-minded, 
single-minded purposefulness with which they choose those elements from existing 
ideologies which are best fitted to become the fundaments of another, entirely fictitious 
world. [...] Their art consists in using, and at the same time transcending, the elements of 
reality, of verifiable experiences, in the chosen fiction, and in generalizing them into 
                                                




regions which then are definitely removed from all possible control by individual 
experience. With such generalizations, totalitarian propaganda establishes a world fit to 
compete with the real one, whose main handicap is that it is not logical, consistent, and 
organized.22  
 
Arendt’s passage highlights a very important trend in the sequence of events: not only has 
the nation been exposed to an ongoing assault of traumatic events, but over time, the collective 
perception of the events undergoes a thorough transformation as the worth of the individual 
becomes increasingly irrelevant and is gradually discarded in favor of the narrative provided by 
the ruling regime. This shift in perception affects the nature of trauma and the perception of one’s 
trauma by the individual and the collective. While during the pre-revolutionary years exposure to 
the front, hunger, and the violations of the Tsarist regime could still be interpreted collectively, 
that is, the individual’s experience was likely to be confirmed by his peers or shared in the 
collective consciousness --as the regime progressively took on a more authoritarian form, the 
individual’s experience increasingly came into conflict with the official propaganda. This 
conflict occurred not only because the individual person’s life was disposable on the stage of 
history, as the Bolsheviks claimed, but also because he/she had no way of defining himself or 
herself with the support of collective confirmation and understanding; his/her reality became 
irrelevant and was replaced by a reality he or she could not define or affect.  Pipes notes that the 
first year of Bolshevik rule 
left Russians not only cowed by the unprecedented application of largely random terror 
but thoroughly bewildered. Those who had lived through it experienced a complete 
reevaluation of all values: whatever had been good and rewarded was now evil and 
punished. The traditional values of faith in God, charity, tolerance, patriotism, and thrift 
were denounced by the new regime as unacceptable legacies of a doomed civilization. 
                                                




Killing and robbing, slander and lying were good if committed for the sake of the proper 
cause as defined by the new regime. Nothing made sense.23  
 
It is necessary to understand that that nature of trauma is radically different depending on 
whether it is experienced and validated by the collective, or whether, on the contrary, the 
victim’s experience is invalidated. This distinction is especially important when the question of 
healing is at stake.  Judith Herman, a clinician of trauma, describes the operations of the 
perpetrator of a crime in terms very similar to those used by Arendt and Pipes to characterize the 
Bolsheviks: 
[I]n order to escape accountability for his crimes, the perpetrator does everything in his 
power to promote forgetting. Secrecy and silence are the perpetrator’s first line of 
defense. If secrecy fails, the perpetrator attacks the credibility of the victim. If he cannot 
silence her absolutely, he tries to make sure no one listens. To this end, he marshals an 
impressive array of arguments, from the most blatant denial to the most sophisticated and 
elegant rationalization. After every atrocity one can expect to hear the same predictable 
apologies; it never happened, the victim lies, the victim exaggerates, the victim brought it 
upon herself, in any case it is time to forget the past and move on. The more powerful the 
perpetrator, the greater is his prerogative to name and define reality, and the more 
completely his arguments prevail. The perpetrator’s arguments prove irresistible when 
the bystander faces them in isolation.24  
 
Several of the strategies listed by Herman as ways in which an abuser gradually takes 
hold of the definition of the victim’s reality parallel the ways in which the Bolsheviks gained 
psychological control over much of the nation.  Arendt, in a different context yet in strikingly 
similar terms, asserts that the establishment of a totalitarian state can be considered accomplished 
when  
people have lost contact with their fellow men as well as the reality around them; for 
together with these contacts, men lose their capacity of both existence and thought. The 
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ideal subject of totalitarian rule is not the convinced Nazi or the convinced Communist, 
but people for whom the distinction between fact and fiction (i.e. reality of experience) 
and the distinction between true and false (i.e. the standards of thought) no longer exist.25 
 
Herman, when speaking of soldiers exposed to war traumas, states that “the strongest 
protection against overwhelming terror [in the trenches] was the degree of relatedness between 
the soldier, his immediate fighting unit, and their leader.”26 This bond is canceled out in 
totalitarian regimes, which in turn limits the available strategies for adjustment and possible 
healing.  
When considering Shklovsky’s and Kharms’s work, one must take into account the fact 
that these authors have been exposed to traumatic events, and, moreover, that the works treated 
in this dissertation were conceived during different phases of the establishment of the totalitarian 
state, therefore are reflective of different stages of personal isolation and degrees of control of 
the state over the collective consciousness. Shklovsky was exposed during the early years of his 
work (1916-1922) to World War I and Civil War-related traumas and to the inception of the 
totalitarian state, which to a degree were collective experiences. He witnessed the beginning of 
the reversal of the collective consciousness that had existed prior to the Bolshevik rule, and a 
gradual subjection of the collective consciousness to the official ideology. Despite the 
challenges, his work was still embedded in the collective effort of the Russian avant-garde and 
their critical counterpart, the Formalists. Even if, during the course of the late 1910s and early 
1920s, the pressure increased on him to conform, his connections to a past preceding the rule of 
the Bolsheviks and to a collective of intellectuals he identified with served as an antipode of 
references that could counter or coexist with the emerging Bolshevik ideology. Kharms, on the 
                                                
25 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 474. 
 




other hand, wrote during a time when the totalitarian state was fully established, meaning, he had 
no collective point of reference external to him that could validate him or that he could identify 
with. As a result, the need to create an alternative/substitute reality that reflected his system of 
beliefs was more immediate, but also more fictitious (or matter of personal imagination) as it had 
no chance for external or collective confirmation and validation. According to Herman, for an 
individual to heal from a traumatic encounter, “reliving [an experience] alone is not enough, 
unless it is integrated.”27 Shklovksy, to a degree, could count on the support of fellow Formalists 
(and contemporaries) and had a few years (1917-23) that paralleled the establishment of the 
totalitarian Bolshevik state, where he in his theoretical works could sustain a parallel dialogue 
with the regime. For Kharms such a level of integration of his experience in a form of collective 
endeavor was no longer possible. 
My exploration of these two authors’ work therefore provides an opportunity to examine 
two samples of survivor texts, each of which presents a possible conceptual framework and 
meaning-generation strategy that carries the imprint of the differing degrees language has been 
appropriated by the Bolshevik regime. 
I shall later return to the historical outline of events, when addressing the political context 
in which Kharms was embedded. For now, in brief, I shall only mention that the purges that 
began with the Red Terror in 1918 continued in a series of events that took place in 1929, 1933-
34, 1935-36, and culminated in the Great Purges of 1937-8.  By the end of 1941 (the year of 
Kharms’ death) there was no question of any potential inhibition on the party leadership’s ability 
to act as it wished; the leadership was above any laws and its leader enjoyed complete impunity. 
The advent of World War II brought further suffering to a nation that had been subject to 
                                                




ongoing suffering for three and a half decades. Since events past the late 1930s are beyond the 
scope of this essay, it is sufficient to say that it took until Stalin’s death in 1953 for the regime to 
ease its terror and resort to other forms of governance. 
In light of all this, it is perhaps not an overstatement to contend that violence and its 
particular formation, terror, was a dominant feature of the nation’s history in the first decades of 
the 20th century. Millions perished between 1914 and 1939, and the losses in World War II added 
another 60 to 70 million to the number of casualties.28 Researchers estimate that the Russian 
army suffered an approximate 1.7 million deaths as result of the First World War, nearly 5 
million soldiers were wounded, and 2.5-3.5 million were missing or taken as POWs. These 
numbers do not include civilian casualties which were significant in their own right.  The 
Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War between 1917 and 1922 accrued, according to Richard 
Pipes, an estimated nine million deaths: five million due to famine, two million in combat, 
another two million as a result of epidemics. Many historians consider the famine a democide 
that the Bolshevik regime with their uncompromising and ill-driven policies inflicted on the 
people.  
The large numbers indicate that practically every family in the western part of Russia 
suffered losses in consequence of the wars, famine, terror and disease. Under such conditions, it 
can be expected that life was, for the most part, reduced to activities ensuring survival and all 
other priorities for the majority of people came second. Violence became part of life, which 
means that traumatic processing was an ongoing and primary mode of cognitive processing. A 
person’s experience with trauma shows similar features across individuals regardless of the types 
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of trauma inflicted.  However, I would argue that one’s perception of one’s trauma is affected 
and modified based on the degree to which the experience is collectively shared or not: that is, to 
what degree the individual has resources to validate his own experience, and to what degree (in 
Herman’s words) “an individual is able to make use of any opportunity for purposeful action in 
concert with others.”29 As Bolshevik rule progressed, while some forms of trauma were ongoing 
and recurring, the connection with others over time diminished and destroyed the fabric of the 
collective and society at large. Therefore, the scope of an individual’s search for the meaning of 
his trauma and for coping strategies became increasingly limited, and, I would suggest, gained an 











                                                




II. The Effects of Trauma on Cognitive Processing and Language Use 
 




Features of traumatic language use 
 
 Roman Jakobson, in his essay “The Futurian of Science“ recalls the years of revolution 
and Civil War up until his departure from Soviet Russia in 1920: “There was never any idyll, 
only battle, all the time. There were moments of break-throughs—for example, when parks in 
Moscow were painted in various colors on the occasion of May—but in general complexity one 
had to be constantly on the alert.”31 Jakobson is generally reluctant to speak of his feelings 
throughout his memoir, so the laconic quality of his recollection is no surprise. Yet, as terse as 
his sentence is, it reflects the overwhelming and predominant experience of war and an ever 
present state of alert.  
Judith Herman, in her seminal book Trauma and Recovery, describes the source and the 
underlying mechanisms of this state of being “constantly on the alert” as follows:  
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The ordinary human response to danger is a complex, integrated system of reactions, 
encompassing both body and mind. Threat initially arouses the sympathetic nervous 
system, causing the person in danger to feel adrenalin rush and go into a state of alert. 
Threat also concentrates a person’s attention on the immediate situation. In addition, 
threat may alter ordinary perceptions: people in danger are often able to disregard hunger, 
fatigue, or pain. Finally, threat evokes intense feelings of fear and anger. These changes 
in arousal, attention, perception, and emotion are normal, adaptive reactions. They 
mobilize the threatened person for strenuous action, either in battle or in flight.32  
 
There is a fine line between feeling threatened on occasions and perpetually. The longer the 
exposure to threat is, the more ingrained the state of alert becomes in the human system.  
Van der Kolk and McFarlane describe this state of “alert,” or as they call it 
“hyperarousal,” in the context of trauma in similar terms. The difference between being in a 
“state of alert” and in a perpetual state of alert or “hypervigilance” lies in the degree to which 
this mode of response is engrained, that is, in the ability or lack of ability to turn off the signals 
of threat. The authors describe the phenomenon thus:  
Perhaps the most distressing aspect of hyperarousal is the generalization of threat. The 
world increasingly becomes an unsafe place…Ordinarily, autonomic arousal serves the 
very important function of alerting people to pay attention to potentially important 
situations. However, for persons who are chronically hyperaroused, the autonomic 
nervous system loses that function…The persistent, irrelevant firing of warning signals 
causes physical sensations to lose their functions as signals of emotional states and, as a 
consequence, they stop serving as guides for action. Thus, like neutral environmental 
stimuli, normal physical sensations may take on a new and threatening significance. The 
person’s own physiology becomes a source of fear.33 
 
While it would be hard to establish from Jakobson’s passage to what degree the perpetual 
state of alert had an affect on the individual or the collective, the perpetuity as indicated by the 
author points toward the assumption that the sensation of threat was ongoing and so was the state 
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of hypervigilance. And if that is the case, there had to be an alteration in modes of perception 
that have significant bearing, as I later will point out, on  modes of cultural production and the 
construction of meaning. What a perpetual state of alert indicates is that the person, or here an 
entire nation, cannot function apart from the sensation of feeling threatened, so that every 
process in one’s life is marked and modified by this sensation. 
Traumatic experiences bear the mark of inescapability, some form of fatality that engulfs 
the individual in face of the prospect of annihilation. “Traumatic reactions occur,” asserts 
Herman, “when action is of no avail. When neither resistance nor escape is possible, the human 
system of self-defense becomes overwhelmed and disorganized. Each component of the ordinary 
response to danger, having lost its utility, tends to persist in an altered and exaggerated state long 
after the actual danger is over.”34  Trauma, in other words, happens on the threshold between the 
options of fight or flight, except that it is not a turning-point, or neutral point of the binary that 
would facilitate the transition from one to the other, and thus perhaps cannot even be considered 
a threshold that one can traverse, but rather an invisible and inconceivable obstacle one needs to 
transcend. There is no point of reference to trauma in ordinary life; trauma becomes a point of 
reference after the traumatic event. Therefore, trauma cannot be narrated, as it transcends the 
ordinary capacity of language that is based on some form of pre-established agreement between 
signifier and signified. This might be one of the reasons why van der Kolk refers to trauma as the 
“black hole.” In short, the inescapability of the exposure to the traumatic experience is coupled 
with a linguistic void or inability to process the event that accompanies the experience. 
                                                




 But let us return to the general sense of helplessness, as described by Herman, and the 
historical context. A similar sense of helplessness emerges from Shklovsky’s words when he 
recalls his experiences in the trenches of World War I:  
I waited for a miracle more than once. And the Bolsheviks believe in miracles. They even 
perform miracles, but miracles are hard to perform. You remember the folk tale about the 
devil who could make an old man young again? First he consumes the man in fire; then 
he restores him to life rejuvenated. Then the devil’s apprentice tries to perform the 
miracle. He’s able to consume the man in fire, but he cannot rejuvenate him. When the 
Bolsheviks left the front wide open [here Shklovsky refers to World War I and Trotsky’s 
refusal to sign the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the “no peace-no war” policy], they were hoping 
for a miracle, but the man consumed in fire didn’t rise from the dead…The miracle 
hadn’t come off and they [the Bolsheviks] realized it.35  
 
Shklovsky’s reference to “miracle” reflects the fundamental difference between the 
Bolsheviks, who were motivated by their ideology and faith in the world revolution--according 
to Shklovsky, a miracle in its own right--and the general sense of hopelessness amongst the 
soldiers and non-Bolsheviks at large, manifested in hoping that the situation at the front, as if by 
miracle, would be solved.  While the miracle did not happen--that is, the uprising of the workers 
in the enemy countries did not ensue--the progression of the revolution and its effects could no 
longer be stopped. The gesture of renouncing one’s agency and hoping for a miracle to resolve a 
situation that is perceived to be beyond one’s control itself testifies to the general sense of 
helplessness; the content or narrative of these survival fictions, however, tells just how desperate 
the people were.   
It seems that the greater the sense of helplessness, the more highly unlikely the rescue 
scenarios constructed in the minds of the helpless, and the further the possibilities of one’s 
agency or sense of presence are removed from the story. The following anecdote, which 
                                                




circulated and was believed in southern Ukraine at a time when it was apparent that the Whites 
were losing ground in the Civil War, testifies to this effect:  
It was said that the English had already landed in Baku a herd of apes trained in all the 
rules of warfare. The people who said this weren’t sick. It was said that you couldn’t 
propagandize these apes, that they went into battle completely without fear and that they 
would defeat the Bolsheviks. People held their hands about two feet off the ground to 
indicate the size of these apes. They said that Baku was taken, one of these apes was 
killed and it was buried with a band playing Scottish military music and the Scots cried. 
That’s because the instructors of the ape legions were Scottish.36  
 
The anecdote, if we accept at face value Shklovsky’s claim that it was widely believed as 
true, suggests a complete subversion of normal (or possible) and abnormal (impossible) to the 
point where even the abnormal (such as being rescued by the apes) can be considered likely, or 
take on the role traditionally performed by normal events. In fact, whether a thought is normal or 
not is nearly irrelevant; what matters is how the story serves its purpose of releasing fears and 
hopes. Not only can the “likely” no longer be differentiated from the “unlikely”—or,in the face 
of the traumatic events, the “unlikely” becomes “likely,” and what used to be considered “likely” 
“unlikely”--but also the attributes of speech lose their traditionally assigned significance.  
Traditional hierarchies built in speech, whereby facts gain value on the spectrum ranging 
from greater to lesser importance, is characteristically absent in the speech of traumatized 
individuals, in whose speech details become of equal importance. This is visible in the anecdote: 
for example, in the equal treatment of the English, the Scottish, the Bolsheviks and the apes in 
terms of agency and importance; or in the failure to distinguish between the less and more 
significant factors in the story (so that equal narrative significance is given to the small size of 
the apes and their heightened role in defeating the Bolsheviks); or in the mode of providing a 
                                                




detailed step-by-step narrative to the story without any climax or inner dynamics that would be 
characteristic of normal language use. The story begins with a protagonist, the ape, only to shift 
to a substitute protagonist, who will grieve over the loss of the unfilled potential of the ape that 
died and never had a chance to live up to expectations. Yet this is not a typical anti-climactic 
story, an intended farce. Indeed, the logic to the story is artificially restored when, despite the 
fact that the construct of the apes and their battle defies common sense, their passing elicits 
predictable human responses to death (crying) and appropriate action (the burial of the dead). 
The anecdote is highly illustrative of certain “abnormalities” in the processing of traumatic 
events, as well as of a modification in language use that occurs in the speech of traumatized 
individuals. While these abnormalities would be considered normal or even  mandatory in a 
satirical genre--that is, in fiction--they are completely out of place when taken in earnest, and 
show a high level of delusion and dissociation from the actuality of the events. 
As I have stated earlier, when humans enter a prolonged state of alert and search the 
environment for clues to survival and possible sources of threats, ordinary perceptions change. 
Under threat, there is a compulsion to give equal importance to each and every component of 
what is being perceived in a logical space, which results in a lack of ability to differentiate 
between pieces of information or to evaluate the significance of each according to their 
appropriate measures. As Shklovsky puts it: “[I]n this strange daily life,  as strong as the 
sculptured peaks of the Gaul, as long as the breadline, what was most strange of all was that we 
were equally interested in rolls and life. Everything that remained in the soul seemed of equal 
importance; all things were equal.”37  
                                                




The breakdown of overall structures of perception that had traditionally been upheld by 
distinct societal and personal values can be considered in parallel with (and is perhaps 
ontologically related to) the presence of a similar process in language, whereby the habitual 
connection between the signifier and the signified may be overwritten by the context of trauma, 
become disrupted, and take on a random connotation. Consider the following example told by 
Shklovsky: “One morning when I got up and opened the street door, something soft fell to the 
side. I stooped down and looked…Someone had left a dead baby at my door. I think it was a 
complaint.”38 As the example shows, the threshold between traditionally different semantic 
domains (of “baby,” a person, and “complaint,” which normally evokes a written paper or 
object) may collapse, and words gain value not based on intrinsic context, but depending on 
purpose of use (or functionality) which in this case renders a person (even if dead) and an object 
interchangeable. In this transformation the sign becomes void of symbolic meaning or reference 
beyond itself and the statement becomes a possibility of a fact that gains factuality by its sheer 
fact of actualization, which fact will only last as long as the actualization is in effect. The dead 
child becomes the means of communication between its Persian parents and the Russian officer, 
replacing whatever traditional or normative means had been established in the past. Under 
normal circumstances, a complaint would have been filed and (separately) the child’s body 
would have been given its due respect, but in this instance, it is the body that takes on the role of 
the notice of complaint. From a literary point of view, this exchange of values evokes an 
uncanny parallel with the Futurists’ endeavor to emancipate the word from its traditional 
connotations; it also resonates with the Formalists’ demotion of semantic content and 
accentuation of the word and larger literary devices in their theory of estrangement (ostranenie). 
The example, furthermore, highlights that when encountering trauma, silenced and/or silent 
                                                




language use (or communication through omission) may be more appropriate or easier for the 
survivor to resort to than language use that implies the need for verbal articulation. 
Another feature of traumatic language use (or of one’s verbal response to trauma) is the 
dominance of images, sensations and affective states over the presence of semantic and symbolic 
modes of narration. Van der Kolk notes in his essay “Dissociation and the Fragmentary Nature of 
Traumatic Memories” that “‘memories’ of the trauma tend to, at least initially, be predominantly 
experienced as fragments of the sensory components of the event: as visual images, olfactory, 
auditory, or kinesthetic sensations, or intense waves of feelings (which patients usually claim to 
be representations of elements of the original traumatic event.) What is intriguing is that patients 
consistently claim that their perceptions are exact representations of sensations at the time of the 
trauma.”39 There are several examples in Shklovsky’s memoir, The Sentimental Journey, where 
the leveling effect of trauma is visible on a semantic level along with an unusually high presence 
of sensory components in the narration of events.   
While the following stories were written sometime after the author’s exposure to 
traumatic experience, one is able to recognize the unusual presence of the sensory components 
the narrative is built upon, which is likely ontologically connected to the initial memory of the 
event broken into fragments of sensations. Shklovsky recounts: “I saw three more bodies, all laid 
out with their feet touching by someone following the Kurdish custom of using corpses as 
roadside decorations. On the face of one of the corpses, a cat was sitting, all bristled up, 
awkwardly gnawing at the cheeks with its small mouth…” I suggest that the explicit presence of 
three senses--sight (“I saw”), touch (“feet touching”), and taste (“gnawing)--and the implicit 
presence of hearing and smelling indirectly associated with the cat eating a dead human body, is 
                                                




an example of an account that has preserved the initial elements of sensory fragments but is in 
the process of gaining a narrative that is somewhere on the threshold between traumatic memory, 
with its dominant feature of images and sensations, and narrative memory, in which the event 
gains semantic and symbolic meaning.  
An additional feature of personal response to traumatic events, and thus of traumatic 
language use and narratives, is the element of dissociation. We have already seen examples of 
dissociation in Shklovsky’s accounts, where I highlighted the even rendering of all components 
of the events, manifested in the artificial decreasing of the significance of the traumatic 
components of the events (components that elicit pain), or ignoring of the significance of these 
components altogether. Dissociation is aimed at the compartmentalization of the experience, 
which is revealed in the absence of integration of the events that normally would evoke intense 
emotional response, which are left instead, as if bypassing their significance, as isolated 
fragments. Were these events given their due attention, the intense arousal they would elicit 
would severely inhibit the progression of the narrative, or even possibly cancel it out. Therefore 
these events are often lessened or even denied in narrative formations.  
In his account of his experience at the Western front in the Great War, Shklovsky recalls: 
“I ran into a friend here, he was killed in battle later the same day. I went on. The number of 
dead was small; the wounded kept streaming in, most of them ours, which meant that the enemy 
hadn’t been encircled yet. Right by the road, under a bush, lay a dead man; he lay still. Next to 
him, the soldiers were calmly having a breakfast of Austrian canned goods, setting the cans on 
the corpse.”40 The narrative conveys the presence of dissociation on numerous levels: first in 
Shklovsky’s reluctance to spend adequate time on the death of a friend, which he glances over as 
                                                




if it was insignificant and proceeds to ensure the progression of the text; second, in the account 
of the dead man, where he elaborates on a seemingly frivolously expanded explanation of the 
soldiers “calmly having breakfast of Austrian canned goods,” only to end the story brusquely 
with “setting the cans on the corpse.” The pain associated with the loss of the friend and of the 
travesty of human dignity is deliberately overlooked, its importance downplayed.  
As these stories testify, it is in the nature of a traumatic event to disrupt the normal 
framework of perception of events, or even of the world one lives in.  As a result, elements of 
experience otherwise ordered by custom and normal emotional response become distorted, de-
contextualized, and as if suspended from having function or meaning in a traditional sense. They 
acquire the function of signifier only in relation to the trauma, which modifies language use from 
intentional to non-intentional, meaning certain automatisms appear in language that are initiated 
by the person’s exposure to trauma rather than by the intent of the narrator. For example, if one 
were to tell a fairy tale that describes a cruel story, one would normally elaborate on certain 
parts, bestowing the event with symbolic or semantic meaning, expanding or condensing the 
content and the pace of the narrative, adapting it to the social context. When one gives an 
account of a traumatic event one has been exposed to, this is not the case. The components of the 
events become fixed, automatic to a degree; the connection between sign and meaning breaks 
down to the point that the sign may become completely void of meaning, or assigned a meaning 
that is random, and may become fixed (in its randomness) overtime.  The connective tissue that 
connects elements of speech and facilitates an internal logic of the event is removed, and an 
external logic is superimposed, the logic of “something inexplicable happened, therefore it is; 
what had been explicable, therefore is not.” The more prolonged the exposure to the trauma, the 




speech become from their initial semantic domain, and from their normative psychological 
motivations in speech. In fact, the psychological motivation for the act of speech appears in 
contrast to the act of speaking inasmuch as it is no longer about what is being told but about the 
intent or psychological motivation of the speech act. The connective tissue of the speech act that 
connects the speaker, the listener and the content breaks down as well as the connective tissue of 
the narrative (space, time, emotional attributes, inner logic, etc.), and the text becomes a 
collection of components unified under a mechanism set in place by the traumatic encounter.  
 
 
Possible roles of agency after the traumatic encounter 
 
  Over time, a sense of agency opens up to the survivor.  This is a long and arduous 
process, however, and is, for the most part, subject to the meaning imparted by survivors to their 
experience. Because of the abnormality of the experience of a traumatic event, survivors often 
register what happened to them at first in disbelief.  The fact that the event is in direct collision 
with past systems of beliefs calls for confirmation or validation of the survivor’s experience, and 
even of his sanity.  Shklovksy expresses this doubt and invites confirmation when he writes: “If 
you don’t believe that there was a revolution, go and put your hand in the wound. It’s wide. The 
pole was pierced by a three-inch shell.”41 He frequently comments, “I understood nothing.”42  
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In the midst of uncertainties and of the complete upheaval of previous paradigms of 
normative experience, math and science in general (which offers knowledge that is less 
dependent on semantics and emotion) seem to be the only domain that remains certain and 
untouched by the traumatic events. Shklovsky recalls: “And in the midst of this misery, which I 
didn’t understand, in the midst of the shells falling from the sky, as they fell one day along the 
Dnieper into a crowd of swimmers, it’s very reassuring to say calmly: ‘The larger the numerator, 
the larger the fraction, because that means there are more parts. The larger the denominator, the 
smaller the fraction, because it’s more finely sliced. That’s a sure thing. It’s the only sure thing I 
know...So I taught arithmetic. We had been given the job of blowing up the wooden bridge over 
a tributary of the Dnieper.”43  Math is reassuring because it is an area of knowledge that is 
constant and consistent in contrast with the senseless death of the swimmers or destruction of the 
bridge, examples which suggest unpredictability, mortality, and absence of ethics or regard for 
man and his accomplishments. The numeric values in math are unchallenged by events or 
emotions, they are simply elements of application that manifest their value when entering into 
relations. There is nothing extraneous to math, it is a self-contained system that generates 
knowledge base only by applications.  I suggest that the Formalists’ emphasis on device and 
method (or application of device) in their literary theory possibly appealed to Formalist scholars 
partly as an effort to distance themselves from the academic traditions of Russia, but also as 
result of the systematic destruction of any value other than non-semantic, non-symbolic 
functionality; that is, the function / application of the literary device.  
Shklovsky reminisces about the Formalist school during the years of the Civil War in 
those terms: “We worked from 1917-1922. We created a scientific school and rolled a rock up 
                                                




the mountain.”44 In another section of the memoir, when talking about Opoyaz, he mentions: 
“About Opoyaz. ‘Opoyaz’ means ‘The Society for the Study of Poetic Language.’ About 
something as clear to me as numerators and denominators. When you think, you get absent-
minded.”45 The semantic overlap between Shklovsky’s teaching fractions at the front and his 
scholarly work suggests an element of escape from reality in both activities. I would suggest that 
what they share is an element of dissociation, which would confirm that personal tragedies 
played a significant role in the shaping of the Formalist school and its preference for function 
(application of literary devices) over semantics. As much as modernity pushed artists and 
thinkers in the direction of the disintegration of meaning, the inability to narrate and integrate the 
traumatic memories inflicted by the war and Bolshevik terror, being a physiologically imposed 
limitation, would probably equal or outweigh in this instance the mental intent. In other words, 
when the individual is exposed to extreme forms of trauma the body’s response to the experience 
overrules conscious mental decisions. 
 One of the painful tasks of a survivor--having asserted and acknowledged that the event, 
which cannot be explained and could not have been anticipated, occurred--is to understand what 
role one played and plays in the event. Shklovsky, too, searches for answers and recognizes the 
limits of his importance both on the scale of Russian history and on a personal level: “I am sorry 
that no matter how hard I tried to direct the events, they went on their way. I’m sorry that I 
fought in Galicia, that I got mixed up with armored cars in Petersburg, that I fought along the 
Dnieper. I changed nothing…I’m thinking that I should have probably let the revolution go past 
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me…”46 In  a separate passage he gives an explanation of why he participated in the 
war,admitting: “I am guilty only of not having let life go past me like the weather; I am guilty of 
having had too little faith in miracles. There are men among us who wanted to finish the 
revolution on its second day. We didn’t believe in miracles. There are no miracles and faith alone 
doesn’t produce them.”47 He feels, not without reason, that he was no match for the events, 
though he did try to follow his convictions and make a difference. 
I would make the argument that generally speaking, one could have felt only a very 
limited sense of agency while coping with the onslaught of extreme events and circumstances, 
and that if one desired to maintain some form of agency, it had to be in direct correlation with the 
events, in areas where one could escape (“flee”) from events that were inescapable in a physical 
sense. The possibilities for agency were confined to the mental domain, and embedded in the 
state of alert that Jakobson speaks of.  Any possible form of escape had to ensure that the state of 
alert was maintained, as it was essential to survival to constantly observe and monitor events; 
and, at the same time, it had to master that compulsion to observe, and transform this state of 
alert—which by its overwhelming dominance of all other mental functions could be 
paralyzing—into a mode of action. Thus, the escape had to facilitate two contradictory motions: 
to be present (uphold a state of hypervigilance) and to be absent (freed from that, in other 
regards, debilitating state).  
Regarding the possibility for action in such circumstances, Shklovsky writes: “When you 
fall like a stone, you don’t need to think; when you think, you don’t need to fall. I confused the 
two occupations. The forces were external to me. The forces moving others were external to 
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them. I am only a falling stone. A stone that falls and can, at the same time, light a lantern to 
observe its own course.”48 The answer as to which path one is to take, in my view, is not so 
much a matter of confusion, but more a matter of one’s identity--one’s decision to primarily 
concern oneself with action, with thinking, or with the combination of both.  
The image of the falling stone recurs on several occasions in Shklovsky’s memoir as an 
image of a motion with no forward trajectory, a motion that is inhibited from moving forward by 
its own weight, a motion that is primarily ruled by gravity. This image of the author as a falling 
stone is often merged with the image of Russia as a falling rock, as, for example, in the following 
passage: “It is hard to say what distinguished 1921 from 1918 and 1919. During the first years of 
the revolution, there was no normal life in any sense, unless you consider a storm normal. There 
wasn’t a man alive who didn’t experience periods of belief in the revolution. For whole minutes, 
you would believe in the Bolsheviks…But the weight of the world’s habits was drawing to earth 
the rock of life thrown horizontally by the revolution. The flight was turning into a fall.”49 
Shklovsky sees an alignment between the life of an individual and the events in which his life is 
embedded. When he says that he had the options of falling (participating in the events), thinking 
(extracting himself from the events), or falling and thinking, which he did, he speaks of a person-
-more precisely, of the position of an intellectual--who attempted to do both, fall and reflect. 
When he sees himself as “[a] stone that falls and can, at the same time, light a lantern to observe 
its own course,” he not only speaks on behalf of the general situation of the intelligentsia, but 
also points to the only existing mode of response that may afford a sense of control; that is, the 
ability to observe and record in the mind, or in other words, the ability to assign meaning to 
                                                
48 Shklovsky, A Sentimental Journey, 133. 
 




one’s life even amidst the cataclysmic events that envelop and direct the motion of the very same 
life. It is not possible to decide whether this heightened mode of awareness of one’s falling and 
constant mental processing of events is a manifestation of the state of alert or hypervigilance 
induced by the traumatic events, or if it represents, on the contrary, an escape from events. 
Perhaps it is both.  
 It can be thus established that the direct experience of war elicits a heightened state of 
alert and a compulsion to observe, to channel one’s attention to the sphere of cognitive 
processes.  While it would be hard to equate the experience of war and revolution with that of the 
Holocaust, it is worth mentioning that heightened mental activity is also characteristic of the 
accounts of Holocaust survivors. Primo Levi recalls: “[F]or me thinking and observing were 
survival factors…although in my opinion sheer luck prevailed. I remember having lived in my 
Auschwitz year in a condition of exceptional spiritedness. I don’t know if this depended on my 
professional background, or an unsuspected stamina, or on sound instinct. I never stopped 
recording the world and people around me, so much that I still have an unbelievably detailed 
image of them. I had an intense wish to understand. I was constantly pervaded by…the curiosity 
of the naturalist who finds himself transplanted into an environment that is monstrous but new, 
monstrously new.”50 Levi’s recollection is very similar to Jakobson’s description of the general 
state of alert, and to Shklovksy’s image of the falling stone recording its own fall. Whether this 
compulsion to observe is conscious or instinctual, it can be established that under stress there is 
an upsurge of mental activity, and that most of the person’s resources are mobilized and 
channeled towards a cognitive presence/particular mode of observation over neutral interaction 
with the environment. In fact, observation becomes the primary mode of interaction with one’s 
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environment and the only way an individual feels he or she can assert some form of control over 
the events. 
 
Dissociation and content formation in trauma narratives 
 
 It may be assumed that the ongoing state of alert and compulsion to record would 
generate an unusually high amount of information that would, in turn, create a narrative around 
what is being observed. There have been scores of memoirs written about traumatic experiences 
in different contexts, but it is important not to ignore the fact that these testimonies were written 
much later, when the traumatic memories had begun to lose their intensity and yield to narrative 
processing. Thus the truth value of what was being observed emerges only with time, and is 
characteristically absent at the moment of exposure to trauma. As  Cathy Caruth points out, “the 
attempt to understand trauma brings one repeatedly to this peculiar paradox: that in trauma the 
greatest confrontation with reality may also occur as an absolute numbing to it; that immediacy, 
paradoxically enough, may take a form of belatedness.”51 Thus a person who has been exposed 
to trauma need not speak of trauma to show signs of traumatic exposure; trauma, though it may 
manifest itself in the content of thought, is primarily an alteration in the functioning of the 
human system. In fact, it is generally recognized that people often would rather not speak of 
trauma; this phenomenon itself, in the context of trauma (that is, under confirmed personal or 
cultural exposure to a traumatic event or series of events), can itself be a sign of traumatic 
numbing. 
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Freud mentions, “I am not aware…that the patients suffering from traumatic neurosis are 
much occupied in their waking lives with memories of their accident. Perhaps they are more 
concerned with not thinking about it.”52 Thus detachment, suspension of judgment or value 
systems, presence of analgesia, lack of emotional engagement, depersonalization, de-realization, 
and other aspects of constriction in a narrative, which attest to the reluctance of speaking or 
thinking about a traumatic event, bear more signs of trauma than do coherent, logical narratives 
that describe in expressive detail the traumatic experience. 
 This heightened desire to see or record in the mind is accompanied by an equally strong 
desire to speak or write, but it shall be noted again that the function of speech and writing, like 
that of thinking, at least in the beginning (that is, while being exposed to a traumatic event or 
shortly thereafter), is more motivated by the need to respond to a stimulus triggered by the 
traumatic encounter rather than to speak of the trauma.  Speaking or writing is, therefore, often 
associated with a form of survival in a physiological as well as a spiritual sense. When 
Shklovsky reflects on his period of silence between writing parts of his memoir, he likens silence 
to death by saying: “It has been a long time since I’ve written so much. It’s as if I were getting 
ready to die.”53 On another occasion, he recalls his return to Petersburg and first impressions of 
the city: “[T]he way the city had grown quiet. Like after an explosion, when it’s all over, when 
everything’s blown up. Like a man whose insides have been torn out by an explosion, but he 
keeps on talking. Imagine a group of such men. They sit and talk. What else are they to do—
howl?”54 While this passage serves as a metaphor to convey Shklovsky’s impressions of the city, 
it also bespeaks the compulsion to continue speaking that lives on amidst the silence marked by 
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the presence of death. The image conveys a sense of inner compulsion, an almost instinctive 
desire to continue writing and speaking to ensure one’s survival and go on with life, and there is 
an additional element in the second image of speaking despite the circumstances which 
resembles a form of dissociation from the pain. The men who speak despite the fact that their 
guts have been torn out by an explosion are men who speak as if the event had not happened, as 
if they did not feel the pain. It is indeed, if we part from the metaphoric level of the image, hard 
to speak while in pain; the best one can do is to split off the traumatic event from the 
consciousness, if one is to be able to continue to speak, that is, to survive.  The line, “What else 
are they to do—howl?” illustrates what survivors often recall: a sense of inhibition, a feeling that 
one’s experience is somewhat inappropriate to tell, or that the experience is far outside the 
normal and may not be believed or received empathetically.  
Shklovsky on another occasion refers to this dilemma of the survivor: “And as for me, I 
can’t make out of all the strange things I’ve seen in Russia. Is it good to trouble my heart and tell 
what happened? And to judge without calling witnesses. I can speak only for myself, and then 
not everything.”55 What is perplexing in this passage is the fact that even if traumatic events are 
widely shared and experienced collectively, it seems that on the level of coping the individual is 
left to his or her own devices, and that the awareness of cultural trauma still registers as a form of 
personal trauma that must be processed individually, which underscores that no cultural 
phenomenon can be addressed without considering the personal component of the event. 
Shklovsky, in this passage as well as in the previous image, reflects on the inability to speak of 
most painful experiences, even in passing.  Survivors of trauma, indeed, often block the event 
from their memory and show signs of dissociation and even amnesia. Shklovsky’s fictitious 
                                                




image of men who continue speaking despite their intestines being torn out of their stomachs 
echoes classic medical descriptions of dissociation.  
One of the reasons why survivors “choose” to dissociate from the pain of the traumatic 
experience is that they are at the same time compelled to relive it in violent flashbacks; they are 
haunted by the experience and cannot contain and integrate it—so by dissociating from the 
event, they try to block intrusive memories of the event. Van der Kolk, in his essay “Trauma and 
Memory,” points out that traumatic memories differ from natural memories in the sense that they 
cannot be integrated, assimilated into memory, and therefore they do not disintegrate over time. 
Quoting Pierre Janet, van der Kolk says that “memory traces of the trauma linger as what [Janet] 
called ‘unconscious fixed ideas,’ which cannot be ‘liquidated’ as long as they have not been 
translated into a personal narrative.”56 Studies suggest, van der Kolk continues, that “what may 
most complicate the capacity to communicate about traumatic experiences is that memories of 
trauma may have no verbal (explicit) component whatsoever. Instead, the memories may have 
been organized on an implicit or perceptual level, without any accompanying narrative about 
what happened.”57 I am not sure why traumatic events cannot be registered verbally: whether it is 
because they are outside of normal linguistically decodable events and so surpass the 
potentialities of language, or simply because the stress that the event induced breaks down 
certain cognitive mechanisms, such as language formation or lingual processing. In either case, 
Van der Kolk’s remarks highlight for the purpose of my argument the general inability to form a 
“verbal” narrative around the traumatic event, to create a coherent and cohesive story that can be 
told, heard, internalized, stored and gradually phased out like ordinary memory narratives, which 
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dissolve over time. Shklovsky’s image of the men talking after the explosion ripped their guts 
apart does reflect in a miniature form the split between the pictorial and verbal component of the 
event: the pictorial describing the traumatic event (the explosion and the guts) and the non-
pictorial--or even counter-pictorial--fact of the men continuing to talk. What is interesting is not 
so much how the sentence is formed, but the fact that the pain of the trauma is likened to an 
event that is perceived pictorially, that is, non-verbally, whereas the theme of survival is linked 
to the continuum of speech, that is, to the continuous formation of the narrative. This, I assume, 
is not a conscious choice, but confirms van der Kolk’s assumption that traumatic experiences are 
primarily registered as visual or sensory perceptions.  
The image of the men talking while their insides are being torn out parallels Shklovsky’s 
experience of an explosion of a bomb in his hands that caused severe physical injuries, including 
some to his stomach. It is a remarkable fact, though not accidental, that Shklovsky began writing 
his memoir in the hospital while not sure of his own survival. As he describes the event: “I was 
lying in an infirmary. Some syphilitic was dying in the corner. It was a good infirmary and while 
I was there, I started to write the first book of my memoirs, Revolution and the Front.”58 The 
nonchalant and seemingly neutral juxtaposition of the components of the situation when recalled, 
as in the case of the anecdote of the apes coming to rescue Russia, is characteristic of survivor 
texts. Just as Levi mentioned his compulsion to observe and catalogue all components of the 
event as if he were a scientist paying attention to the minutest details, Shklovsky, too, exhibits 
this characteristic of listing narrative elements as if they had equal weight in the story, and 
certainly as if there was an absence of climax to the story, and absence of an inner constructive 
principle.  
                                                




The following passage demonstrates this modification in perception, as recalled by 
Shklovsky, of a starving man, “A man can find in his situation all kinds of nuances…And when 
a man’s starving, he lives that way—continually fretting, wondering which is tastier, boiled 
greens or linden leaves. He even gets excited about these problems and, gradually becoming 
immersed in such nuances, he dies.”59 This leveling of information, I believe, is rooted in many 
factors, such as the fact that under extreme circumstances the mind must regard everything as 
being of equal importance, for as Jakobson recalls, the mind is screening the world for possible 
clues that could at any time be central to survival. I would also argue that the traumatic 
experience destroys former semantic orderings or inner organizational principles, the lack of 
which results in an inability to differentiate between the values of parts of speech.  
As abnormal as it may seem under duress, it is apparent that mental processing of the 
traumatic event (and the act of speaking and/or writing that facilitates the mental processing) is 
essential to survival and serves several purposes. It upholds a perpetual readiness to counter any 
possible threat (see Jakobson’s reminiscence), it can channel a person away from the event, 
facilitate numbing and dissociation (as recalled by Shklovsky), and it can, at the same time, 
continue to rehearse unsuccessful efforts to integrate or “understand,” and thus diminish, the 
effect of the event on the human psyche.  The examples I have quoted bespeak an urgent need to 
speak as well as an inability to speak effectively of the content of the trauma. This inner conflict 
is partly due to the fact that some of these motivations cancel each other out when they are 
simultaneously present: i.e., the desire to relive the experience and the desire to block the event 
may be present simultaneously, but have opposing aims so they paralyze the cognitive 
processing. The same can be said of the desire to record, and the desire to numb one’s perception 
                                                




of the event, when these exist concurrently. Given these features of cognitive processing (and 
this list is far from being exhaustive), when speaking of trauma on a cultural scale, it seems that 
understanding the peculiarities of language use of speakers affected by trauma is paramount to 
understanding how trauma on a cultural level becomes encoded in verbal cultural products, most 
notably in literary language use. I shall return to this topic in a later chapter; for now it is 
important to say that all of these features of language use will occupy a  dominant position in 
both Shklovsky’s and Kharms’s theoretical and poetic language use. 
 
On the role of application 
 
When language use is disturbed, i.e. when it is motivated not by what can but by what 
cannot be said, the primary function of communication-- the motivation to convey content--goes 
missing, gets misplaced or disabled, and another form or application will take a dominant role: 
that of not speaking about, or of speaking despite, the traumatic experience. Shklovsky illustrates 
this particular dislocation of content in an anecdote that refers to the years of the Civil War and 
records a conversation he had with people at the front about their allegiance: “[I]f we had been 
asked…’Who are you for—Kaledin, Kornilov or the Bolsheviks?,’…I would have chosen the 
Bolsheviks. However in a certain comedy, the harlequin was asked, ‘Do you prefer to be hanged 
or quartered?’ He answered, ‘I prefer soup.’”60  
As the anecdote illustrates, the speech of individuals who are exposed to threat of 
annihilation becomes modified: the communicative function or desire to convey truth, or content, 
                                                




can become secondary and/or subordinate to the function of ensuring immediate survival. In 
other words, language-­‐-­‐whose primary function is to exchange information, to communicate 
content, to facilitate understanding and connect the individual to the collective--turns as if inside 
out, and can become a protective shield (to use Freud’s terminology), formed of and aiming at 
intentional non-understanding, or at least withholding of content, limiting exposure. In such 
cases, content becomes external to the text and is replaced with context: that is, with the context 
of the traumatic situation. The message is understood not from what has been said but from how 
it has been said. While one can argue that language is always a method or means of 
communication, and that the context of communication is an important component of the overall 
effort of communication even under normal circumstances, I would make the argument that the 
function of the code that facilitates mutual understanding is altered when the trust between the 
addressee and the addresser breaks down. One need not literally distrust the addresser for, as the 
medical literature attests, a person who has been affected by trauma can continue to act or speak 
as if under threat, even when the threat is no longer present. It seems that under the conditions 
that call for the need to survive or else perish, an exaggerated focus on how something is said is a 
good indicator that the referential function of language has become secondary if not nonexistent, 
due to the fact that cognitive processing becomes highly personalized (as it is controlled by the 
trauma), and language use thereby becomes a primarily self-serving act. What is so fascinating, 
in my view, is that the language or speech of traumatized individuals bears strikingly similar 
characteristics to language that fulfills a poetic function. For if one compares both language uses, 
the languages of trauma and of poetry (especially of literature that gravitates away from 
“realism,” such as works of the Russian avant-garde) both deliver a design that can be 




referential function. In other words, the dominant or identifying feature of both literary and 
abnormal language use, like that which is affected by exposure to trauma, lies in the 
abnormalities (and artificiality) rather than the normality of its elements.  
 The previous examples testify to an altered function of language as well as to 
modifications in language composition. One of the key alterations in language use is, as I have 
demonstrated, the overall presence of trauma which becomes the key defining context of 
language use. The language act (speech and writing) betrays the inability to speak of a trauma. It 
can serve as an escape from the traumatic memories or as a means of externalizing the 
compulsion to record. It can assert the continuation of one’s existence as it provides for a 
possibility of action, a sense of movement (in a mental domain) that is impossible in the 
physically limiting realities of the individual.  Everything is implemented in the service of 
survival, which is why modes of application (how language use is implemented) take over the 
importance of referential value. 
Consider, for example, the following incident described by Shklovsky:  
After the explosion, our soldiers, surrounded by enemies, were waiting for a train to 
come for them; while waiting, they busied themselves by picking up and putting together 
the shattered pieces of their comrades’ bodies. They picked up pieces for a long time. 
Naturally, some of the pieces got mixed up. One officer went up to the long row of 
corpses. The last body had been put together out of the leftover pieces. It had the torso of 
a large man. Someone had added a small head; on the chest were small arms of different 
sizes, both left. The officer looked for a rather long time; then sat on the ground and burst 
out laughing…laughing…laughing. In Tiflis—I’m returning to my trip—a crime was 
committed…61  
 
What happens in this incident is that the men are blown to pieces and the soldiers out of 
habit, or a sense of decency or duty, begin to assemble the bodies. As they proceed, they 
                                                




misplace the body parts, but in the end, everyone, of course, has the necessary components, 
though not the parts that had belonged to them when alive. Amidst the variations, the only thing 
that is certain is the function of the body parts: hands are hands, feet are feet,; their attributes 
(whom they belonged to, whether they are left or right), as tragic as it may be, becomes 
secondary or even random. This is not the norm, of course, but rather an illustration of how 
barren under such circumstances options for action are, and how all is subordinated to the most 
fundamental laws and is void of semantics, or content. These dead bodies exist only by virtue of 
combination. It is the combination, the form these body parts are arranged in (not the content, 
which would prohibit the application of two left hands when assembling a human body) that 
creates a unit. It is understandable that having exposed to an experience as this, Shklovsky would 
prefer a language use, i.e., of mathematics, where values only gain significance in their 
application.   
The heightened role of application (knowing how to say something) in everyday 
operations results, understandably, in the elevated role of organizational principles and their 
modus vivendi (or method in short) both in everyday and in theoretical language use. This, I 
would say, implies not only the role of method that one needs to take into account when 
exploring the inner workings of the works of Shklovsky or Kharms and of the avant-garde artists 
in general, but also the need to prioritize an understanding of what role a text plays in traumatic 
processing (what it does), as opposed to what it says of the traumatic event.  
There are several examples throughout Shklovsky’s memoir that illustrate the heightened 
importance of how language is applied when a speaker is under extenuating, possible fatal 
circumstances. Shklovsky reflects on his encounter with a Jewish boy who survived the anti-




look at corn without trembling. He told me this: When killing was going on in the Ukraine, it 
was frequently necessary to check whether the person being killed was a Jew. They would tell 
him, ‘Say ‘kukuruza.’ The Jew would say ‘kukuruzha.’ He was killed.”62 This story underscores 
the previous example of how non-referentiality (a deliberate use of language for the purpose of 
not-revealing some critical information), here manifested in the desired elimination of the Jewish 
“zh” from a Jewish person’s speech) may be essential to survival, and how mediated language 
use becomes when context and abnormal language use (saying “z” instead of “zh”) overrides 
content and normal or ordinary language use of the Jews (approaching the matter from the 
Jewish boy’s perspective). Furthermore, the story confirms Jakobson’s contention that under 
critical circumstances paying attention to the slightest details-- here, to the phonemes of speech--
is imperative. It is important to note that, as the examples suggest, non-referentiality is both 
willed and unconscious. Willed to the extent that it is safer, when the objective is to survive, to 
void what is being said of any possible incriminating meaning or content (the less marked 
content is, the better it is), as is shown in the example; and unconscious to the extent that speech 
is voided of the content of the traumatic event for, as I have pointed out, traumatic events resist 
narrative formations. The real tragedy of this story highlights that it is not a matter of knowing 
what to say but the inability to apply language use properly, that is as needed, that resulted in the 
death of the Jew. When incidents like this can happen, they confirm to the speakers that there are 
no inherent values in the content of words other than the way in which they can be put to a 
purpose. 
In studying literary practices and personal language use during the years of the Bolshevik 
revolution and the Civil War, while acknowledging the preferred emphasis on application and 
                                                




the various ways in which language is organized to fulfill what it is intended to accomplish,  one 
cannot take at face value the imbalance between the primacy of context and the indifference to 
content. In fact, it may be argued that a reversal needs to take place: that is, the silent component 
needs to be excavated, and the loud, obvious component toned down, if one is to understand not 
only the intent but also the main motivation behind these speech acts.  
 The language use of the survivors, which was predominantly non-referential and 
deployed in the service of survival, and thus had primarily an organizational quality for the self, 
had parallel features with the language use of the Bolshevik regime. The use of language as a 
method of organization was widely established by the Bolsheviks, who themselves were likely 
unsure of their own political survival in the early years of their regime. Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, which supplied language with ready-made formulas and an appearance of scientific 
infallibility, provided an effective weapon of organization. As Shklovsky noted, the strength of 
the Bolsheviks was that their message was definite and simple. Arendt comments on the 
utilitarian role of such language use for a regime, saying “the true goal of propaganda is not 
persuasion but organization.”63 She links the scientific use of language to the traditions of 
nineteenth-century systems of thought, such as positivism, pragmatism and behaviorism, but also 
notes that such language has a very strong appeal to the psychological needs of the masses: 
The language of prophetic scientificality corresponded to the needs of masses who had 
lost their home in the world and now were prepared to be reintegrated into eternal, all-
dominating forces which by themselves would bear man, the swimmer on the waves of 
adversity, to the shores of safety…For the masses…want victory and success as such, in 
their most abstract form…More important to them than the cause that may be victorious, 
or the particular enterprise that may be success, is the victory of no matter what cause, 
                                                




and success in no matter what enterprise…They do not believe in anything visible, in the 
reality of their own experience; they do not trust their eyes and ears but only their 
imaginations, which may be caught by anything that is at once universal and consistent in 
itself. What convinces the masses are not facts, and not even invented facts, but only the 
consistency of the system of which they are presumably part…What the masses refuse to 
recognize is the fortuitousness that pervades reality. They are predisposed to all 
ideologies because they explain facts as mere examples of laws and eliminate 
coincidences by inventing an all-embracing omnipotence which is supposed to be at the 
root of every accident. Totalitarian propaganda thrives on this escape from reality into 
fiction, from coincidence into consistency.64 
 
It is unlikely that Bolshevik propaganda appealed to all segments of society; as 
Shklovsky noted, not all had the same dream. Arendt’s passage, nevertheless, is very insightful 
regarding the overall desire of the masses to escape into an ideology that offers a chance of 
redemption from the anxieties triggered by unpredictable conditions and an overwhelming sense 
of threat or annihilation. To what degree the Bolsheviks used language intentionally for the 
purpose of establishing their rule over the masses, and, at the same time, were part of the very 
same masses--which swam on the waves of adversity, and sought victory of no matter what 
cause by embracing the ideology of Marxism or Bolshevism--is a question that could be 
interesting to explore, though very hard to measure. At some point the line becomes blurred 
between perpetrators and victims, especially when history reverses roles, and elevates the 
formerly powerless to complete power. As much as ideology (and thus, language) served as a 
means to effective strategy to survive in the external world, it could equally well have served the 
Bolsheviks as a self-organizational principle, facilitating inner survival.  
                                                




When contrasting the language use of a private person with that of the state, there seems 
to be an opposing movement: where private language use gravitates towards the minutest details 
or micro levels of language use as if searching for clues, laws amidst seemingly random 
variations that would enhance one’s survival or well-being, the official language moves towards 
a metanarrative, an artificially consistent construct. Both poles reflect a non-equilibrium, as 
private language use diminishes referential value for the sake of functional gains (i.e., staying 
hidden behind a language that is inexplicit of the real position of the speaker), and official 
language use devalues “abnormalities” for the sake of consistency. Fundamentally both are 
primarily concerned with optimal application (for purposes that transcend the content of speech) 




 It has often been argued that the decrease in the role of content in favor of function in 
speech acts is a sign of modernity and reflects the loss of a sense of certainty in the world.  It is 
often hard to determine to what extent the growing sense of helplessness and dislocation is a 
result of alienation and the disintegration of what once was considered a unifying world-view, or 
bears the imprint of the traumas that the individual faces in his or her life. I would argue, 
considering the examples listed in this section, that exposure to the severe forms of stress that the 
Great War, the Civil War and the Bolshevik terror brought on the Russian population took 
precedence over any abstract form of Weltschmerz. To be sure, modernist discourses are keenly 




that they seek to understand cultural responses primarily through this lens, this approach is 
similar to my efforts. However, the facts of perpetual exposure to a series of critical and 
traumatic events cannot be discarded in favor of an argument that asserts the connection of the 
Russian avant-garde with modernity in the abstract, even if there is little or no mention of 
traumatic experience in the actual works. Shklovsky’s memoir is a wonderful example of a text 
that, perhaps because it was not intended to be a theoretical text, reveals more of the motivations 
of the author than does his theoretical work. It establishes that language use was fundamentally 
affected by exposure to traumatic events.  For this reason, any literary study of the epoch cannot 
ignore the fact that even prior to modernist literary experiments, speech and writing bore traits of 
“abnormalities” that supplied “ready-made” elements and structures for literary use, and, in the 
case of theoretical writings, heightened a particular type of sensitivity in literary analysis.  
Under the exposure to perpetual threat which was felt during the years of the Great War, 
the Bolshevik revolution, the Civil War, the famine and the epidemics, the needs of the masses 
and the needs of the intelligentsia, and even the needs of the Bolsheviks, presumably overlapped 
inasmuch as each was motivated to ensure its own survival; the only difference perhaps lay in the 
ways the need for survival was satisfied. According to Arendt, the masses channel their fears of 
annihilation into an ideology that satisfies their “primordial” need for escape from their 
conditions. Shklovsky and Arendt seem to agree that the masses lack agency and are directed by, 
as opposed to leading, events. Both Sheila Fitzpatrick and Richard Pipes suggest that the 
Bolsheviks channeled their anxieties into unchecked terror and aggression, which in turn became 
central to their own survival and identity formations. As far as the intelligentsia is concerned, 
while it is impossible to speak for everyone, I would argue that Shklovsky and the school he 




the course of events, as did the masses, yet nor did they align themselves with the Bolsheviks, 
the key actors on the stage of history. They internalized the events and because of their 
professional disposition, they turned them into an artifact.  What makes it interesting to study the 
writings of the Formalists, and of Shklovsky especially, is that they managed to transcend a 
paralyzing situation, marked by the impossibility of either fleeing (removing oneself from the 
course of events) or fighting  (countering the influx of traumatic events). This they did by 
creating a mental construct that was receptive of the underlying mechanisms of their time, and at 
the same time, could extract and compartmentalize the reality component, namely, the 
overwhelming presence of trauma in one’s life. As the excerpts from Shklovsky’s memoir show, 
the psychological disposition of survivors were more or less typical in a sense that survivors of 
trauma bore the signs of traumatic experience, but it took an exceptional intellect like 
Shklovsky’s to transform a traumatic event into a meaningful one. In between the compulsion to 
record and repeat and the inability to speak of an event, on the threshold of the no-man’s-land 
termed “black hole” by van der Kolk, a literary theory was born that bore signs of traumatic 
symptoms: the compulsion to record the slightest details and bestow them with significance not 
in terms of their semantic content, but in terms of their contextual significance; recognition of 
abnormalities in language use and interest in the organizational principles behind these 
abnormalities; and, overall, an interest in the organizing principle as opposed to the content of 









Cultural Context: On the Competing Legacies of Modernity, Soviet Marxism, and 
Traumatic Conditioning 
 
I. Modernism: Its Conceptual Challenges and Language Experiments 
 
 
When speaking of the literary and linguistic accomplishments of Shklovsky and in 
general of the theorists of Russian Formalism, it is essential to acknowledge the influence of 
Russian and European modernism on the writers of the school.  At the same time, because the 
language use of survivors can be strikingly similar to modernist features of speech, it is also 
important to delineate as closely as possible the domain of the influence of modernism and the 
impact of traumatic encounter.  
Of all the Russian avant-garde schools it was Futurism (and to a degree Cubism) that 
exerted the largest influence on the formation of the Formalist school and on Shklovsky’s 
theoretical position. Futurism preceded the formation of the Formalist school by about four 
years, so the movement’s early years predate World War I. However, it developed over the years 
in ongoing dialogue with the revolution, until the Bolsheviks solidified their rule and bore down 
in the mid-1920s on avant-garde schools and their experiments.  The relationship between 
Formalism and Futurism was mutually fertile; the arts played an essential role in the 
development of Formalism, and conversely, the Futurists were deeply interested in Formalist 
studies of literature. In fact, theory and literature grew equivalent to each other to an 




members of Formalist circles, refer to themselves as Futurists and not as Formalists (a term 
coined by the school’s critics). Jakobson calls his creative years prior to his departure to the West 
in 1920 “my Futurist years,” and Shklovsky in his essay collection Knight’s Move, written during 
1920-21, refers to himself as “a man who wears under his tunic the yellow flag of the 
Futurists.”65  
Futurism began as a poetic movement that in the beginning focused primarily on the 
“word” and its functions in poetry. Jakobson notes:  
This was a time when readers gravitated almost exclusively toward poetry. If anyone 
from our wider circle of acquaintance had asked what is happening in Russian literature, 
there would have been references to the Symbolists, especially Blok and Belyj, partly, 
perhaps, to Annenskij or to those poets who followed the Symbolists, but no one would 
hardly have recalled Gor’kij; his work seemed already completed by 1905.66  
 
 
With time, however, the importance of poetry among the liberal left receded, and I believe, was 
put to an end on the eve of Majakovsky’s suicide in 1931. Mayakovsky’s death not only 
indicated an end of the life of a great poet and a movement, but also of the poetic sentiment in 
general. Mayakovsky himself was aware of this coincidence when he declared shortly before his 
death that “poetry was done for.”67 During the 1930s prose took precedence.  
There could be many reasons for this change. One explanation is that this was a logical 
byproduct of the shift in the focus of the artistic experiments of the avant-garde, which initially 
concerned themselves with the object (in literature, its equivalent, the word) and only gradually 
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became interested in building a system or method. So interest in poetry reflected a preoccupation 
with literary material and units, whereas prose was more concerned with function and syntax. 
Indeed,  
By the 1920s, a shift from poetry to prose is visible both in literature and in the focus of 
the Formalists, who began to broaden the scope of their investigations from the elements of 
poetic speech to the special ways in which these elements are used. This exploration inevitably 
brought along, or was driven by, a need to create a narrative, to see these elements in the context 
of their ongoing change and interrelatedness and to establish laws that operate these elements in 
literary language. 
Shklovsky’s work on the theory of plot and the theory of novel in the late 1910s indicates 
this shift from the study of literary elements (words, phonemes) to compositional concepts 
(structural devices such as parallels, estrangement, etc.). When talking about narrative, I must 
take note of the fact that the word may be misleading, as my intention is not to talk about the 
emergence of content (as conveyed by a narrative) so much as of a narrative that unfolds as the 
role and function of form in literary composition becomes more defined. Basically, for the 
Formalists, the concept of literature (or what separates literature from everyday speech) in the 
end coincides with the concept of form (that is, the fabric within which the differences between 
literary and everyday language manifest themselves). But inasmuch as the systemic nature of 
literary language needed to be articulated, we can talk about a narrative and the role of the 
narrative. The fact that the literary devices that primarily interested the Formalists, such as sound 
repetitions, tautology, tautological parallelism, deceleration, etc., were conceived of as 




narrative” was provided that established “literariness” as one common goal of all devices in the 
literary artifact.  
The preference for poetry over prose in the first post-revolutionary years can be attributed 
to the historical context, as Mayakovsky claims, and/or can be seen as a symptom of a natural 
course of evolution, whereby preoccupation with smaller units of speech in the outset gradually 
shifted to interest in larger units and, eventually, in a schematic model that could offer an 
explanation for the compositional laws that direct the literary text. The shift from poetry to prose 
indicates a change in modes of expression or aesthetics, or better said, an eventual replacement 
of one mode of expression (poetry) with another (prose). One way to illustrate this process of 
replacement is to consider that during this shift a primarily metaphoric mode of expression 
characteristic of poetry was replaced by a primarily metonymic mode of self-expression 
characteristic of prose. The metaphoric and metonymic modes are tendencies, meaning the 
dominance of one does not necessarily eliminate the other, but there is a visible orientation, or to 
use Jakobson’s expression, there is a dominant element in each.  
Jakobson defines the dominant as follows: “The dominant may be defined as the focusing 
component of a work of art: it rules, determines, and transforms the remaining components. It is 
the dominant which guarantees the integrity of the structure.”68 The dominant can be many 
things: it can be an element that dominates the entire structure of a composition, it can be a set of 
norms dominating a poetic school, it can be the dominant art form in a given epoch, it can 
manifest itself in any systemic formations. A shift in the dominant within any systemic structure 
introduces a shift in the mutual relationship of all components of the structure. The recognition 
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of the role of the dominant in cultural formations thereby implies an inquiry into the cross-
sections of diachronic and synchronic explorations, inasmuch as the dominant  is descriptive 
both of the current state of affairs (a synchronic reading) in any given system and of an 
underlying motion or shift between the dominants over time (a diachronic reading).  So when 
considering a particular predisposition of each genre (prose vs. poetry) toward one or the other 
mode of expression, the Formalists noticed that in poetry there is a preference for a metaphoric 
approach that is manifested in an emphasis placed on the word and its possible variants whereas 
in prose words are combined and contrasted in semantic contiguity; that is, prose represents a 
metonymic approach. I repeat, these are only tendencies, and most language users as well as 
writers oscillate between these two poles. 
As we have seen, Jakobson in “What Is Poetry?” notes two key characteristics that 
separate the language of poetics from non-poetic language. Poetic language (or rather the 
language of “poetika” or the arts in general), in his opinion, first, is felt in its own right and is 
freed from the constraints of any possible reality component; second, a possible breakdown 
between the signifier and signified functions to introduce an element of mobility in the 
construction. Jakobson continues his exploration: 
Why is all this necessary? Why is it necessary to make a special point of the fact that the 
sign does not fall together with object? Because, besides the direct awareness of the 
identity between sign and object (A is A1), there is a necessity for the direct awareness of 
the inadequacy of that identity (A is not A1). The reason this antinomy is essential is that 
without contradiction there is no mobility of concepts, no mobility of signs, and the 
relationship between concept and sign becomes automatized. Activity comes to a halt, 
and the awareness of reality dies out.69  
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From Jakobson’s observations it is possible to infer that preference for poetic language 
(again it should be noted that he speaks of literary language in general, and not of poetic 
language alone) is directly linked, first, to the emancipation of the sign from reality, and second, 
to a heightened awareness of a breakdown of the assumption of identity between the sign and the 
object. Literature thus represents conceptually a freeing of the sign from the referent and opening 
it to the possibility of myriad connections. This can be said of all formations of literary texts, but 
will manifest itself in different ways and to different degrees in different genres, such as prose 
and poetry, each of which comes with a system or structure that alters how literariness is 
manifested. 
Jakobson and the Formalists concluded that there are two primary and diametrically 
opposed forces in language that manifest themselves in metaphoric and metonymic language use. 
Jakobson notes that: “In normal verbal behavior both [metaphoric and metonymic] processes are 
continually operative, but careful observation will reveal that under the influence of a cultural 
pattern, personality, and verbal style, preference is given to one of the two processes over the 
other.”70 An example of an extreme dependence on metaphoric language use would be the 
language of the Symbolist poets, whereas an excessive use of metonymy could be demonstrated 
in the language of realist novels. Preference for the metaphoric or metonymic mode of 
expression shows a preference for linking elements within the text either through their similarity 
(metaphoric linking, e.g. by saying “a shed is a shabby house”) or through their contiguity 
(metonymic linking, e.g. by saying “the shed burnt down”). When considering literary language 
use, Jakobson notices the following trend: “In poetry there are various motives which determine 
the choice between these alternants. The primacy of the metaphoric process in the literary school 
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of romanticism and symbolism has been repeatedly acknowledged, but it is still insufficiently 
realized that it is the predominance of metonymy which underlines and actually predetermines 
the so-called ‘realistic’ trend, which belongs to an intermediary stage between the decline of 
romanticism and the rise of symbolism and is opposed to both.”71  Jakobson notices that 
metonymic modes of expression gain primacy during intermediary stages, e.g. between 
romanticism and symbolism, which in my view can be explained by the fact that the closure of 
an epoch visible in the transition from one paradigm to another calls for narrative formation 
based on contiguity in space and time (a symptom of displacement) whereas during the relative 
homeostasis of an epoch there will be a higher degree of identification and symbolism (an 
symptom of stasis) in meaning formation.   
Jakobson’s studies on aphasia, a form of impairment in the activation of metaphoric and 
metonymic functions of language, are especially useful to consider because they highlight the 
processes that take place when one of these two poles of language use becomes blocked or 
restricted. Jakobson began working on aphasia shortly after fleeing Prague from the impending 
German invasion in the late 1930s; however, the paradigm he describes in his model can offer a 
plausible explanation of the shift from poetry to prose that took place earlier during the 1920s 
and ‘30s. Jakobson states:  
The varieties of aphasia are numerous and diverse, but all of them oscillate between the 
two polar types [the metaphoric and metonymic poles] just described. Every form of 
aphasic disturbance consists in some impairment, more or less severe, either of the 
faculty for selection and substitution or for combination and contexture. The former 
affliction involves a deterioration of metalinguistic operations, while the latter damages 
the capacity for maintaining the hierarchy of linguistic units. The relation of similarity is 
                                                





suppressed in the former, the relation of contiguity in the latter type of aphasia. Metaphor 
is alien to the similarity disorder, and metonymy to the contiguity disorder.72 
 
Jakobson’s observations highlight that when the metaphoric pole is severely restricted, 
language use suffers from the impairment of not being able to think in associations, see 
similarities, draw connections between a metaphorical term and what it stands for, whereas when 
the metonymic pole suffers, language use becomes impaired inasmuch as it cannot sustain the 
contiguity it needs to form a narrative, and becomes overwhelmed with a multiplicity of details. 
Excessive use of either pole therefore reveals not only the choice that provides the least 
resistance for language use under given circumstances, but also difficulties with or impairment of 
the non-preferred mode of expression.  
For my purposes, it is important to note that the Futurists’ nearly absolute preference for 
poetry coincides with a restricted or limited use of the metonymic pole in language use, a 
phenomenon that reflects a constricted ability to create narrative context/content. The Formalist 
school is particularly interesting because the influence of Futurist poetry had a tremendous 
impact on their understanding of prose relations, to the extent that in a sense, the Formalists 
merged their understanding of prose formations (detected features of prose) with the poetic 
material of the Futurists (detected features of poetry). If one can consider this merge to be an 
intrapersonal and social process with an underlying psychological mechanism that motivates it, 
one can make the claim that the Formalists in their construction of language use (and especially 
in Shklovsky’s theory of prose, which reduces the role of narrative to the minimum), are trying 
to bridge the gap between two preferred and antithetical modes of perception. What happens is 
that prose takes on the structure of poetry and the poetic elements gain metonymic quality. In 
                                                




other words, when poetry or poetic language use is taken as a structural model for literary 
narrative constructions, the literary narrative takes on a metaphoric quality, whereas poetic 
language use, which becomes the subject of description applied to prose, takes on a metonymic 
quality.   
The projection of the laws of poetry onto prose is a highly unusual experiment if one 
thinks about it. In my opinion, this heightened and unusual role attributed to poetry could only 
happen because prose during the years of the revolution suffered a metonymic impairment due to 
ongoing exposure to traumatic encounters, which resulted in an impairment of narrative 
formation. As we have already seen, the inability to render a narrative of a traumatic encounter is 
an established fact in trauma research.  We can thus hypothesize that the characteristics of 
meaning formations shifted from metonymic to metaphoric features as a result of the 
revolutionary traumas. The predominance of poetry on the eve of the Revolution and its 
subsequent decline, and conversely the absence of prose in the early years of the revolution and 
its later rise to dominance, indicate that preference for one genre over the other was in direct 
correlation with the authors’ ability or lack thereof to organize words into larger syntactic units, 
or on a semantic level, the inability to create a systemic and complex unity of thought. In other 
words, the emancipation of the word may have had a strong correlation with the loss of the 
signifying function of the word on the eve of the revolution (manifesting in the ease poets 
resorted to the use of “arbitrary and derivative words”), whereas later in the 1920s, as the 
signifying function gradually reemerged, the autonomous selection process became constricted. 
The Formalists’ theoretical stance is a model of language application that facilitated the 
transition between the breakdown of all unity of thought inflicted by the traumatic experiences of 




This theoretical stance on and preference for a particular type of literary language use can 
be considered in direct correlation with the relatively early stage of traumatic processing. The 
Formalists’ indifference toward story reflects the impairment of the metonymic pole--see also 
their emphasis on non-semantic units--however, it also denotes an intent to create a narrative 
around a traditionally non-visible subject matter (such as laws operating literary devices in a 
text). This would be a psychological reading of the Formalists. In my opinion, the Formalist 
theory of language use can be claimed as a symptom of impairment in metonymic expressions, 
which is why it is primarily descriptive of the processes that take place in literary language and 
why it is the description of language use that becomes both the form and content of  the 
Formalists’ observations.  
This hypothetical parallel between preferred modes of language use (manifested in 
systems of poetry vs. prose) and ability or inability to form a narrative, while it cannot be proven, 
can perhaps suggest an alternative reading as to why formal experiments in Russian letters 
evolved as they did, from poetry to prose, from the mid-1910s to the late 1930s. It would require 
further textual analysis to assert that the predominance of metaphoric as opposed to metonymic 
features correlates with processes that take place during the encoding of a traumatic encounter, 
when in the earlier stage the mind struggles with organizing words into larger syntactic units and 
where there is a breakdown between sign and referent inasmuch as signs do not carry thought, 
but are registered as if with no context, on a perceptual level. 
In my view, while the language use of the Formalists without a doubt reflects a 
fundamentally modernist aesthetics and preferred mode of seeing the world, it also reflects an 
inner schism or break, an element of turning back within itself, when one considers that its 




is void of “semantic content” commonly attributed to the story within the text. Whether we call 
this a metonymic impairment (impairment of contiguity) or an inability to form a narrative 
around the traumatic events of the time, I would say that this feature carries in itself a reference 
to trauma that cannot be explained by the well-documented shift in perspective that modernism 
introduced. If we refer back to early recollections of modernist experiments, the shift in 
perspective resulting in a recognition of the need to find connections between hitherto-unnoticed 
elements was part of a larger narrative of finding the invariable within the variable. There seems 
to be an optimism in movements such as Suprematism and Cubism that such language can be 
found. When we look at the Futurist experiments and the Formalist enterprise, we can discern an 
inability to generate the next generation of unifying method; therefore the narrative, whose 
purpose normally is to render an overarching meaning to an event or phenomenon, becomes self-
referential, meaning it becomes its own content or event. I would say this may be a point where 









II. Soviet Marxism: Trotsky on the Avant-Garde 
 
A very different view from a modernist reading of the Formalist School and their literary 
counterpart, the Futurists, emerges from Trotsky’s assessment, which he articulates in his 
polemical work Literature and Revolution (1922-23). Despite Trotsky’s often appalling use of 
language that is full of militancy and dismissiveness towards the intelligentsia, he offers, because 
of his materialist approach, an otherwise often sidelined sociological, psychological and 
philosophical reading of the Futurist poets and Formalist theoreticians. His argument is in direct 
contrast to Jakobson’s, who refrains from addressing the domain of art in relation to other 
constituents of the social structure and focuses instead on the autonomous aspect of art and the 
autonomy of the author.  
Positing the liberal intelligentsia as necessary to the process of development of 
proletarian culture, Trotsky gives a gloomy prognosis of the intelligentia’s viability due to its 
inability to integrate itself into the post-revolutionary Russian cultural milieu, which is 
fundamentally alien to its psychological make-up. By calling attention to this fact, whether he is 
correct or not, he is foreshadowing the intelligentsia’s future isolation, which, as Arendt claims, 
has a fundamental effect on its ability to generate meaning, transcend its fate and leave a 
permanent cultural artifact behind.  
The position of the intelligentsia, claims Trotsky, is untenable due to the fact that it has 
been historically bound to the bourgeoisie, which has been eliminated by the revolution. Now the 
intelligentsia has to align itself either with the peasantry or the proletariat, and knowing that the 




proletariat, but it gravitates toward the peasantry. The choice between the proletariat and the 
peasantry represents, I believe, a choice between revolutionary function or preservation of the 
old world. Of this contradiction between a historical necessity in the fate of the intelligentsia and 
its own inclinations, Trotsky writes:  
One can say that the poets and writers of these sharply critical years differ from one 
another in the way they escape from this contradiction, and in the manner in which they 
fill in the gaps [between desire and historical necessity]; one with mysticism, another 
with romanticism, a third with cautious aloofness, and a fourth with a cry [a reference to 
the Futurists] which drowns everything. Regardless of the variety of methods of 
overcoming the contradiction, its essence remains one and the same.73  
 
Trotsky seems to offer several explanations as to what this contradiction may indicate. 
One could be a psychological explanation of the current situation of the intelligentsia, which 
because of its allegiance with the now-defunct bourgeoisie, found itself in a situation when 
neither fleeing nor fighting is possible; thus unable to identify with either the proletarian or the 
peasant, it escapes into a construct, or the literary product. For the purpose of this dissertation, it 
is of little interest whether the class affiliation of the intelligentsia plays a role in the social 
function it fulfills. What matters is the notion that the intelligentsia somehow “compensates” for 
its sense of displacement, and in that sense Trotsky’s use of the word “escape” is significant.  In 
his equation of “escape” with the pursuit of various forms of art Trotsky points in a direction that 
has not been registered in the works of the Futurists and Formalists when approached in a 
modernist context. What he is proposing, whether fully intentionally or not, is that culture (here, 
of the intelligentsia) is a form of escape from the reality (here, the realities of the working man) 
and is therefore inferior insofar as it seeks to conserve the status quo or elite status that it held in 
the past. Many would argue that the intelligentsia never had an elite status in Russia, but what 
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Trotsky probably means is the prerevolutionary intelligentsia’s prerogative to determine the 
interpretation of “reality,” which in itself could arguably represent an elite and elitist position.  In 
this sense, the intelligentsia is, for Trotsky, by its nature reactionary, and cannot align itself with 
the revolution for it is deeply embedded in a structure that lives off a surplus generated by the 
ruling elite--here, the bourgeoisie--or if that is not the case, it generates a “surplus” of 
irrelevance, as Trotsky sees it. Most likely, what motivates the escape that Trotsky sees as 
characteristic of the 1920s is that the intelligentsia (including the Formalists)  has no bearing on 
Russian reality and is somehow in direct collision with it. Indeed, as Jakobson noted, 
Mayakovsky, for example, feared nothing more than the vulgarization of the “Revolutionary 
Spirit” or the misappropriation of the purpose of the revolution as Mayakovsky saw it. Jakobson 
notes:  
Majakovskij was terribly afraid that the revolution would become philistine, that it would 
be overgrown by vulgarity. He had a total hatred of such overgrowth…And it seemed to 
him for a long time that in the near future one could raise what he called ‘The Revolution 
of the Spirit’ against philistinization, against conservatism in architecture, against 
growing numb on the operas of Verdi, and so on. But at the same time…he was afraid 
that vulgarity would be victorious. He had a sharp and far from happy prognosis. He 
sensed the invasion of vulgarity into private life, into art, into culture, into everything…In 
general, the question of the ‘Revolution of the Spirit’ was for him for a long time the 
basic question of the October revolution; it was precisely from the point of view of the 
‘Revolution of the Spirit’ that Majakovskij defined his attitude toward October.74  
 
This passage reflects on the distance between the intelligentsia, here embodied by Mayakovsky, 
and the proletarian base of the revolution. One could perhaps justly make the claim that from the 
point of view of the Bolsheviks, what motivated members of the intelligentsia who supported the 
revolution was not so much the Bolshevik ideology as its own conceptions of spiritual revolution 
                                                




or evolution. In this sense the avant-garde authors’ ability to sustain a position of meaning-
generation in the context of the revolution is of existential consequence. Their  inability to ensure 
that its perception of the reality and/or of the reality of the revolution is validated or upheld 
indicates the intelligentsia’s absence of chance of defining or owning its own reality. 
In an imaginary dialogue with Trotsky, Hannah Arendt would counter Trotsky’s 
argument regarding the elitist stance of the intelligentsia on many fronts. Arendt, in The Human 
Condition, differentiates three stages of human development: (1) labor, which consumes most of 
man’s efforts and is primarily concerned with survival in the form of sustaining one’s existence, 
(2)  work, where man functions as a homo faber, whose work contributes to the sustenance of the 
material aspects of reality (in other words, man makes things that last longer than his life and 
contribute to the material survival of human culture and collective), and (3)  a stage of activities 
whose role goes beyond personal and collective survival, and which are motivated by an inner 
sense of freedom and desire to create something entirely new.  
Whereas Trotsky’s model offers a skeptical vision of the human being whose sole 
purpose is to fulfill a role that history has cast him/her in, and an even more skeptical vision of 
the intelligentsia, who seem to exist outside of historical purpose or relevance. Arendt claims that 
a human being’s ultimate goal is to transcend his/her instrumental character and fulfill his or her 
potential, defined as the ability to create something entirely new which serves not as a means to 
an end, but as a new end in its own right. For Arendt, novelty takes place outside of the 
predictable and the necessitated, and therefore it always occurs as if by miracle. Her position is 
closer to that of Mayakovsky, who in the passage quoted above was hoping to see the advent of a 




envisioned) and who seemingly reserved a central and historical role for artists/intellectuals in 
the revolution as he understood it.  
It is on this last point that Trotsky and Arendt most likely would disagree. For Trotsky, a 
person’s ultimate role is to fulfill his/her historical function, and if possible, by some form of 
recognition induce a transition from one’s trajectory if that is misaligned with what he sees as the 
direction of history with a capital H.  Any non-allegiance from this perspective is an escape from 
the inevitable course of events and is an inutile and futile mode of living. Arendt, on the other 
hand, sees that any activity that transcends historical, social or any other form of necessity is an 
opportunity to create something that is beyond what can be thinkable, an opportunity to 
transcend the limitations of one’s conditions that are indeed governed by inner laws dictated by 
necessity.  
The output of Formalism and of the Left thus can be considered either as a form of 
escape from a reality that they could not align themselves with, as Trotsky suggests, and in that 
sense, it is a reflection of deliberate non-engagement or dissociation from events, or, to the 
contrary, as an effort to generate meaning within the constraints and limitations posed. When 
Shklovsky claims, referring to the conditions of war, famine and hunger, that “[t]he fact that we 
write articles on Schiller and Sterne, solving problems anew, is a miracle,” he is not far from the 
position stated by Arendt, whose words he reiterates in an uncanny way nearly verbatim.75  The 
option to see the efforts of the avant-garde as a form of escape − manifested in working on 
Sterne and Schiller at times when one’s survival was not foreseeable − or as a form of human 
desire to transcend the gravity of the revolutionary abyss and create out of it something 
meaningful perhaps depends mostly on one’s personal disposition and, for the most part, on the 
                                                




value one places on work. I would argue that quite possibly the theoretical works of the 
Formalists were motivated both by a desire to escape or distance oneself and by the desire to 
extract from the unbearable conditions what remains as a repository of one’s sense of 
humaneness and belonging. As Judith Herman notes:  
[S]tress-resistant people appear to be those with high sociability, a thoughtful and active 
coping style, and a strong perception of their ability to affect their own destiny…During 
stressful events, highly resilient people are able to make use of any opportunity for 
purposeful action in concert with others, while ordinary people are more easily paralyzed 
or isolated by terror. The capacity to preserve social connection and active coping 
strategies…seems to protect people to some degree against the later development of post-
traumatic symptoms.76 
  
In that regard, the literary activities of the Formalists, especially Shklovsky’s work written 
between 1916 and 1923, could well be regarded as a result of coping strategies since, as he puts 
it, the fact that under such conditions, he and his colleagues were able to work is indeed a 
miracle and could only happen because it enhanced and was essential to their survival in a 
spiritual sense. 
As I have mentioned, Trotsky sees in the output of the intelligentsia a manifestation of 
disengagement, a form of escape or means of dissociation by which it overcomes the void of its 
own incapacity to do “something.” What is it that the avant-garde authors suffer from? It is 
unclear. It could be incapacity for action, for manual work, a lack of historical function, its 
inability to merge with the collective, just to list a few possibilities. If I were to entertain a 
common ground between Trotsky’s and Arendt’s vision, it could well be an escape from certain 
duties that are inherently bound to man’s role as a means to an end outside of himself.  What is 
essential, symptomatic and common to all members of the intelligentsia is the fact, according to 
                                                




Trotsky, that it buries its head in its cultural activities in an effort to transmit its inner 
psychological contradictions into a form of activity that, regardless of what shape it takes, in 
essence bears signs of that internal conflict with society and within the author’s psychology.  
Trotsky continues with his typically acerbic language:  
It is silly, absurd, stupid to the highest degree, to pretend that art will remain indifferent 
to the convulsions of our epoch. The events are prepared by people, they are made by 
people, they fall upon people, and change these people…[T]hose who hide themselves 
passively are imperceptibly dying off…[T]he new art…can be created only by those who 
are at one with their epoch…The Revolution is reflected in art…to the extent to which 
the artist ceases to regard it as an external catastrophe  and to the extent [he/she] becomes 
a part of the living tissue of the Revolution and learns to see it from within and not from 
without.77 
 
The question is not whether this statement has historical validity or not, but whether one can 
speak of the psychological disposition of the artist/writer to speak or not to speak of the 
revolution and direct correlation between  this ability or inability to speak and the degree of 
one’s acceptance of a fact of life and one’s willingness to integrate it into one’s artistic output, or 
in psychological terminology, into one’s narratives of meaning. Trotsky makes a brilliant point: 
the more catastrophic (traumatic) meaning one attributes to the revolution, the less likely one is 
to speak of the subject and, as I’ve suggested in Chapter 1, the more likely one will have to seek 
a substitute content to replace it with. This is a very important notion that addresses the nature of 
the interrelationship between traumatic content and formal experimentation. It has been observed 
by Freud and subsequent scholars in the field of trauma studies, to quote for example Pierre Janet 
that: “[W]hen people become too upset, memories cannot be transformed into a neutral narrative; 
a person is unable to make the recital which we call narrative memory, and yet remains 
confronted by [the] difficult situation. This results in a ‘phobia of memory’ which prevents the 
                                                




integration of traumatic events and splits off the traumatic memories from ordinary 
consciousness.”78 Both Trotsky and scholars of trauma studies point in the direction that the lack 
of reference to the events of the revolution in the works of the artists and theoreticians of the 
avant-garde is highly indicative of the degree of traumatic effects the revolution had on them. 
For Trotsky, there is no question about the devastating effects of war and revolution on 
the intelligentsia:  
The pre-revolutionary ripple at the beginning of the century, the unsuccessful first 
revolution in 1905, the tense but unstable equilibrium of the counter-revolution, the 
eruption of the War, the prologues of March 1917, the October drama—all these struck 
the intelligentsia heavily and continuously, as with a battering-ram. Where was there time 
to assimilate facts, to recreate them into images, and to find for these images expression 
in words? …Literature after October 1917 wished to pretend that nothing special 
happened and that this period in general did not concern it.79 
 
I have already referred to the predominance of poetry during the 1910s, which indicates a 
marked orientation toward elevated use of sensory images and preference for metaphoric 
linguistic constructions. Elevated use of sensory images signals a possible elevated level of 
arousal and, in the case of traumatic encounters, a possible splitting off in processing of the 
traumatic memory. The degree of preference for poetic expression indicates on an equal scale, 
but in another dimension, a lack of metonymic modes of self-expression, that is, a markedly 
absent or diminished role in thinking along the lines of contiguity, characteristic of prose. The 
absence of prose can indicate either a loss of capacity or lack of desire to utilize larger syntactic 
units. The inability of the avant-garde intelligentsia to render a narrative and integrate events 
seems to resonate with Trotsky, who notes that the intelligentsia simply could not keep up with 
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the speed of events (Mayakovsky’s earlier passage confirms this), assimilate the facts, or find 
expression in words for these encounters that were highly traumatic. I have talked about cultural 
trauma and how it parallels mechanisms set in place when a person is exposed to a traumatic 
event or series of events. It is interesting to note that the evolution of traumatic processing is 
analogous, or at least strikingly similar, to the processes that take place in perception when a 
shift from poetry to prose takes place, and it is in accordance with Trotsky’s perception of the 
overall paralysis of the intelligentsia facing the series of traumatic events that span from 1914 to 
1923, the year Trotsky wrote Literature and Revolution. Trotsky’s reference to the intelligentsia 
pretending that nothing happened evokes the concept of “phobic memory,” of the splitting off of 
the traumatic memories from the everyday consciousness. 
In his attack on the pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, Trotsky continues his train of thought 
by asserting that there is no culture, and thus no meaning-construct, other that which is defined 
by the revolution. He asserts that 
October entered into the destinies of the Russian people, as a decisive event and gave to 
everything its own meaning and its own value. The past receded at once, faded and 
drooped, and art can be revived only from the point of view of October. He who is 
outside of the October perspective is utterly and hopelessly reduced to nothing and it is 
therefore that the wiseacres and poets, who do not ‘agree with this’ or whom ‘this does 
not concern,’ are nobodies. They simply have nothing to say.80  
Trotsky makes unkind but important points. First, that the revolution created an all-
encompassing point of reference, created an entirely new system of meanings. There are no 
alternative or competing value systems, and he, too, sees a complete rupture or discontinuity 
between past and present values. Second, he states that anyone who is not in support of the 
Bolshevik experiment, who cannot identify with it, is outside its scope and is reduced in 
                                                




significance to nothing. Their point of view does not matter; whatever they may have to offer is 
of no importance.  Trotsky outright denies any meaning to the life of those who cannot identify 
themselves with the revolution, and makes a link between people who are nobodies and people 
who have no voice. Thus Trotsky’s reference to the intelligentsia’s inability to speak, whether 
because  they lack anything worthy to say or because of the shock of the revolution that silenced 
them, bespeaks a common feature described in medical literature about survivors, that is, the 
dual effect of repetitive intrusions, which are themselves non-syntactic in nature and thus lack 
proper narrative, and the counter-effect of avoidance and numbing whereby survivors, for 
example, can either entirely block the experience from their memory, or resort to substitute 
activities (i.e., to activities of escape according to Trotsky), through which they distance 
themselves from the experience. 
While it has been frequently noted that the experience of trauma results in a conflict of 
meanings,  between the system of meanings/values that were in effect prior to the experience of 
trauma and the negation of those meanings in the form of the traumatic memory that violates the 
physical and/or mental integrity of the survivor, medical research shows that it is primarily the 
meaning attributed by the survivor to the event that will play a key role in whether the survivor is 
capable of transcending the trauma or not. Trotsky’s model notably does not allow for 
internalized or personal meaning-generations, only for those external to the individual, in other 
words, only for meaning-generations that have socio-historical implications. 
Generally speaking, trauma studies in the field of literature tend to emphasize the conflict 
of meanings or realities and the incomprehensibility of the event that ensues from the clash 
between realities anterior and posterior to the event of trauma. Cathy Caruth in line with this 




It is indeed this truth of traumatic experience that forms the center of its pathology or 
symptoms; it is not a pathology, that is, of falsehood or displacement of meaning, but of 
history itself. If PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] must be understood as a 
pathological symptom, then it is not so much a symptom of the unconscious, as it is a 
symptom of history. The traumatized, we might say, carry an impossible history within 
them, or they become themselves the symptom of a history that they cannot entirely 
possess.81 
  
Caruth suggests that trauma results in a crisis of truth inasmuch as the truth internal to a 
person is canceled out by the event. For one thing, the traumatic event by its intrusive nature 
overrides any other forms of narratives and gradually invades the mind of the individual and 
takes over; secondly, when events on a mass scale such as the Holocaust or the Russian 
Revolution with their well-defined demagoguery and exclusive right to meaning-generation take 
place, the individual’s historical experience is denied. Generally speaking, this is a rather 
fatalistic take on human agency, but it is clearly in line with Trotsky’s assumption that once an 
individual stands in the way of a historical event, he is doomed to insignificance. Arendt too 
seems to believe that an individual can be silenced and rendered meaningless in totalitarian states 
that through complete isolation reduce his sphere of possible contribution to zero. This is 
because Arendt sees meaning in human life in the context of exchange between human beings 
and contribution to life. Cathy Caruth, Shoshana Felman, and Dori Laub all share an intellectual 
investment in restoring the truth of the victim and their model posits an important role for 
language and means of re-facilitating the act of witnessing the event that was denied to the 
victim due to the inability of the victim to process it when it happened, and partly due to the 
prerogative of the perpetrators to define the event. According to these scholars language acts 
retroactively; that is, truth is resurrected by the testimonies of witnesses, and witnessing is 
                                                




ensured when discourse between the victim and his environment is restored and his story is at 
last heard. 
If Trotsky and the scholars mentioned are right, the Russian avant-garde would have to 
be considered a failure, for it could not assert a voice or bear testimony to itself, at least not in 
the lifetime of the poets and scholars that Jakobson refers to as “a generation that squandered its 
poets.”82 It had no redeeming moment in its own course of history and could not withstand, to 
quote Mayakovsky, the vulgarization of the times. I disagree. I prefer to take a different path and 
shift the locus of “survival” back to within the survivor. Van der Kolk asserts: 
the critical element that makes an event traumatic is the subjective assessment by victims 
of how threatened and helpless they feel. So, although the reality of extraordinary events 
is at the core of PTSD, the meaning that victims attach to these events is as fundamental 
as the trauma itself. People’s interpretations of the meaning of the trauma continue to 
evolve well after the trauma itself has ceased. Lazarus and Folkman are in agreement 
with van der Kolk when they assert that “coping is largely determined by the meaning 
that people give to their experiences.83  
 
According to this view, personal meaning is derived from an evaluation of how much one 
is harmed, threatened, and challenged by an experience, and by an evaluation of one’s perceived 
options for mitigating the effects of the event. Thus, it is important to consider resilience and 
vulnerability in terms of both individuals’ responses to the trauma and their capacity to cope with 
their reactions.”84 
The notion of individual variability in terms of response to trauma and the ability to 
overcome a traumatic event or series of events by means of meaning-constructs allows for a 
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more flexible treatment of traumatic experience and the survivor’s role in the aftermath of the 
event. This model also better accommodates change over time in the meaning-constructions of 
the individual and shifts in preference for certain types of literary modes of expression that I 
have already touched upon. It also allows for a multitude of literary motivations. While the 
models of Caruth, Laub and Feldman primarily attribute a dual function to the literary act, 
whereby the verbal act is seen as a symptom of trauma and as means of 
reconstruction/retelling/re-witnessing the event, van der Kolk’s, Lazarus’s and Folkman’s model 
allows for the validity of the text as an end in itself, meaning the text can write itself regardless 
of trauma, in a sense similar to Arendt’s supposition that one can initiate meaning and new 
beginnings despite the inhibiting necessities of one’s reality. 
When Trotsky contrasts pre-revolutionary to post-revolutionary Russia, he follows a 
tradition of binary models, by seeing events in succession as contradictory and essentially 
antithetical to one another, separated from each other by a moment of rupture embodied in the 
revolution. This model is not entirely dissimilar to the dialectic described by Lotman and 
Uspenskii in their article “The Role of Dual Models in the Dynamics of Russian Culture.” 
According to Lotman and Uspenskii, Russia’s markedly different development from the 
countries of the Catholic West derives from the fact that that during the medieval period in 
Russia a system of thought based on a binary model became established that allowed for the 
existence of “holy” and “sinful,” or “heaven” and “hell,” but not a third, neutral option. The 
Catholic West was able to develop such a “third option” because its vision of the afterlife was 
divided into three: paradise, purgatory and hell. The Catholic West thus over time allowed for 




and Uspenskii claim that “[t]his neutral sphere becomes a structural reserve from which 
tomorrow’s system develops.”85 “This neutral sphere of life,” continue the authors,  
became the norm, and the highly semiotized top and bottom of medieval culture were 
ousted into the zone of cultural anomalies. In Russian culture…a different set of values is 
prevalent. Dualism and the absence of a neutral axiological zone led to the new being 
regarded not as a continuation but as an eschatological replacement of everything…Thus 
in these conditions the dynamic process takes on a fundamentally different character: 
change takes place as the radical rejection of the preceding stage. The natural result of 
this was that the new emerged not from the structurally ‘unexploited’ reserve, but as a 
result of the transformation of the old, as it were, of its being turned inside out. In this 
way repeated change could in fact lead to the regeneration of archaic forms.86  
 
Lotman and Uspenskii’s model suggests that Russian culture, because of its disposition to 
dualistic thinking, is fundamentally resistant to evolutionary change, because each of its stages 
can be perceived as a negation of the previous one. Therefore, its growth is circular; once the 
negation of a negation is negated, the cycle returns to its point of origin. One of the 
manifestations of this developmental model is, as Lotman and Uspenskii claim, that “for Russia 
at its various historical epochs it is not conservatism that is typical, but on the contrary both 
reactionary and progressive tendencies.”87 
The lack of a “neutral axiological zone” as articulated by Lotman and Uspenskii is visible 
in the rhetoric of Trotsky, who is unable to perceive any other actors in history besides those 
“good” or “progressive forces” who happen to be on the side of the Bolsheviks, and the “bad” or 
“reactionary ones,” who are in opposition to them. This phenomenon bears severe consequences 
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for the intelligentsia, which is commonly viewed as playing a central role in the creation of 
cultural narratives and cultural identity formation. Lotman and Uspenskii claim that:  
The essence of culture is such that in it what is past does not ‘pass away,’ that is, does not 
disappear as the events do in the natural flow of time. By fixing itself in the memory of 
the culture the past acquires a constant, but at the same time potential existence…A 
culture which is united with its past by memory generates not only its own future, but 
also its own past, and in this sense is a mechanism that counteracts natural time…The 
specific character of Russian culture…[is] that the connection with the past objectively 
made itself felt most sharply when subjectively there was a predominant orientation 
towards a total break with it; and on the contrary orientation towards the past was 
connected with the complete eradication from memory of the real tradition and a 
tendency to make chimerical constructs of the past.88  
 
Reconsidering Trotsky’s claim that the intelligentsia was paralyzed on the eve of the revolution, 
and accepting Lotman’s and Uspenskii’s model, it seems that the avant-garde intelligentsia found 
itself in a very complex situation, where it was given an impossible role of playing a progressive 
part but at the cost of complete denial of itself and its own past.  
The situation is, if one is willing to draw the analogy, not very different from that of the 
Jews in a Holocaust camp, whose point of reference for self-definition was external to them. The 
Jews were defined by their perpetrators therefore the Jews’ ability of relating their experience, 
creating a meaning around their experience was erased. As result, the violence penetrated against 
them went un-witnessed. It is impossible to witness when one cannot define what one is 
witnessing, as much as it is impossible to create a meaning of one’s experience when that 
meaning is denied. It is my theory, which I hope to demonstrate in this dissertation, that under 
such conditions, when one has no hope for the redemption provided by being witnessed, such as 
was the case in post-revolutionary Russia, redemption lay in finding meaning in one’s non-
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meaning. In other words, the only way one could exit the situation were if one somehow could 
come up with ways to occupy the void one was assigned. This void is within the axis of 
contradiction in spatial terms, and in terms of temporal realities it can only be a-temporal or in 
active disengagement with external or real time. It is not accidental that that the Formalists 
focused on function or form as opposed to semantic realities or content, or that Kharms was so 
preoccupied with the concepts of nothingness and zero or the axis of non-meaning.  I would 
argue that it is possible to see in the Formalist experiment not only an effort to emancipate 
literary scholarship from past efforts to define literature in terms of history and aesthetics, but 
also an effort to carve out meaning in areas that had not been invaded by ideology, had not been 
appropriated by the establishment. From Trotsky’s point of view, this lack of content in the 
works of the Formalists is necessitated by the fact that they are unable to generate historically 
significant meanings. From a psychological point of view, which Trotsky unwittingly reveals, 
this lack of content is due to the fact that traumatic encounters lack a semantic component as 
well as to the fact that in order to overcome a traumatic event there has to be a narrative 
formation of the event and a presence or sense of ownership of one’s ability to generate meaning. 
Trotsky considers the Futurists’ allegiance with the revolution accidental, meaning that 
their poetic revolt happened to overlap with the revolution, but they, because of their petty-
bourgeois origin, could not understand the significance of the Revolution and could not therefore 
wholeheartedly support it. Their main concern was their revolt against the limitations and stifling 
conditions of the old life, and it just happened that they found themselves caught up in the fervor 
of the Revolution that pushed them further in their art than what had been manifested in other 




Much has been written about Mayakovsky’s connections to the revolution and of the 
meaning of his death for the avant-garde, including the fact that his death was inevitable 
psychologically, artistically and politically. Jakobson recalls  Mayakovsky’s last months in his 
typically ahistorical account: “Majakovskij could do nothing more. He was in too great a despair. 
All he had were unanswered questions. What he wrote in his farewell letter—‘I have no 
choice’—was the truth. He would have perished all the same, whatever happened, no matter 
where he was, whether in Russia, Sweden, or America. He was a man absolutely unsuited for 
life.89 Mayakovsky was, according to Jakobson, inherently inept for living. Jakobson sees a 
fundamental lack of motivation to sustain living in Mayakovsky.  
Trotsky offers a very different interpretation of Mayakovsky’s ineptitude, seeing it 
manifested in his poetry, which Trotsky views as emblematic of the Futurist enterprise:  
Mayakovsky’s weighty images, though frequently splendid, quite often disintegrate the 
whole, and paralyze the action. The poet evidently feels this himself; that is why he is 
yearning for another extreme, for the language of ‘mathematical formulas,’ a language 
unnatural to poetry. It makes one thing that the self-sufficient imagery that Imagism has 
in common with Futurism (which is beginning to resemble our peasant-singing 
Imagism!) has its roots in the village background of our culture. It is more related to the 
church of Vassili the Blessed than to a steel bridge, but, whatever may be the historic and 
cultural explanation of this, the fact remains that the thing that is most lacking in 
Mayakovsky’s works is action. This may look like a paradox, for Futurism is entirely 
founded on action. But here enters the unimpeachable dialectics; and excess of violent 
imagery results in quiescence. A work of art must show the gradual growth of an image, 
of a mood, of a plot, or of an intrigue to its climax, and must not throw the reader about 
from one end to another end, no matter if it is done by the most skillful boxing blows of 
Imagery. Each phrase, each expression, each image of Mayakovsky’s works tries to be 
the climax. That is why the whole ‘piece’ has no climax. The spectator has a feeling that 
he has to spend himself in parts, and the whole eludes…Mayakovsky’s works have no 
peak; they are not disciplined internally. The parts refuse to obey the whole. Each part 
tries to be separate. It develops its own dynamics, without considering the welfare of the 
                                                





whole. That is why it is without entity or dynamics. The Futurists have not yet found a 
synthetic expression of words and images in their work.90  
 
It is startling to see Trotsky’s brilliant insight into the inability of Mayakovsky or the Futurists’ 
texts to evolve into a narrative on the principle of contiguity. Mayakovsky’s work lacks the 
metonymic pole: it cannot proceed, it does not have “the capacity to for maintaining the 
hierarchy of linguistic units” as Jakobson would word it.91 From Trotsky’s point of view, there 
are several reasons why the intelligentsia could not create a narrative. He suggests as possible 
causes the lack of ability to identify with the meaning of the revolution as defined by  the 
Bolsheviks; the inability to generate a meaning-construct due to an absence of historical 
significance; and the presence of the traumatic encounter with the  erasure of the pre-
revolutionary context,  to name a few.  In Jakobsonian linguistic terms, the text is structurally 
inhibited from evolving because the dominant that organizes its structure is of an excessively 
metaphoric direction, which creates deficiencies in or, so to speak, paralyzes the metonymic 
function. The text described above is also symptomatic of trauma narratives. Features such as 
obtrusive images that are repeated compulsively, lack of differentiation in volume, an inability to 
regulate the image, the prominence of the word-image or fragment over the whole, a dialectic 
that is fundamentally oppositional and cancels any possibility of motion or creation of narrative, 
an anti-climactic quality that points toward an inability to reach a resolution and break down the 
disabling mechanism, and so on, all cancel out the possibility of forming a narrative.  
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I would close this section with the parable with which Jakobson ends his essay 
“Futurism.”  The author talks about the artistic effect of ‘impeded perception” in painting and 
continues with a story to illustrate his point:  
When a critic looking at such pictures is at a loss and asks: ‘What in the world does this 
mean, I don’t understand’—and what precisely does he want to understand?—he is like 
the metaphysician of the fable: they want to pull him out of the hole in the ground he’s in 
and all he can do is ask: ‘What sort of thing is rope?’ More briefly: for him, perception 
that is valuable in and of itself does not exist. He prefers paper currency to gold; 
currency, with its conventionally assigned value, seems to him more ‘literary.’92  
 
Jakobson uses this parable to highlight the difference between two types of criticisms or critics. 
The first type looks at the picture presented in the text and believes that the purpose of seeing lies 
in understanding the meaning of rope in the image. This type of critic takes the parts of the 
image literally and seeks to assert the reality component of the rope. The other critic would 
proceed by looking at the object (rope) as valuable in and of itself, as it is manifested by the 
object or element’s function in the structural reality of the text. 
To this I would say, yes, it is true that the meaning of the rope is secondary to the 
function of the rope to those who are in a ditch and need to climb out, but it also happens that the 
importance of function over meaning is contingent upon the situation one is in: the preferential 
treatment of the function of the rope over its meaning is in direct correlation with the function of 
the rope as sole means of escape from the ditch. For the purpose of the person in the ditch, the 
semantic meaning of the rope is of no relevance whatsoever, whereas the function of the rope not 
only serves as a preferred mode of perception, but is also an existential necessity. It is hard not to 
                                                





read this parable not only as an artistic manifesto of the Formalists but also as a psychological 






























Man lives not by what he eats but by what he digests.  
Art is needed for the ferment.93 
Shklovsky 
 
Now I know how vital it is to keep plowing even  





I. Trauma Research as a Theoretical Framework and Its Application to Literary Criticism  
 
 
 The study of psychological trauma has a long history in the medical field that 
subsequently reached and enriched other, non-medical fields, such as the humanities. It has, as 
Herman states, “a curious history — one of episodic amnesia.”95 Discourse on trauma from time 
to time comes to the forefront of public discourse, disappears, then re-appears in cycles.  There 
are many possible reasons behind this, such as the fact that traumatic encounters evoke and 
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remind us of man’s vulnerability in the face of traumatic events and of the mankind’s ability to 
commit evil deeds that cannot be comprehended and explained away. Therefore, the collective 
consciousness, much like that of an individual, tends to phase out memories that are painful in 
favor of experiences that are positive. Another possible reason for this on-and-off interest in 
trauma studies is that the question of establishing the identities of a  victim and a perpetrator can 
be a highly contentious matter, and often is politically motivated or of a time sensitive nature. 
For example, interest in trauma studies usually increases when there is a need to address the 
consequences of a crime or cause that inflicted trauma, such as in the case of war veterans whose 
reintegration into society can trigger additional attention to trauma research, but fades when war 
ends.  Much of the context that trauma research has grown out of is associated with extreme 
experiences that imply a dialectic of survivor or victim and perpetrator (for example, in the 
context of the Holocaust), and research is heavily invested in finding a remedy to the imbalance 
the traumatic experience has inflicted in the psyche of survivors, and in finding an understanding 
of the motivations behind the act of the perpetrator. When this context is lacking, the relevance 
of trauma research seems to lose its sense of urgency. 
 In literature, like in medical research, the initial interest in trauma grew out of a study of 
survivor texts, such as the memoirs of Holocaust survivors, and took on a social mission of 
erecting memorials in the collective consciousness to events evoked in survivors’ memories.  
Literature in this context offers an opportunity for the survivor to relive/recount the event and 
share it with a sympathetic public —an opportunity he or she was denied at the time of the 
encounter—which in turn, as the survivor’s reality has finally been confirmed, facilitates both 
collective and individual healing. Dori Laub describes this process in the context of the 




of destructiveness, brutally imposed upon their victims a delusional ideology whose grandiose 
coercive pressure totally excluded and eliminated the possibility of an unviolated, 
unencumbered, and thus sane, point of reference in the witness.”96  
This denial of the victim’s ownership of her or his reality and of the ability to take part in 
a shared collective reality that confirms the victim’s reality leads to a situation in which the 
crime is never acknowledged. Testimony, according to this train of thought, is necessary in order 
to reestablish the fact that a violation happened. As Laub states, “repossessing one’s life story 
through giving testimony is itself a form of action, of change, which one has to actually pass 
through in order to continue and complete the process of survival after liberation. The event must 
be reclaimed because even if successfully repressed, it nevertheless invariably plays a decisive 
role in who one comes to be, and in how one comes to live one’s life.”97 Survivor texts thus 
reenact the event, reestablishing the survivor’s voice in the process. Literary criticism that 
occupies itself with survivor texts is often an examination of the psychological processes that 
take place in these texts and of the cultural implications of literature whose motivation is some 
form of trauma. 
 I would like to depart from this theoretical tradition, especially in regard to the 
implication that not telling the story of one’s traumatic encounter is necessarily a form of 
perpetuation of the power of the perpetrator over the victim, or that healing can only take place 
when the event is shared and retold. This may be the case in many instances, and memory 
narratives can without doubt enrich our understanding of how language and literary language 
functions. However, I would like to employ a wider-ranging understanding of the healing 
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process, one that emphasizes various possible forms of meaning-generation that can serve as 
alternative or simultaneous venues for the healing process. Bessel van der Kolk states, “the 
critical element that makes an event traumatic is the subjective assessment by victims of how 
threatened and helpless they feel.”98 Van der Kolk’s  assertion introduces the possibility of the 
co-existence of various alternative realities even from the witness’ perspective (whose stance 
embodies an interpretation of the victim’s reality which itself is in constant state of flux); it 
broadens the possible scope of what retelling may consist in, what the content of the victim’s 
testimony may be, in a sense reintroduces an element of subjectivity to the survivor story.  In 
other words, my approach, following van der Kolk, not only allows a larger freedom in the 
choice of self-expression but also frees the text from the obligation of “realism” and the 
necessity of reliving/recreating the event for the purpose of re-witnessing. Van der Kolk also 
asserts that according to clinical studies, “people’s interpretation of the meaning of the trauma 
continues to evolve well after the trauma has ceased,” which indicates that trauma narratives are 
in constant flux and are not reliable accounts of the events.  This is another argument against 
looking at survivors’ texts as recreations of a lost, un-witnessed by others history.99 Interestingly, 
while medical literature emphasizes the need for the integration of the traumatic event into 
victim’s consciousness, and does point out that over the course of healing, the traumatic event 
gradually gains a verbal component that is lacking during and immediately after the exposure, 
there is no medical literature that would support the idea that retelling a story provides a release 
to the trauma and is redeeming. To the contrary, it appears, as van der Kolk states, that  
even after acquiring a personal narrative for the traumatic experience, most of our 
subjects reported that these experiences continued to come back as sensory perceptions 
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and as affective states. The persistence of intrusive sensations related to the trauma, even 
after the construction of a narrative, contradicts the notion that learning to put the 
traumatic experience into words will reliably help abolish the occurrence of flashbacks--a 
notion that seems to be a central assumption in a variety of treatment modalities. 100  
 
This passage indicates that one should proceed with caution when reading survivor narratives as 
redemption stories. Medical literature seems to confirm that reality is replaced in the process 
with meaning-generation that evolves and is subject to change over time, and also calls attention 
to the fact that not only the content but the form of these recollections changes,, proceeding from 
sensory perceptions to increasingly verbal articulations (speech acts). Lastly, I believe that one 
should not limit the available forms of meaning-generation to a verbal account of the event, 
because, as experience has shown, there are many possible ways of creating meaning and 
reestablishing the severed contact between the survivor and the world through other forms of 
self-expression.  
 As I have mentioned, cultural theories of trauma evolved from trauma research that 
focused on the individual, and they examine the application of what goes on in the psyche of the 
individual to describe collective psychological processes that take place when a culture is 
impacted by traumatic events. Current cultural models tend to originate in Freud’s description of 
the traumatic encounter. Freud contends that under normal circumstances humans are motivated 
either by seeking pleasurable encounters or by avoiding experiences that are unpleasurable. He 
says: “pleasure and unpleasure…can be regarded as having a psycho-physical relation to 
conditions of stability and instability…every psycho-physical motion rising above the threshold 
of consciousness is attended by pleasure in proportion as…it approximates to complete stability, 
                                                




and is attended by unpleasure in proportion as…it deviates from complete stability.”101 Freud 
sees a fundamental principle of economy in how organisms operate: namely, the desire to ensure 
constancy and survival inevitably gives a large role to ensuring the condition of stability and 
disfavors the condition of instability.  From this, continues Freud, it follows that:  
the protection against stimuli is almost a more important function for the living organism 
than the reception of stimuli. The protective shield is supplied with its own store of 
energy and must above all endeavor to preserve the special modes of transformation of 
energy operating in it against the effects threatened by the enormous energies in the 
external world—effects which tend towards a leveling out of them and hence toward 
destruction.102   
 
Freud ties traumatic experiences to the breakdown of this mechanism, and defines traumatic 
encounters as 
any excitations from outside which are powerful enough to break through the protective 
shield…Such an event as an external trauma is bound to provoke a disturbance on a large 
scale in the functioning of the organism’s energy and to set in motion every possible 
defensive measure. At the same time, the pleasure principle is for the moment put out of 
action. There is no longer any possibility of preventing the mental apparatus from being 
flooded with large amount of stimulus, and another problem arises instead—the problem 
of mastering the amounts of stimulus which have broken in and of binding them, in the 
physical sense, so they can be disposed of.103 
 
 The inability to dispense the encounter with the traumatic event or events, which entails 
the integration of its reality with the preceding reality of the survivor, is the biggest challenge of 
the survivor, and much of the healing depends on how the survivor is able to reconcile the two 
conflicting realities that cancel each other out. The survivor needs to find a meaning-construct 
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around the event that enables accommodation of the experience and can also transcend the 
experience. Culture normally plays a key role in the individual’s healing by providing context for 
social support and opportunities for meaningful engagement. However, during massive 
upheavals, culture may not be able to function as a regulatory and protective mechanism because 
the impact is so large that the fabric of culture (its institutions, values, norms, etc.) is torn and/or 
becomes dismantled. Under such circumstances, two trends are set in motion, as de Vries points 
out: “the possibility for change or creation of new social forms…[and/or]… regression to 
previous historical conditions and to primitive emotions and behaviors.”104 Collective traumas 
are conceived by analogy with personal traumas, and project the effects personal encounters with 
traumatic events inflict on a person onto society as a whole, thus typically provoking a 
breakdown of cultural values, beliefs, attitudes, identity, trust among the members of a 
community, normal language use, and other aspects of society that under normal circumstances 
bind people together and provide them with venues for meaningful existence. 
 Because theories of collective trauma derive their insights from medical literature on 
individuals who have encountered traumatic events, it is best, I believe, when considering the 
application of trauma studies to literature, to likewise consider the primary medical literature as a 
point of departure for further inquiry. A traumatic encounter can be not only a single occasion, 
but also a series of events. A key feature of the traumatic encounter is that the individual--who 
under normal circumstances of feeling threatened would either flee or fight--has no recourse to 
either. As Herman points out, “traumatic reactions occur when action is of no avail. Neither 
resistance nor escape is possible.”105 Under the extreme duress introduced by the traumatic event 
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and the subsequent physiological effects triggered by the encounter, the human organism 
becomes disorganized and radically alters the functioning of the individual. 
 Exposure to trauma alters the ways in which the survivor processes incoming 
information. Survivors’ trust in the world is shattered and therefore they tend to anticipate the 
worst. They enter a perpetual state of hypervigilance that is sustained and reinforced by their 
inability to block traumatic memories from recurring. They are constantly scanning their 
environment for information that can give them guidance as to how to protect themselves from 
future traumatic encounters or the world that they perceive as hostile and treacherous. While in 
search of signals, they tend to pick up on clues that remind them of the encounter and shut out 
other non-trauma related information. Because of this heightened sense of importance invested in 
searching for clues, they lose their ability to differentiate between less and more important 
signals. Information that they let in tends to have meaning in the context of trauma while they 
block out information that does not resonate with their traumatic encounter. These factors lead to 
a biased worldview that enforces the centrality of the traumatic encounter. In other words, the 
person’s judgment becomes impaired and all meaning-formations are anchored in the traumatic 
memory that provides a point of reference well past the end of the encounter. 
 There are variations in the ways in which the person can modulate feelings. Survivors 
tend to overreact or freeze, have difficulty modulating and even articulating their feelings, lack a 
sense of future and planning, and avoid fantasizing because they fear the resurfacing of 





 One of the key features of traumatic responses is the intrusion of violent sensory images. 
Herman states: “long after the danger is past, traumatized people relive the event as though it 
were continually recurring in the present. They cannot resume the normal course of their lives, 
for the trauma repeatedly interrupts. It is as if time stops at the moment of trauma.”106 Over time 
the repeated exposure to these images becomes etched in the brain and induces biological 
responses in the human organism which, when entrenched, are hard to reverse.  
 Medical descriptions of traumatic memories are an especially rich source of information 
regarding the ways in which personal narratives are formed under extreme circumstances and 
can shed greater light on the motivation, characteristics and functioning of literary texts 
conceived against the background of traumatic experiences. These intrusive memories are very 
different from memories of normal events. “Traumatic memories,” according to Herman, “lack 
verbal narrative and context; rather, they are encoded in the form of vivid sensations and 
images.”107 This happens because the encounter with the traumatic event elevates the level of 
arousal in the nervous system, as a result of which the nervous system reverts to the sensory and 
iconic forms of memory that predominate in early life. Memories of traumatic events resemble 
the memories of children. These memories are not coherent stories but instead carry intense 
emotions and somatosensory impressions. Survivors can often relive how it felt to be subject to 
the experience without being able to relate precisely what happened. Often they are haunted in 
their dreams by the experience, but when awake, experience total amnesia. So the survivor is 
either too upset to integrate the memory of intrusive images or suffers from the inability to recite 
the event, in both of which cases the traumatic memory is forced to split off from ordinary 
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consciousness. Janet observed that “memory traces of trauma linger as what he called 
‘unconscious fixed ideas’ which cannot be liquidated as long as they have not been translated 
into a personal narrative.”108 The physiological process described here was probably one of the 
key sources of the redemption element of trauma studies in the literary field, although in medical 
literature there is no explicit reference to the need to retell the story. What is implied is rather the 
need to provide a verbal narrative of an event that exists initially on the level of somatosensory 
sensations. As long as memory is organized on a somatosensory or iconic level, it remains in the 
unconscious.  There is a direct correlation between the decrease of the ability to provide verbal 
narrative and the increase of sensory perception. Kolk notes that neuroimaging research done on 
the brain of patients with PTSD shows that “during the provocation of traumatic memories there 
is a decrease in activation of Broca’s area--the part of the brain most centrally involved in the 
transformation of subjective experience into speech…Simultaneously, the areas in the right 
hemisphere that are thought to process emotions and visual images show significantly increased 
activation.”109  It is only over time that the verbal component of memory processing regains 
ground and the survivor is able to tell what happened.  What is particularly interesting is that 
according to medical research:  
The subjects’ traumatic experiences were not initially organized in a narrative form, and 
they seem to serve no communicative function. It appears that as people become aware of 
more and more elements of the traumatic experience, they construct a narrative that 
“explains” what happened to them. This process of weaving a narrative out of separate 
sensory elements of an experience is not dissimilar from how people automatically 
construct a narrative under ordinary conditions, however, when people have day-to-day, 
non-traumatic experiences, the sensory elements of the experience are not registered 
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separately in the consciousness, but are automatically integrated into a personal 
narrative.110   
 
It is important to highlight, because it is usually not part of the literary discourse, that the process 
of narrative construction of traumatic events does not have a conscious communicative function 
but is rather a physiological process through which memory fragments gradually emerge and 
bind together into a verbal narrative, and that lack of narrative or reference in language of 
trauma, commonly referred to as a “phobia of memory,” is and can be a signal of the presence of 
trauma. Thus the inability to speak of a traumatic encounter is a key feature of survivor 
narratives, a feature that is often overlooked because in literary criticism the emphasis has been 
placed, instead, on the ability to retell the event, and survivor texts were held to a principle of 
realism that nowhere can be confirmed to exist in medical literature. What medical literature 
proves is that, to the contrary, most survivors dread and fear the reliving of the experience, be it 
via dreams, intrusive memories, or actions—therefore, Herman points out, “because reliving a 
traumatic experience provokes such intense emotional distress, traumatized people go to great 
lengths to avoid it.111 
 During the encounter with the traumatic event and in the aftermath there is a general 
sense of helplessness that has a paralyzing effect on the survivor. Because there is no possibility 
of self-defense, the entire system of self-defense shuts down. Herman notes that under such 
circumstances “[t]he helpless person escapes from her situation not by action in the real world 
but rather by altering her state of consciousness.”112 The victim continues to observe the events 
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but perceives them as if disconnected from their original meaning or context. This shift in the 
perception of the events results in an altered sensation of time, voices, visual and other 
components that would normally amount to an accurate registration of the event. Survivors often 
report having an out-of-body experience, meaning their mind and body diverge, and while the 
body continues suffering the mind splits off and becomes detached as if the whole experience 
were a bad dream. These detached states of consciousness, notes Herman,  “are similar to 
hypnotic trance. They share the same features of surrender and voluntary action, suspension of 
initiative, critical judgment, subjective detachment or calm, enhanced perception of imagery, 
altered sensation, including numbness and analgesia, and distortion of reality, including 
depersonalization, derealization, and change in the sense of time.”113 
 While the description Herman gives describes the way in which survivors live through 
the traumatic encounter, because of the recurrence of traumatic memories, this altered mode of 
perception becomes entrenched over time in the survivor’s psyche. The dissociation from the 
event and the emotions it evokes lives on and is manifested in the careful avoidance of any 
situation or emotions that might remind the person of the traumatic experience. In some 
circumstances dissociation can result in an alteration of identity or a doubling that goes beyond 
the split of functions an individual needs to fulfill, and registers the division of the self into two 
functioning wholes, as in the case of Nazi camp doctors who were able to uphold at home their 
identity as good parents, partners and, at the same time, committed horrific atrocities within the 
confines of the camp. 
 The ongoing intrusion of traumatic memories and the concurrent desire to block these 
memories via dissociation create a peculiar dynamic that is particularly challenging for a 
                                                




survivor to overcome. Herman notes: “Since neither the intrusive nor the numbing symptoms 
allow for integration of the traumatic event, the alteration between these two extreme states 
might be understood as an attempt to find a satisfactory balance between the states. But balance 
is precisely what a traumatized person lacks. She finds herself caught between the extremes of 
amnesia or of reliving the trauma, between floods of intense and overwhelming feeling and arid 
states of no feeling at all, between irritable, impulsive action and complete inhibition of action. 
The instability produced by these periodic alternations further exacerbates the traumatized 
person’s sense of unpredictability and helplessness. The dialectic of trauma is therefore 
potentially self-perpetuating.”114 Over time, parallel with the process outlined in the cognitive 
processing of traumatic memories, this dialectic undergoes an evolution, whereby the intrusive 
reliving of traumatic images decreases and the ability to block out these images increases. While 
this shift looks promising from the outside and often the survivor carries on with life as if 
normal, inwardly, he/she continues to sever the events from their ordinary meaning and the 
distortion of reality is sustained. Elements of depersonalization and derealization continue to 
exist, one continues to feel detached from one’s experience, continues to limit one’s activities 
and exposure to activities and situations in order to minimize the possibility of reliving the 
traumatic encounter.  
 Because of the breach of trust the survivor experienced at the moment of exposure and 
subsequently due to the self-perpetuating features of the effect trauma bears on the body and the 
mind, traumatic events call into question the very foundations of a person’s relation to the world 
and other human beings. As Herman notes: “[traumatic events] shatter the construction of the 
self that is formed and sustained in relation to others. They undermine the belief systems that 
                                                




give meaning to human experience...[they] have primary effects not only on the psychological 
structures of the self but also on the systems of attachment and meaning that link individual and 
community.”115 These events violate the autonomy of the person, whose belief that he can be of 
himself or that he is capable of retaining agency is shattered. In the aftermath of the event 
survivors often doubt themselves and others. They struggle with a sense of guilt over not being 
able to protect themselves or detect the dangers that befell them. The ability to return to a 
fulfilling life depends on their ability to resurrect a meaning to their lives, a meaning that can 
encompass both the traumatic event and the world that they had faith in and the values they 
believed in prior to the events. Re-establishing modes of collaboration with the collective is 
central in this process as well as other active coping strategies and a degree of willingness to 
embrace the experience and translate it into a meaningful asset. 
 When considering the application of trauma research to literary criticism, I would thus 
highlight especially the relevance of the changes in information processing and the processes 
described therein, the synchronic and diachronic descriptions of traumatic narrative formations, 
the causes and the effects of dissociation, and the importance of meaning constructions and 
overcoming isolation in the context of survival. All these elements, in my view, seem to carry an 
added value in the eyes of the Formalist scholars, and stand out as key loci of attention in 
Shklovsky’s theoretical work written  during 1917-1923, and later in altered manifestations in 
the prose work of Kharms. 
 
 
                                                




II. Shklovsky’s Memoir A Sentimental Journey in the Context of His Scholarship  
 
 Shklovsky’s memoir A Sentimental Journey, published in 1923, provides a first-hand 
account of the cataclysmic times spanning 1917 to 1922, from the disintegration of the Tsarist 
empire to the establishment of the Bolshevik state, as well as a unique opportunity to hear 
Shklovsky the soldier and theoretician reflect on the events. Because of the temporal overlap, the 
memoir can provide background information on the context in which the articles  “Art as 
Device” (1917) and “The Relationship between Devices of Plot Construction and General 
Devices of Style” (1919) were written, and can, at the same time, generate rich material for 
textual analysis regarding intertextual connections between personal accounts and theoretical 
undertakings.   
During the years 1917-1919, Shklovsky was actively involved as a soldier in military 
operations and, quite surprisingly, managed at the same time to produce one of the central pieces 
of the Formalist school. He volunteered in the Tsarist Army to fight in World War I, and was 
eventually transferred to Petersburg in 1916, where he became an armored car driving trainer. 
While stationed in Petersburg, he became a founding member of the linguistic circle OPOYAZ 
(Obshchestvo Izucheniia Poeticheskogo Iazyka), the Petersburg section of the Formalist 
school.116 He participated in the February Revolution; during his brief stay in the capital, he 
published his article “Art as Device.” Shortly afterwards, he was sent by the Provisional 
Government, first to the Southwestern Front as a Commissar, and then to Persia as an Assistant 
Commissar of the Russian Expeditionary Corps. He received the St. George medal, Russia’s 
                                                




highest military award, for his bravery on the Southwestern Front, and generally speaking, he 
was a very highly respected Commissar. He was in Persia during the November coup and 
returned shortly afterwards, in January 1918, to Petersburg.  His political leanings were of the 
liberal left: he was openly supportive of the Provisional Government and critical of the 
Bolsheviks. In the matter of land, he was close to the Socialist Revolutionaries who advocated 
the return of land to the peasantry. He was implicated in an anti-Bolshevik plot following the 
wave of arrests of the Socialist Revolutionaries in the summer of 1918 and had go into hiding in 
Russia and Ukraine. He was eventually pardoned with the help of Gorky and returned to 
Petersburg in August 1919. Shklovsky wrote his article “The Relationship between Devices of 
Plot Construction and General Devices of Style” while fleeing from arrest by the Cheka, and 
published it shortly after his return to the capital.  
I used passages of the memoir in Chapter 1 to illustrate ways in which the traumas of the 
two wars and the Red terror affected the population, and how historical realities influenced 
everyday perception, which in turn, habituated modified language use. In this section I hope to 
demonstrate that the memoir can also be especially useful in understanding the psychological 
motivations (in the context of trauma) behind Shklovsky’s theoretical work as well as the 
structural and functional similarities between traumatic processing and Shklovsky’s tenets 
regarding the workings of literature and prose narrative. I will not explore the connections 
between the principles Shklovsky follows when constructing his memoir and the principles he 
claims motivate a literary text despite various references Shklovsky makes to the literary devices 
(such as deceleration or zamedlenie) he follows in constructing an account of an event.  This is 
mostly because unlike in his theoretical writing, the use of the device in the memoir does not 




the language use of the memoir is that the very same devices that in a literary context, according 
to Shklovsky, have nothing in common with semantics or extra-literary realities, here, on the 
contrary, are linked with and are intentionally used to accentuate the content. Highlighting this 
contrast between aesthetics and personal application of the device could yield interesting results 
if it were an enterprise on its own. However, since I have already spoken of the impact of trauma 
on perception and personal language use in the memoir, it seems redundant to use the same 
passages to highlight a degree of artificiality due to artistic preferences, when I have argued that 
artistic preferences were likely to have been affected by traumatic conditioning.  
I would like to reiterate that in demonstrating the extent to which World War I, the Civil 
War and the Red Terror afflicted Russia’s population and Shklovsky, in particular; in 
establishing the presence of all-encompassing traumatic conditioning both in the lives of the 
individuals and on a cultural scale; and in unearthing possible connections between traumatic 
processing, signs of which are visible in the memoir and in Shklovsky’s theoretical tenets, my 
intention is by no means to negate the Formalists’ accomplishments or prove them wrong 
regarding their key stance on art’s independence from life.  In fact, I consider the Formalists’ 
conclusions an outstanding accomplishment, and share their sentiment regarding the 
emancipation of art from extra-literary realities and the notion of utility as its main purpose. 
What I hope to prove, instead, is that there are a multitude of parallel realities that result in a 
construct, such as a piece of artwork or literary theory, and that the Formalists’ insistence on 
excluding extra-literary elements from their research may have led scholarship on Formalist 
theory to bypass the extra-literary realities of the movement in an effort to be faithful to their 
tenets and underlying philosophy of the arts.  Lastly, I am hoping that the connections I have 




mechanism that can explain why and how it is possible for a culture to survive at times of grave 
challenges, and why perhaps cultural evolution is intrinsically connected with near death 
experiences, in addition to, or rather than, experiences of prosperity. 
 I touched upon issues such as changed language use, alterations in everyday perception, 
role of method and function, and issues concerning agency in Chapter 1. In this chapter the focus 
is on Shklovsky the scholar, not the soldier or Russian citizen. The key themes in this section 
therefore are those that have theoretical applicability, that can lead to a greater understanding of 
Shklovsky’s position on and insight into the workings of literary art. Some of the information 
discussed in Chapter 1 to confirm the existence of traumatic encounter is here reapplied as a 
means of facilitating the transition to abstract language use in the subsequent analysis of 
theoretical works. The question that has not yet been explored is the role of writing, and thus of 
scholarship, for Shklovsky. This seemingly banal question may not seem as simple if we begin to 
wonder how we can account for Shklovsky’s productivity under such harsh conditions. 
 There are several markedly distinct, yet inherently connected, motivations for the 
conception of the memoir that Shklovsky articulates throughout A Sentimental Journey.  There is 
a frequently evoked need or rather compulsion to record these events and a desire to purge them 
from the soul.  He frequently interpolates as closing statements following his account of events 
exclamations such as: “If I don’t tell it here, then where else can I tell this fact?” or “You tell me 
this doesn’t fit in here. So what! I should carry all this in my soul?”117 Shklovsky articulates his 
inability to make sense of the events and the survivor’s dilemma (often highlighted in literary 
criticism) of whether the testimony is of any validity without having a third party witness who 
can confirm that these events happened: “And as for me, I can’t make any sense out of all the 
                                                




strange things I’ve seen in Russia. Is it good to trouble my heart and tell what happened? And to 
judge without calling witnesses? I can only speak for myself, and then not everything.”118 
Shklovsky also refers to the need to carve out some sense of agency (that of the recorder or 
interpreter) amidst the events  I have mentioned, within the constraints of the traumatic 
encounters and the ethical choices available. This response was perhaps the only option available 
that from the survivor’s point of view could facilitate ownership of the survivor’s experience and 
offer a chance of participation in some form of meaning-generation. To illustrate his position, 
Shkovsky explains as follows: “When you fall like a stone, you don’t need to think; when you 
think, you don’t need to fall. I confused two occupations. The forces moving me were external to 
me. The forces moving others were external to them. I am only a falling stone. A stone that falls 
and can, at the same time, light a lantern to observe its own course.”119   
The image of the falling stone, a metaphor that seems at first to refer to the general state 
of an intellectual in Russia, is broadened by the image of the scholar in the following section: “I 
am a falling stone—professor of the Institute of Art History, founder of the Russian School of 
the formal method (or morphological). In this situation, I’m like a needle without any thread, 
passing through the cloth and leaving no trace.”120 It is of particular interest that in this passage 
Shklovsky combines two images, the image of the falling stone that can light a lantern and 
observe his own falling, and that of the needle without a thread; that is, he is combining a 
survivor motif—the ability and need to record one’s fall—with the motif of death or leaving 
nothing behind. These two motifs seemingly cancel each other out and leave the statement, as it 
were, in suspense, revolve around a void. This reflects a concern that even if one continues to 
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write, there may be an utter lack of regard for the Formalists’ work in the eyes of society.  He 
directs his lament to his Formalist friends when saying: “And you, friends of these last years, I 
grew up with you. In the reeking streets of Petersburg the simple and touching, we grew our 
works, needed, apparently, by no-one.”121  
Yet not writing is not a real option, as the inability to write evokes in Shklovsky a near-
death experience. The author recalls the on-and-off efforts needed to sustain writing: “I continue 
writing. It’s been a long time since I’ve written so much. It’s as if I were getting ready to die.”122 
I have mentioned that during the times of the persecution of the Social Revolutionaries, 
Shklovsky went into hiding, fearing imminent arrest and prosecution. These times were 
especially difficult for the writer, whose fear for himself and the other SRs was debilitating. He 
describes his struggle:  
I write but the shore does not recede from me. I cannot lose myself like a wolf in a forest 
of thoughts, a forest of words created by me. The shores do not vanish. Life looms on 
every side, and not the verbal ocean whose waters are nowhere in sight. The thought runs 
and runs along the ground and still, like a poorly built airplane, cannot take off. And the 
blizzard of inspiration does not want to whirl my thoughts into the air, nor does the god 
of the shaman lift them from the ground. I lick my lips, they are without foam. And all 
this because I cannot forget the trial, about that trial which begins in Moscow 
tomorrow.123 
 
The passage speaks of the overwhelming presence of a sense of paralysis that trauma literature 
can attest to when facing a threat on one’s life (a guilty verdict would have meant the execution 
of hundreds of SRs and put Shklovsky’s life on the line), as well as of a connection between 
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writing and the feeling of being able to lose oneself or be submerged into a state that Freud calls 
the “oceanic feeling.” While Shklovsky makes no connection between the trial and wanting to 
write, his images suggest a yearning for a state induced by writing, wherein he is able to step out 
of the experiences and the confines of his reality and dissociate and lose himself in an altered 
state of consciousness. Writing is likened to getting lost in a forest of words, to detaching oneself 
from the shore and losing oneself in a verbal ocean, and to taking off from the ground--all 
images of removing oneself from where one is. Writing, like dissociation in clinical terms, helps 
the writer de-realize and depersonalize his situation; it supplies a substitute identity (the writer 
rather than the Socialist Revolutionary) that can temporarily replace the identity that is under 
threat; and can narrow one’s attention to that, and only that, which is under his own control, his 
writing. As Herman says: “The helpless person escapes from [his] situation not by action in the 
real world but rather by altering [his] state of consciousness.”124 
 The theme of dissociation frequently recurs in passages where the author talks about the 
nearly insurmountable circumstances surrounding his writing efforts and of the significance to 
him of continuing writing no matter what. “It is pleasant to lose yourself” he says, “[t]o forget 
your name, slip out of your old habits. To think up some other man and consider yourself him. If 
it had not been for my writing desk, for my work, I would never again have become Viktor 
Shklovsky.”125 Shklovsky had several names at the time: following his marriage (1919) he took 
his wife’s last name Kordi but as he was hiding and fleeing arrest, he lived under a pseudonym.  
He lived as a shoemaker in Ukraine and continued in his free time to work on his scholarly 
articles. In the abovementioned comment, the identity of Victor Shklovsky (the person born 
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under this name) at that time seemed to be exclusively centered in his scholarly work and pre-
revolutionary identity. Interestingly, the author states that had he not been drawn to submerging 
himself, disappearing in a literary text, had it not been for his work, he would not have been able 
to sustain or return to his identity as Shklovsky, which indicates Shklovsky’s inverse relationship 
with reality—namely, the more he is able to submerge and detach, the more his identity (as 
Shklovsky the scholar) emerges. There again, we can see an element of homecoming in the 
shaping of identity that gains fulfillment by losing the reality component of that identity through 
fiction.  
 Shklovsky’s complex relationship with his writing and his scholarly self is further 
revealed when he refers to the conditions in which he wrote the article “The Relations.” 
Shklovsky began to work on his article in Chernaya Rechka in 1918 while fleeing arrest. He on 
several occasions draws an analogy between the writing of this article and Kipling’s story “How 
the Whale Got His Throat.” Kipling’s story is about a whale and a shipwrecked sailor whom the 
whale swallows and who, in the end, miraculously escapes from the animal’s belly. Once 
swallowed and inside the whale’s belly, the sailor raises a rumpus, jumping, banging, howling, 
banging, hitting, biting, etc., creating such discomfort for the whale that it decides to let him out.  
The man, while inside the belly, cuts up his raft with his knife and ties the pieces together with 
his suspenders. While walking out to the shore, the man pulls the raft behind him with the 
suspenders that he also used to tie the raft together. As he walks through the throat, the raft gets 
stuck. The man jumps to the shore and lives happily ever after, but the whale from then on can 
neither cough up nor swallow the raft, so it becomes stuck in its throat forever and prevents the 
whale from eating men from then on. The suspender (an object that is used to tie the raft together 




it enjoys a larger structural role. The narrator reminds the reader, from the time he introduces the 
protagonist and describes him as having nothing but a pair of pants and suspenders, of the 
importance of not forgetting the suspenders. Every time the suspenders are mentioned in the 
story, the narrator tells the reader “you must particularly remember the suspenders,” and, at 
times, when there is no mention of the suspenders in the story for a while, there is a reminder 
“have you forgotten the suspenders?” The recurring act of reminding the reader of the suspenders 
introduces into the story an awareness of the difference between the story and the plot via the 
technique of estrangement; that is, by continual reminders the narrator repeatedly cancels out the 
reader’s ability to lose himself in the story and absorb it unconsciously (as if by vision and not 
recognition). Shklovsky speaks of his work “The Connection” in the following terms: “[t]his 
article is like Kipling’s story about the whale—‘the suspenders, please don’t forget the 
suspenders. ’”126  The reference to Kipling’s story is repeated under more dramatic 
circumstances when Shklovsky recalls how during the winter of 1919, which decimated the 
population of Petersburg and Moscow, even at the door of death, he tried with all his efforts to 
continue his scholarly work. He recalls the times thus:“[t]here is a roaring in your ears, you’re 
half-dead from the strain and you fall down. But your head keeps thinking by itself about ‘The 
Connection between the Plot Devices and General Stylistic Devices’. ‘Please don’t forget the 
suspenders.’ I just finished my article then. Boris was finishing his. Osip Brik had finished his 
article on ‘sound repetitions’.”127 
 There could be many interpretations of the analogy between Shklovsky’s scholarship 
and/or writing in general and the suspenders. The suspenders are almost all the ship-wrecked 
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sailor has (plus a knife), yet he is able, even though as if by accident, to block the whale’s throat 
so the whale is of no more danger to men. In this way, man leaves an artifact behind that was 
created at times of great distress or near-death experience, and that somehow helps mankind live 
on. The suspenders also play the role of a literary device whose purpose is not to let the reader 
off guard while reading, and to remind him that there is more to the story than what at first sight 
seems to be. In this regard, the sentence “don’t forget the suspenders” is a reminder of 
Shklovsky’s theoretical work on “estrangement,” the subject matter, or at least one of the central 
ideas, he explores in “The Relations.”  Shklovsky’s references to the suspenders in the context of 
his literary scholarship seem to convey, in addition, a sense that his scholarly work was all there 
was to draw strength from during times when he was at death’s door. Wherever he went he 
carried his books and writings with him, as the shipwrecked sailor carried his suspenders and 
knife, unaware of what use they might bring, but as if ruled by an inner imperative, like those 
peasants who continued to plow in between two fronts. 
 Based on the passages mentioned above, it is beyond doubt that sustaining the activity of 
writing for Shklovsky was a means of survival in the context of the ongoing encounter with 
traumatic events, be it in the capacity of an observer of these events or of a subject whose own 
survival was under threat, or both. The purpose of sustaining one’s identity as a writer and 
scholar is both to constrict within the given circumstances—as it is one of few possibilities for 
creating meaning for one’s life under the Bolshevik rule—and to liberate, as it offers a possible 
area of escape from one’s realities.  
 Escape from the experience of war and terror is thus facilitated by the activity of 
immersing oneself in a context that is fictitious, namely, void of real persons and situations that 




oneself from trauma and the need to seek out personal space that is emptied of traumatic 
reminders. It may also be argued that there is an active correlation between the degree of 
intensity of the traumatic encounter and the degree to which a person limits the possibility of 
recurrence of reminders of traumatic events—here, of anything that would remind a person of 
reality in the fictitious world.  
The idea that writing seems to have served as a venue of dissociation cannot be separated 
from the content matter. When there is a motivation to dissociate from a content or event, the 
substitute reality has to be void of any reminders of that event. Therefore we cannot overlook the 
purported scientificality of the Formalist tests, and Shklovsky’s quest for meaning in function as 
opposed to semantic content and context. Shklovsky on numerous occasions refers to the 
Formalists as a scientific school (nauchnaia shkola). He says, “[w]e worked from 1917 to 1922. 
We created a scientific school and rolled a rock up the mountain.”128 The role of science, while 
without doubt significant conceptually in the quests of modernist artists, as Jakobson pointed out 
in his memoir, My Futurist Years, gains a particular dimension in the context of war and terror. 
Shklovsky recalls how in the spring of 1918, while at the front, he taught the soldiers fractions:  
All over Russia, fronts were being opened. The Poles were advancing and my heart ached 
as it aches now. And in the midst of all this misery, which I didn’t understand, in the 
midst of the shells falling from the sky, as they fell one day along the Dnieper into a 
crowd of swimmers, it’s very reassuring to say calmly: ‘The larger the numerator, the 
larger the fraction, because that means, there are more parts. The larger the denominator, 
the smaller the fraction, because that means it’s more finely sliced. That’s a sure thing. 
It’s the only sure thing I know…So I taught arithmetic.129   
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It seems that not only did the subject matter (arithmetic and science) have nothing to do with 
reality and therefore could provide an antipode (or alternative reality), but it could also fill that 
epistemological vacuum that ensued following the breakdown of Russian culture as a result of 
wars and terror. Science provided a grasp on the only aspect of reality that had not evaporated, 
the only aspect where values and laws had not changed and could not be changed. Speaking of 
the Formalist linguistic circle Opoyaz, Shklovsky draws a parallel between the circle’s scientific 
predisposition and his own teaching of arithmetic on the front: “About Opoyaz. ‘Opoyaz’ means 
‘The Society for the Study of Poetic Language.’ About something as clear to me as numerators 
and denominators.”130 Given the fact that there is a very particular reason behind Shklovsky’s 
teaching arithmetic at the front, I would suggest that similar factors could have played a part in 
the direction of the poetic school and its desire to remain as scientific as possible. With the 
understanding that science played a prominent part in cultural discourses, be it that of the 
modernist artists or of the Bolsheviks advocating their “scientific” propaganda, I would still 
argue that over time, and especially having been impacted by the unforeseeable consequences of 
the wars and the terror, the Formalists and Shklovsky found a retreat in literature that they 
reconstructed along scientific laws and intentionally voided of whatever semantic content it may 
have held for the reader. I would argue that literature, in addition to many other roles it may have 
fulfilled, served as an alternate reality one could retreat into from the disturbing realities of the 
world, as it offered a domain free for explorations. It is not by accident that Formalist 
interpretation focused on form and not content, because for the alternate reality to function fully, 
it had to be void of reminders of the traumatic encounter and memories associated with the real 
world. And much as literature supplied material for such reading and sense of certainties, writing 
such “scientific” texts provided an active means of sustaining the realities of such “certainties.” 
                                                




 The role of writing therefore is inseparable from the notion of the creation of realities 
needed to sustain the writer who, at the same time and for the very same reasons, must be in full 
control of his text.  This notion is in direct opposition to perceptions of writing that suggest that 
writing (and reading) is a means toward greater understanding of some knowledge external to the 
text. This element of complete control over one’s text in terms of structure and content is 
highlighted in Shklovsky’s words: “The formal method is very simple—a return to 
craftsmanship. Its most remarkable feature is that it doesn’t deny the idea content of art, but 
treats the so-called content as one of the manifestations of art.”131 The idea of craftsmanship in 
the passage is primarily an indication of the perception of literature as a craft, meaning an 
assembly of devices according to the laws of functions that, in the view of the Formalists, govern 
the literary work and motivate writers when writing. I would suggest that the idea of 
craftsmanship can also be applied to the way in which the Formalists reconstruct a literary text 
along the lines of function in line with their own psychological objectives, that is with the 
purpose (conscious or not) of creating a substitute reality that is free of signals reminding them 
of their real realities. So in the process the idea of content (values, beliefs, meanings, cultural 
references traditionally associated with literature) disappears and so does any reminder of the 
traumatic past and present.  
 In this line of thought, when Shklovsky says that “[a]rt is fundamentally ironic and 
destructive. It revitalizes the world,” his statement can be read literally as a perspective on the 
functioning of art whose abnormalities conflict with habitual perspectives, which conflict inflicts 
a rupture in our habitual vision of the world and introduces an element of recognition of realities 
in the text of which we were until then unaware. The very same passage offers another, less 
                                                




explicit reading, which stems from the Formalists’ negation of the realities of the world, 
manifested in their ironic non-recognition of that particular reality; in other words, their negation 
of the realities of the world via a substitute reality of fiction can be considered another (or 
parallel) mode in which art can be “ironic and destructive.”132 Not only does fiction provide an 
alternate reality, but in this instance, fiction, which can be seen as an antipode to reality, in a 
sense destroys the threatening component of reality and thus revitalizes the scholar, individual, 
survivor, while merging each of these identities and functions. When Shklovsky says, “[l]ife was 
such that we saw nothing in it, just as you can’t see from a man’s footprints what he is carrying. 
Only the footprints—sometimes deep, sometimes, shallow,” he speaks of the unspeakable horror 
and the void of anything that could provide a meaningful context for a direct engagement with 
the realities of the present, as well as of the inability to capture the semantics of such a life and 
its effect on us.133 Life leaves its marks, the possibility of meaning-generation lies not in 
semantics, but in the construct through which, as through the depth of a footprint, some 
correlation with the weight of one’s life shows forth. 
 The replacement of content with function and/or the incorporation of content into form 
allows for (and transmutes) the violation of meanings and thus of inequalities, because 
everything becomes of a functional value void of feelings, emotions, memories, values, and so 
on. Abnormalities in life, as depicted in countless gruesome incidents that Shklovsky recalls in 
his memoir, prepare the ground so semantic shifts in cognition resulting from events beyond 
what can be called normal become central and the literary norm is reflected in functional 
abnormalities both in terms of language application and inner functions. There are many 
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incidents throughout the memoir that testify to the breakdown of language and these incidents 
and thus set non-standard language application as the norm. What normally would be perceived 
as absurdity can take on a pseudo-reality, as in the story of the apes of Baku thought to have been 
sent by the English and trained by the Scottish to salvage what remained of Russia and defeat the 
Bolsheviks.134 Placing a dead baby on the steps can serve as a substitute for a formal, written 
complaint, because clearly these events (and human suffering on such a large scale) cannot be 
conveyed by normal language use, whose communicative function has broken down. The 
confrontation with the recurring semantic shift in everyday realities is “familiarized” and is 
introduced to literary realities via “estrangement” whereby an object is taken out of context--or 
estranged from its traditional context—and becomes a literary device. In this way, writing 
facilitates a process of familiarization or taming of a hostile stimulus, or as Freud would put it, 
the mastering of the event. 
 I have mentioned that under the conditions of exposure to extreme forms of threat, the 
body and the mind enter a state of alert and observe the environment keenly searching for clues. 
The heightened sensation of feeling threatened elevates the status of possible signals that may or 
may not help the individual orient him- or herself in meeting challenges, which results in a 
leveling of relevant and irrelevant information available for perception. Shklovsky recalls: “A 
man can find in his situation all kinds of nuances. I remember how surprised I was in Persia that 
the homeless Kurds lived around the walls of the city with a slight hollow, even if only a few 
inches. Evidently it seemed warmer to them there. And when a man is starving, he lives that 
way—continually fretting, wondering which is tastier, boiled greens or linden leaves. He even 
gets excited about these problems and, gradually becoming immersed in such nuances, he 
                                                




dies.”135  A similar thought is expressed in the following recollection: “And in this strange daily 
life, as strong as the sculptured peaks of Gaul, as long as a bread line, what was most strange of 
all was that we were equally interested in rolls and life. Everything that remained in the soul 
seemed of equal importance; all things were equal.”136 The leveling of available information is a 
characteristic feature of information processing of survivors of trauma, but in this instance it is 
also an indicator of a perception that seeks, in details, clues for survival. Since over time trauma 
becomes entrenched in physiology, that is, cannot be discarded, a predisposition to lose oneself 
in the details of a text could have a physiological explanation as well as a cognitive one. In other 
words, the drive to attend to the slightest clues in a literary artifact (and disregard the role of the 
whole) can be conditioned by a predisposition to search for clues everywhere within the text, in 
addition to being what one would call a consciously chosen method of analysis. Shklovsky’s 
account of how the Russians identified the Jews by asking them to say “kukuruza,”  and how 
they would kill those who betraying their Jewish accent pronounced the word as “kukuruzha” is 
one example of the extreme need to attend to the slightest details of language use and to pick up 
from the context the appropriate application, or choice of response, which if mistakenly applied, 
could result in the person’s death. As Primo Levi said, in the concentration camp the ability to 
report on the slightest details in one’s environment was both conditioned and instinctual; writing 
in that regard served as an outlet to register the world and create an inventory of all information 
that can be deduced from an experience, hoping that no pieces are missing in case the parts are 
needed to be pieced together. Attention to the slightest details not only is reflected in an inability 
to see the whole, but perhaps also in the role of writing in creating inventories of objects (facts) 
available at hand, hoping that while at the moment an overarching narrative is unavailable, with 
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time the fragments can be pieced together. It is the stage of sowing a seed as opposed to watering 
the plant and harvesting it. 
 So far, nearly all properties of language use, or here writing and its role for the author I 
have discussed, have fulfilled a non-communicative function. This function has an element of 
external component or necessity, especially when it is the context of a language user, and not the 
language user himself, that decides the  content.  Shklovsky tells a parable: “[I]f we had been 
asked then, ‘Who are you for—Kaledin, Kornilov or the Bolsheviks?’ Task and I would have 
chosen the Bolsheviks. However, in a certain comedy, the harlequin was asked, ‘Do you prefer 
to be hanged or quartered?’ He answered, ‘I prefer soup.’”137 Whether Shklovsky said he was for 
the Bolsheviks because he was afraid of being quartered by them, or whether he said he was for 
the Bolsheviks because the pressures of life superimposed their realities on the ordinary needs or 
wishes of the individual so that what he had to say (i.e., that he wanted soup) had no relevance 
whatsoever from the point of view of communal language use, is not so important to decide.  
Because language is seized by someone/something else other than the language user, language 
use or the speech act is a form of self-violation against and imposed on the language user. In this 
way, language use is estranged from the speaker. What one says is in no causal relationship with 
what one feels, thinks or wants. The following example illustrates this split within the identity of 
the language user/survivor. Shklovsky discusses in the passage the dilemma of those who fought 
in the Civil War against the Bolsheviks out of conviction that the Bolsheviks were deadly for the 
nation, but who were equally pained by the effect of the war on the Russian population and 
Russia itself:  
                                                




At one of our meetings, the right wing said; ‘Let’s try our hand at cultural work.’ In party 
jargon, this meant the same as the army command, ‘Stand in your place and smoke, if 
you want to.’ The jig was up. It was ‘curtains.’ You had to do something, so you did 
something with no causal connection or, to put it in our philological terminology, 
something of another semantic norm. And I delivered a speech. My course is clear; I’m 
not quick to catch on. I too am of another semantic norm-I’m like a samovar used to drive 
nails. I said: ‘Let’s recognize this triple-damned Soviet regime! Like at the judgment of 
Solomon, let’s not demand half the baby. Let’s give up the baby to strangers; only let him 
live! They shouted at me, ‘He’ll die; they’ll kill him.’ But what could I do? In this game, 
I could see only one move at a time.138 
 
A double estrangement is manifested, first in the image in which Shklovsky likens himself to “a 
samovar used to drive nails,” suggesting a misapplication of one object (normally used to 
enhance times of leisure and good conversations over tea) in the function of another (a hammer), 
and second in the parallel concept of needing to act under the circumstances as if with no causal 
connection. Connecting two images of different semantic domains means some form of violation 
in the connection of the elements within the picture. For example, the samovar’s image is linked 
to the domain of associations the image normally evokes; however, in this case, the connotation 
becomes that of a hammer. What happens is that the use of the image loses its reality component; 
it represents a random possibility in a logical space  that does not correspond to the logic of 
commonsense reality. Commonsense reality evaporates as a point of reference, or at least stands 
in conflict with the logic of the current state of affairs, to which it becomes subject. Both images 
suggest that the person and/or object is organized by forces external to him/it; the person or 
object’s functioning has no logic on a semantic level but rather fulfills as it were a structural 
purpose. A person becomes a device motivated not by the inner logic of his personal beliefs, 
faith, values, psychology, etc., but by some external scheme or logic. This notion that is rooted in 
the encounter with everyday realities is very similar if not identical to the notion that in literature 
                                                




all literary elements are subject to a structure that is external to them, and that it is not their 
semantic reference but the structural role that plays the major part in how the elements are 
arranged. 
A similar thought emerges later in the memoir when Shklovsky reflects: “everything that 
organizes an individual is external to him. He’s only the point where lines of force intersect.”139 
If one’s life takes place at such intersections, integrating these external forces into a meaningful 
construct can allow a sense of agency or ownership over one’s life. I believe this is the stance 
Shklovsky is taking when he says: “I’ll continue making a cross-section of my life.”140  
Language or writing in this regard is a reassertion of a loss of control over the structural realities 
of one’s life; in a sense, a quest into how one can best live life not by blocking, but by embracing 
such forces or intersecting lines in one’s fate. This approach to one’s life would allow a person 
whose significance as a part, or random object in the universe, is negligible, to enjoy a 
redeeming importance on a structural or systemic level. 
Examples listed in this section that illustrate the role of writing in Shklovksy’s life are 
manifold and are far from exhaustive.  Any statement as to the various functions writing fulfilled 
for Shklovsky seems to run the risk of oversimplification, but perhaps one can safely say that 
writing and scholarship played a central role in Shklovsky’s ability to cope with the influx of 
traumatic memories and cultural discontinuity.  It also allowed him to impart a meaning to his 
life via his scholarship, in a way that in other venues of life would have been nearly impossible, 
as any possible meaning-constructs were external to the individual and gradually appropriated by 
the totalitarian state. When given consideration to all factors, it is not an understatement to say 
                                                
139 Shklovsky, A Sentimental Journey, 188. 
 




that Shklovsky rode the waves of adversity with the most grace the situation and human intellect 




















III.	  Shklovsky’s	  Early	  Theory	  of	  Prose	  (1917-­‐1919)	  
	  
I	  fear	  my	  destiny.	  I	  fear	  its	  literary	  quality.	  




Shklovsky’s	  early	  theoretical	  stance	  on	  prose	  was	  articulated	  in	  two	  seminal	  
articles:	  “Art	  as	  Device”	  (“Iskusstvo	  kak	  priem,”	  1917)	  and	  “The	  Relationship	  between	  
Devices	  of	  Plot	  Construction	  and	  General	  Devices	  of	  Style”	  (“Sviaz'	  priemov	  
siuzhetoslozheniia	  s	  obshchimi	  priemami	  stilia,”	  1919).	  The	  circumstances	  surrounding	  the	  
birth	  of	  the	  two	  articles	  and	  their	  personal	  significance	  are	  well	  documented	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  
memoir,	  while	  the	  articles	  can	  attest	  to	  a	  system	  of	  thought	  that	  encompasses	  the	  author’s	  
position	  on	  art	  and	  literary	  scholarship.	  The	  scholarly	  articles,	  when	  embedded	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  memoir,	  reveal	  structural	  realities	  that	  they	  “borrow”	  from	  extra-­‐literary	  
materials	  in	  the	  author’s	  life,	  while	  the	  stylistic	  and	  thematic	  features	  in	  the	  memoir	  gain	  
special	  complexity	  when	  seen	  from	  the	  angle	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  the	  literary	  text	  as	  established	  
by	  Shklovsky.	  In	  my	  first	  chapter	  I	  explored	  how	  images	  of	  traumatic	  encounters	  bore	  signs	  
of	  traumatic	  cognitive	  processing,	  and	  suggested	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  effect	  of	  trauma	  
can	  be	  detected	  in	  everyday	  language	  use.	  A	  closer	  examination	  of	  Shklovsky’s	  theoretical	  
writings	  can	  highlight,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  existence	  of	  traumatic	  encounters,	  the	  significance	  
                                                




of	  these	  encounters	  in	  connection	  with	  structural	  realities	  within	  Shklovsky’s	  paradigm	  as	  
well	  as	  certain	  motivations	  behind	  Shklovsky’s	  theoretical	  underpinnings	  and	  identity	  as	  a	  
scholar.	  
Shklovsky	  refers	  to	  his	  two	  seminal	  articles	  in	  A	  Sentimental	  Journey	  on	  numerous	  
occasions.	  The	  later	  article	  is	  often	  referenced	  in	  the	  memoir	  as	  a	  piece	  of	  work	  that	  was	  
written	  under	  excruciating	  circumstances	  and	  which	  had	  enormous	  value	  to	  Shklovsky	  at	  
times	  of	  great	  personal	  sufferings.	  The	  earlier	  article	  is	  famous	  in	  its	  own	  right	  for	  being	  
considered	  by	  many,	  including	  members	  of	  the	  Formalist	  circle,	  as	  the	  school’s	  artistic	  
manifesto.	  	  “Art	  as	  Device”	  was	  published	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Tsarist	  era	  and	  World	  War	  
I	  (1917),	  the	  “The	  Relationship”	  during	  the	  time	  of	  the	  Civil	  War,	  famine	  and	  Red	  Terror	  
(1919).	  The	  period	  in	  question	  (1917-­‐1919)	  signals	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  general	  welfare	  of	  the	  
country	  from	  bad	  to	  worse,	  a	  motion	  of	  regression	  from	  a	  dysfunctional	  but	  more	  or	  less	  
constitutional	  dual	  government	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  lawless	  Bolshevik	  totalitarian	  
state.	  The	  times	  changed	  during	  these	  years	  for	  Shklovsky	  as	  well.	  	  In	  1917,	  he	  was	  a	  
respected	  soldier	  and	  then	  commissar	  on	  the	  front	  of	  WWI	  and	  in	  Persia.	  By	  1919	  his	  
fortune	  was	  markedly	  reversed;	  he	  was	  in	  hiding	  in	  the	  countryside	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  flee	  from	  
being	  arrested	  and	  prosecuted	  by	  the	  Bolsheviks.	  
Both	  articles	  focus	  primarily	  on	  prose	  and	  issues	  regarding	  narrative	  construction	  at	  
a	  time	  when,	  in	  the	  background,	  pre-­‐revolutionary	  cultural	  narratives	  were	  at	  a	  point	  of	  
disintegration	  (1917)	  and	  the	  Bolshevik	  totalitarian	  state	  with	  its	  own	  historical	  narratives	  
was	  about	  to	  take	  hold	  over	  the	  society	  (1919).	  These	  were	  times	  when	  individuals	  




collective	  account	  of	  what	  was	  happening.	  	  The	  times	  can	  be	  conveyed	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  terse	  
statement:	  “as	  for	  me,	  I	  can’t	  make	  sense	  out	  of	  all	  the	  strange	  things	  I’ve	  seen	  in	  Russia.”142	  
The	  times	  hardly	  seemed	  conducive	  to	  forming	  a	  theory	  of	  prose	  conveying	  an	  overarching	  
or	  unifying	  metanarrative,	  but	  perhaps	  because	  of	  the	  environment’s	  inherent	  hostility	  to	  
meaning-­‐formations	  and	  metanarratives	  based	  on	  precedent,	  there	  remained	  no	  other	  way	  
but	  forging	  ahead	  along	  new	  paths.	  Both	  articles	  are	  central	  documents	  for	  establishing	  
what	  if	  any	  role	  his	  encounter	  with	  the	  cataclysmic	  events	  that	  took	  place	  in	  Russia	  played	  
in	  Shklovsky’s	  theoretical	  stance.	  First,	  because	  they	  are	  written	  under	  well-­‐documented	  
circumstances,	  when	  the	  existence	  of	  traumatic	  encounter	  can	  be	  established.	  Secondly,	  
because	  thematically	  Shklovsky’s	  and	  trauma	  researchers’	  interest	  overlaps	  inasmuch	  as	  
they	  both	  try	  to	  understand	  the	  inner	  workings	  of	  a	  narrative	  construct,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  
former,	  of	  a	  literary	  text,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  latter,	  of	  trauma	  narratives.	  	  So	  they	  are	  both	  
invested	  in	  understanding	  the	  structural	  laws	  that	  govern	  text	  formations,	  under	  
“abnormal”	  conditions:	  one	  within	  the	  context	  of	  literature,	  the	  other	  in	  the	  context	  of	  
traumatic	  encounter.	  What	  I	  hope	  to	  prove	  is	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  series	  of	  analogous	  
structures	  in	  traumatic	  processing	  and	  the	  formation	  of	  prose	  narratives	  as	  articulated	  by	  
Shklovsky	  that	  can	  illustrate,	  based	  on	  support	  from	  the	  author’s	  theoretical	  work,	  the	  




                                                




“Art	  as	  Device”	  
	  
	   Shklovsky’s	  article	  “Art	  as	  Device”	  is	  one	  of	  the	  earliest	  works	  of	  Opoyaz	  that	  applies	  
to	  prose	  as	  well	  as	  poetry	  (before	  this	  article,	  poetry	  had	  been	  the	  main	  concern	  of	  the	  
school),	  and	  is	  considered	  the	  signature	  piece	  of	  the	  Formalist	  movement	  as	  it	  is	  the	  first	  of	  
their	  studies	  that	  articulates	  the	  school’s	  position	  on	  questions	  regarding	  the	  essence	  of	  art.	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  focus	  on	  two	  key	  themes	  in	  the	  article.	  The	  first	  concerns	  the	  contrast	  
between	  two	  schools	  of	  aesthetics	  that	  Shklovsky	  singles	  out,	  one	  advocating	  for	  the	  
primacy	  of	  content,	  the	  other	  for	  literary	  function.	  The	  second	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  
feature	  of	  	  “impeded	  intelligibility”	  of	  the	  literary	  text	  which	  is	  artificially	  induced	  by	  
literary	  devices	  whose	  purpose	  is	  to	  impede	  cognitive	  processing	  of	  the	  literary	  text.	  
Shklovsky’s	  argument	  defines	  the	  Formalists	  in	  direct	  contrast	  with	  previous	  
schools	  of	  thought	  that	  center	  their	  understanding	  of	  art	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  poetic	  image.	  
The	  purpose	  of	  his	  argument	  is	  to	  prove	  instead	  the	  primacy	  of	  structural	  features	  and	  
motivations	  in	  art.	  The	  predominance	  of	  the	  perceived	  role	  of	  images	  in	  the	  arts	  in	  previous	  
schools,	  according	  to	  Shklovsky,	  stems	  from	  the	  presuppositions,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  that	  art,	  
much	  like	  anything	  else,	  is	  motivated	  by	  the	  natural	  principle	  of	  economy	  visible	  in	  all	  laws	  
of	  the	  universe,	  and	  on	  the	  other,	  that	  art	  has	  its	  purpose	  in	  facilitating	  a	  connection	  
between	  the	  domains	  of	  the	  known	  and	  the	  unknown	  or	  ineffable	  which	  it	  fulfills	  by	  its	  
ability	  to	  resort	  to	  the	  use	  of	  the	  poetic	  image.	  Shklovsky	  quotes	  the	  words	  of	  academician	  
Ovsyaniko-­‐Kulikovsky,	  who	  argues	  for	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  laws	  of	  economy	  in	  poetry	  when	  




This	  mode	  entails	  a	  certain	  economy	  of	  mental	  effort	  that	  makes	  us	  ‘feel	  the	  relative	  ease	  of	  
the	  process.’	  The	  aesthetic	  sense	  is	  a	  consequence	  of	  this	  economy.”143	  	  The	  purpose	  of	  art,	  
as	  seen	  from	  this	  position,	  is	  to	  lighten	  the	  mind	  or	  please	  the	  heart,	  or	  just,	  in	  general,	  to	  
create	  a	  sense	  of	  ease.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  position	  of	  those	  who	  advocate	  the	  tenet	  of	  poetry’s	  
suggestive,	  evocative	  power,	  Shklovsky	  sums	  up	  their	  stance	  as	  follows:	  “[they]	  consider	  
poetry	  to	  be	  a	  special	  form	  of	  thinking	  (i.e.,	  thinking	  with	  the	  aid	  of	  images).	  The	  raison	  
d’etre	  of	  the	  image	  consists,	  in	  their	  opinion,	  in	  helping	  to	  organize	  heterogeneous	  objects	  
and	  actions	  into	  groups.	  And	  the	  unknown	  is	  explained	  through	  the	  known.”144	  	  This	  
position	  is	  based	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  art	  via	  its	  use	  of	  images	  can	  organize	  particulars	  
into	  generals	  and	  reach	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  ineffable	  that	  cannot	  be	  communicated	  by	  
normal	  language	  use.	  In	  short,	  according	  to	  the	  academic	  tradition,	  poetry	  or	  art	  is	  the	  most	  
effective—and	  efficient-­‐-­‐way	  of	  learning	  about	  the	  world,	  about	  subject	  matter	  that	  cannot	  
be	  communicated	  via	  ordinary	  language	  use.	  
Aesthetic	  positions	  that	  see	  economy	  as	  the	  law	  governing	  perception	  in	  the	  arts	  
parallel	  Freud’s	  assumptions	  that	  human	  organisms,	  like	  all	  organisms	  in	  the	  universe,	  
operate	  according	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  economy;	  therefore,	  the	  main	  motivation	  of	  any	  organism	  
is	  the	  approximation	  of	  complete	  stability.	  Freud	  explains	  his	  observations	  as	  follows:	  “In	  
so	  far	  as	  conscious	  impulses	  always	  have	  some	  relation	  to	  pleasure	  or	  unpleasure,	  pleasure	  
and	  unpleasure,	  too,	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  having	  a	  psycho-­‐physical	  relation	  to	  conditions	  of	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stability	  and	  instability.”145	  From	  this	  observation	  Freud	  proceeds	  to	  the	  following	  
hypothesis:	  	  
[E]very	  psycho-­‐physical	  motion	  rising	  above	  the	  threshold	  of	  consciousness	  is	  
attended	  by	  pleasure	  in	  proportion	  as,	  beyond	  a	  certain	  limit,	  it	  approximates	  to	  
complete	  stability,	  and	  is	  attended	  by	  unpleasure	  in	  proportion	  as,	  beyond	  certain	  
limit,	  it	  deviates	  from	  complete	  stability;	  while	  between	  the	  two	  limits,	  which	  may	  
be	  described	  as	  qualitative	  thresholds	  of	  pleasure	  and	  unpleasure,	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  
margin	  of	  aesthetic	  indifference.	  The	  facts	  which	  have	  caused	  us	  to	  believe	  in	  the	  
dominance	  of	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  in	  mental	  life	  also	  find	  expression	  in	  the	  
hypothesis	  that	  the	  mental	  apparatus	  endeavors	  to	  keep	  the	  quantity	  of	  excitation	  
present	  in	  it	  as	  low	  as	  possible	  or	  at	  least	  constant.	  This	  latter	  hypothesis	  is	  only	  
another	  way	  of	  stating	  the	  pleasure	  principle;	  for	  if	  the	  work	  of	  the	  mental	  
apparatus	  is	  directed	  towards	  keeping	  the	  quantity	  of	  excitation	  low,	  then	  anything	  
that	  is	  calculated	  to	  increase	  that	  quantity	  is	  bound	  to	  be	  felt	  as	  adverse	  to	  the	  
functioning	  of	  the	  apparatus,	  that	  is	  unpleasurable.	  The	  pleasure	  principle	  follows	  
from	  the	  principle	  of	  constancy.146	  	  
	  
According	  to	  Freud,	  such	  a	  state	  of	  rest	  is	  essential	  in	  the	  survival	  of	  any	  organism;	  
therefore,	  the	  organism	  associates	  rest	  with	  pleasure,	  unrest	  with	  unpleasure.	  If	  one	  
compares	  the	  principle	  of	  economy	  as	  outlined	  by	  adherents	  of	  traditional	  or	  pre-­‐modern	  
aesthetics	  with	  that	  of	  Freud,	  the	  similarities	  of	  the	  argument	  would	  suggest	  that	  that	  pre-­‐
modern	  views	  on	  art	  belie	  the	  scholars’	  preference	  for	  the	  principle	  of	  constancy	  and	  
restoration,	  which	  is	  what	  they	  associate	  with	  the	  pleasure	  art	  provides.	  These	  scholars	  
single	  out	  as	  central	  features	  in	  art	  those	  characteristics	  that	  facilitate	  the	  ease	  of	  the	  
organism,	  such	  as	  laws	  of	  economy	  and	  images	  that	  help	  to	  process	  particulars	  into	  
generals	  or	  images	  that	  help	  make	  sense	  of	  various	  and	  often	  difficult	  to	  understand	  
phenomena.	  In	  other	  words,	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  arts	  is	  centered	  on	  the	  role	  they	  
perceive	  art	  has	  in	  eliminating	  the	  disturbance	  of	  the	  soul,	  easing	  its	  relationship	  with	  the	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world,	  providing	  a	  sense	  of	  comfort,	  safety	  and	  understanding.	  This	  perception	  of	  art	  is	  
regressive	  or	  retroactive	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  views	  all	  knowledge	  available	  to	  art	  as	  a	  priori	  
(existing	  before	  the	  artifact),	  so	  art	  is	  always	  oriented	  as	  if	  toward	  an	  idyllic	  form,	  an	  a	  
priori	  reality	  that	  it	  can	  never	  fully	  attain.	  	  
The	  paradigm	  of	  art	  Shklovsky	  proposes	  stands	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  one	  
described	  above.	  He	  denies	  the	  role	  of	  the	  image	  and,	  instead,	  calls	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  
structure	  in	  literary	  language.	  He	  articulates	  his	  position	  as	  follows:	  “The	  work	  of	  
successive	  schools	  of	  poetry	  has	  consisted	  essentially	  in	  accumulating	  and	  making	  known	  
new	  devices	  of	  verbal	  arrangement	  and	  organization.	  In	  particular,	  these	  schools	  of	  poetry	  
are	  far	  more	  concerned	  with	  the	  disposition	  than	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  imagery.”147	  	  The	  
purpose	  of	  art,	  according	  to	  Shklovsky,	  is	  not	  to	  know	  of	  an	  object	  but	  to	  be	  able	  to	  perceive	  
it.	  He	  claims:	  “the	  artistic	  quality	  of	  something,	  in	  relationship	  to	  poetry,	  is	  a	  result	  of	  our	  
perception.	  In	  a	  narrow	  sense	  we	  shall	  call	  a	  work	  artistic	  if	  it	  has	  been	  created	  by	  special	  
devices	  whose	  purpose	  is	  to	  see	  to	  it	  that	  these	  artifacts	  are	  interpreted	  artistically	  as	  much	  
as	  possible.”148	  The	  way	  perception	  is	  stimulated	  is	  by	  the	  method	  of	  estrangement	  
(ostranenine).	  Shklovsky	  explains	  the	  process	  as	  follows:	  “The	  purpose	  of	  art,	  then,	  is	  to	  
lead	  us	  to	  knowledge	  of	  a	  thing	  through	  the	  organ	  of	  sight	  instead	  of	  recognition.	  By	  
estranging	  objects	  and	  complicating	  form,	  the	  device	  of	  art	  makes	  perception	  long	  and	  
laborious.	  The	  perceptual	  process	  in	  art	  has	  a	  purpose	  all	  its	  own	  and	  ought	  to	  be	  extended	  
to	  the	  fullest.	  Art	  is	  a	  means	  of	  experiencing	  the	  process	  of	  creativity.	  The	  artifact	  itself	  is	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quite	  unimportant.”149	  	  Shklovsky	  articulates	  the	  Formalists’	  position	  through	  drawing	  
numerous	  contrasts	  between	  them	  and	  the	  academic	  tradition,	  such	  as	  disposition	  of	  
images	  vs.	  creation	  of	  images;	  seeing	  (an	  image)	  as	  if	  for	  the	  first	  time	  vs.	  knowing	  (or	  
recognizing)	  an	  object	  in	  its	  eternity;	  long,	  laborious,	  complicated	  forms	  vs.	  the	  principle	  of	  
economy	  and	  easy	  access.	  The	  role	  of	  the	  image	  thus	  is	  demoted	  to	  the	  point	  where	  the	  
image	  performs	  the	  same	  function	  as	  any	  other	  device	  in	  the	  literary	  arts.	  Its	  role,	  
according	  to	  Shklovsky,	  is	  “not	  to	  draw	  our	  understanding	  closer	  to	  that	  which	  this	  image	  
stands	  for,	  but	  rather	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  perceive	  the	  objects	  in	  a	  special	  way,	  in	  short,	  to	  lead	  us	  
to	  a	  vision	  of	  this	  object	  rather	  than	  mere	  recognition.”150	  Vision	  for	  Shklovsky	  is	  the	  
equivalent	  of	  an	  “aha”	  moment,	  when	  one	  is	  able	  to	  see	  something	  that	  normally	  escapes	  
our	  recognition.	  Recognition	  of	  an	  object	  is	  acquired	  through	  habitual	  encounter,	  therefore,	  
is	  prone	  to	  error,	  for	  we	  are	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  see	  what	  we	  are	  used	  to	  seeing.	  
If	  we	  return	  to	  Freud’s	  thoughts	  on	  the	  pleasure	  principle,	  we	  notice	  that	  
Shklovsky’s	  stance	  on	  art	  suggests	  that	  art	  operates	  along	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  “reality	  
principle,”	  or	  that	  Shklovsky	  reverses	  the	  role	  of	  pleasure	  and	  reality	  principles	  whereby	  
what	  Freud	  would	  call	  the	  reality	  principle,	  which	  is	  generated	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  instability	  of	  
the	  mind,	  becomes	  central	  to	  an	  appreciation	  of	  the	  arts,	  for	  him	  a	  source	  of	  pleasure.	  
Freud	  himself	  recognizes	  that	  often	  the	  principle	  of	  reality	  takes	  over	  the	  principle	  of	  
pleasure,	  a	  fact	  that	  he	  struggles	  to	  explain,	  since	  he	  believes	  that	  the	  desire	  for	  stability	  is	  
essential	  for	  survival,	  and	  instability,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  evokes	  fear	  of	  death	  which	  the	  
                                                
149	  Shklovsky,	  “Art	  as	  Device”	  in	  Theory	  of	  Prose,	  6.	  
	  




organism	  leans	  away	  from.	  His	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  the	  pleasure	  principle,	  which	  is	  a	  
primary	  motivating	  force,	  does	  not	  always	  dominate	  in	  human	  actions	  follows:	  	  
We	  know	  that	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  is	  proper	  to	  a	  primary	  method	  of	  working	  on	  
the	  part	  of	  the	  mental	  apparatus,	  but	  that,	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  self-­‐
preservation	  of	  the	  organism	  among	  the	  difficulties	  of	  the	  external	  world,	  it	  is	  from	  
the	  outset	  inefficient	  and	  even	  highly	  dangerous.	  Under	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  ego’s	  
instincts	  of	  self-­‐preservation,	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  is	  replaced	  by	  the	  reality	  
principle.	  This	  latter	  principle	  does	  not	  abandon	  the	  intention	  of	  ultimately	  
obtaining	  pleasure,	  but	  it	  nevertheless	  demands	  and	  carries	  into	  effect	  the	  
postponement	  of	  satisfaction,	  the	  abandonment	  of	  a	  number	  of	  possibilities	  of	  
gaining	  satisfaction	  and	  the	  temporary	  toleration	  of	  unpleasure	  as	  a	  step	  on	  the	  long	  
road	  to	  pleasure.151	  
	  
	   Freud	  in	  this	  passage	  implies	  that	  because	  (or	  when)	  the	  world	  is	  perceived	  as	  
highly	  dangerous,	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  is	  not	  always	  the	  key	  motivating	  force,	  because	  the	  
individual	  realizes	  the	  threat	  and	  delays	  obtaining	  pleasure	  and	  satisfaction.	  Denial	  of	  
immediate	  satisfaction	  that	  according	  to	  the	  laws	  of	  economy	  can	  be	  the	  most	  immediate	  
reward	  can	  be	  replaced	  by	  a	  delay	  in	  the	  hope	  of	  long	  term	  satisfaction.	  Basically,	  both	  
principles	  aim	  at	  self-­‐preservation,	  and	  whether	  one	  or	  the	  other	  is	  triggered	  has	  a	  lot	  to	  do	  
to	  how	  much	  the	  organism	  feels	  under	  threat.	  
	   The	  question	  is,	  if,	  as	  Freud	  suggests,	  humans	  prefer	  to	  operate	  along	  the	  pleasure	  
principle,	  under	  what	  conditions	  can	  we	  say	  that	  a	  person	  will	  opt	  out	  of	  the	  pleasure	  
principle	  and	  operate	  according	  to	  the	  reality	  principle?	  Freud	  says	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  a	  
trauma	  “the	  pleasure	  principle	  is	  for	  the	  moment	  put	  out	  of	  action.	  There	  is	  no	  longer	  any	  
possibility	  of	  preventing	  the	  mental	  apparatus	  from	  being	  flooded	  with	  large	  amount	  of	  
stimulus,	  and	  another	  problem	  arises	  instead—the	  problem	  of	  mastering	  the	  amounts	  of	  
                                                




stimulus	  which	  have	  broken	  in	  and	  of	  binding	  them,	  in	  the	  physical	  sense,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  
be	  disposed	  of.”152	  So	  one	  explanation	  of	  Shklovsky’s	  preference	  for	  a	  model	  that	  speaks	  
against	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  in	  art,	  or	  at	  least	  the	  way	  it	  is	  conceived	  as	  an	  immediate	  or	  
effortless	  means	  of	  connecting	  with	  deeper	  truths,	  is	  that,	  first,	  the	  historical	  context	  is	  not	  
in	  favor	  of	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  because	  reality	  is	  too	  threatening;	  and,	  second,	  the	  
pleasure	  principle	  cannot	  accommodate	  the	  influx	  of	  traumatic	  encounters,	  so	  instead	  
another	  principle	  is	  triggered	  whose	  motivation	  is	  that	  of	  the	  mastering	  of	  the	  hostile	  
stimuli.	  From	  the	  traumatic	  encounter	  on,	  focus	  is	  on	  accommodating	  the	  hostile	  stimuli,	  
decoding	  their	  “new”	  meaning,	  and	  restoring	  the	  general	  meaning	  to	  a	  priori	  knowledge.	  
An	  equally	  likely	  possibility,	  also	  inherent	  in	  Freud’s	  explanation,	  is	  that	  there	  are	  no	  
available	  cultural	  norms	  that	  one	  could	  refer	  back	  to:	  that	  is,	  while	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  pleasure	  
principle	  is	  to	  sustain	  the	  status	  quo,	  there	  is	  simply	  no	  status	  quo,	  no	  knowledge	  content	  
base	  to	  which	  art	  could	  refer	  during	  the	  times	  the	  article	  was	  conceived.	  Shklovsky’s	  focus	  
on	  devices	  that	  delay	  perception	  has	  its	  parallel	  in	  medical	  literature,	  where	  it	  is	  often	  
noted	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  trauma	  results	  in	  a	  delay	  of	  “understanding”	  for	  survivors	  who	  
lack	  the	  ability	  to	  process	  what	  happened	  to	  them	  and	  to	  integrate	  traumatic	  memories	  and	  
create	  a	  verbal	  narrative	  about	  the	  event.	  	  
If	  we	  consider	  that	  traumatic	  encounters	  over	  time	  condition	  physiological	  
responses	  (whereby	  the	  victim	  internalizes	  trauma),	  an	  argument	  could	  also	  be	  made	  that	  
Shklovsky’s	  stance	  on	  art	  may	  reflect	  an	  element	  of	  internalization	  of	  stimuli	  and	  
externalization	  or	  form	  of	  release	  of	  these	  stimuli	  onto	  outer	  realities,	  that	  is,	  to	  the	  reality	  
of	  the	  literary	  text.	  As	  Freud	  states:	  ”[A]	  particular	  way	  is	  adopted	  of	  dealing	  with	  any	  
                                                




internal	  excitations	  which	  produce	  too	  great	  an	  increase	  of	  unpleasure:	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  
to	  treat	  them	  as	  though	  they	  were	  acting,	  not	  from	  the	  inside,	  but	  from	  the	  outside,	  so	  that	  
it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  bring	  the	  shield	  against	  stimuli	  into	  operation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  defense	  
against	  them.”153	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  projection	  of	  internal	  instability	  onto	  the	  outside	  world	  
can	  offer	  a	  release	  of	  inner	  tension	  and	  can	  help	  stabilize	  a	  person.	  Freud	  struggles	  to	  
explain	  why	  it	  is	  that,	  as	  he	  says,	  “in	  addition	  to	  the	  conservative	  instincts	  which	  impel	  
towards	  repetition,	  there	  may	  be	  others	  which	  push	  forward	  towards	  progress	  and	  the	  
production	  of	  new	  forms.”154	  He	  cannot	  see	  a	  role	  for	  another	  instinct	  to	  play	  and	  therefore	  
concludes,	  “Let	  us	  suppose,	  then	  that	  all	  the	  organic	  instincts	  are	  conservative,	  are	  acquired	  
historically	  and	  tend	  towards	  the	  restoration	  of	  an	  earlier	  state	  of	  things.	  It	  follows	  that	  the	  
phenomena	  of	  organic	  development	  must	  be	  attributed	  to	  external	  disturbing	  and	  diverting	  
influences.”155	  	  Freud	  frequently	  reminds	  us	  of	  the	  hypothetical	  nature	  of	  this	  enterprise,	  
and	  suggests	  various	  solutions	  as	  to	  how	  we	  can	  account	  for	  progress	  and	  our	  “instinct”	  
toward	  perfection.	  He	  contemplates	  the	  possibility	  that	  “[b]oth	  higher	  development	  and	  
involution	  [an	  act	  contrary	  to	  the	  pleasure	  principle]	  might	  well	  be	  the	  consequences	  of	  
adaptation	  to	  the	  pressure	  of	  external	  forces;	  and	  in	  both	  cases	  the	  part	  played	  by	  instincts	  
might	  be	  limited	  to	  the	  retention	  (in	  the	  form	  of	  an	  internal	  source	  of	  pleasure)	  of	  an	  
obligatory	  modification.”156	  What	  happens,	  according	  to	  Freud,	  then,	  is	  that	  since	  the	  
pleasure	  principle	  is	  delayed	  because	  the	  organism’s	  desire	  to	  sustain	  the	  status	  quo	  is	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impossible,	  there	  is	  no	  alternative	  but	  to	  advance	  in	  the	  direction	  in	  which	  growth	  is	  still	  
free	  and	  possible.	  If	  one	  is	  to	  apply	  the	  processes	  Freud	  describes	  to	  a	  cultural	  product,	  
then	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  there	  are	  epochs	  in	  which	  there	  is	  a	  tendency	  toward	  restoration	  
or	  regression,	  when	  the	  threat	  to	  the	  homeostasis	  of	  the	  culture	  is	  below	  the	  threshold	  that	  
an	  organism	  can	  handle,	  whereas	  when	  the	  individual	  feels	  under	  grave	  threat	  and	  the	  
protective	  shield	  is	  broken	  through,	  the	  desire	  to	  reach	  a	  restoration	  of	  an	  earlier	  state	  of	  
affairs	  (state	  of	  equilibrium)	  is	  abandoned	  and	  the	  organism	  is	  pushed	  forward.	  In	  a	  sense,	  
both	  directions	  aim	  at	  the	  same	  result,	  that	  is	  of	  a	  restoration	  of	  earlier	  state	  of	  things,	  but	  
one	  retroactively,	  the	  other	  proactively.	  If	  there	  are	  no	  external	  disturbing	  forces,	  the	  
organism	  would	  continue	  to	  repeat	  the	  same	  course	  of	  life.	  If	  there	  is	  an	  external	  threat,	  
however,	  it	  may	  “oblige	  the	  still	  surviving	  substance	  to	  diverge	  ever	  more	  widely	  from	  its	  
original	  course	  of	  life	  and	  to	  make	  ever	  more	  complicated	  detours	  before	  reaching	  its	  aim	  
of	  death.”157	  Art	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  this	  perspective	  as	  a	  verbal	  or	  visual	  expression	  of	  the	  
compulsion	  to	  repeat	  the	  external	  (and	  internalized)	  stimuli	  the	  body	  encounters,	  in	  an	  
effort	  to	  master	  them.	  Once	  the	  hostile	  stimulus	  is	  mastered,	  it	  becomes	  part	  of	  the	  status	  
quo,	  or,	  in	  literary	  terms,	  part	  of	  the	  canon.	  This	  is	  one	  possible	  explanation	  of	  the	  origin	  of	  
Shklovsky’s	  aesthetics	  and	  the	  dynamics	  he	  sees	  between	  academic	  and	  modern	  aesthetics.	  
	   Shklovsky’s	  vision	  of	  art,	  when	  looked	  at	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  Freud’s	  model,	  can	  also	  
explain	  why	  the	  deficit	  in	  stability	  and	  the	  presence	  of	  external	  threat	  the	  artists	  of	  the	  
avant-­‐garde	  faced	  could	  lead	  to	  an	  upsurge	  of	  creative	  and	  progressive	  energy	  that	  
manifested	  itself	  in	  formal	  experimentation	  and	  not	  in	  meaning-­‐constructs.	  	  When	  an	  
organism	  is	  under	  immediate	  threat	  (be	  it	  external	  threat	  or	  internal,	  that	  is,	  an	  
                                                




internalized	  form	  of	  traumatic	  encounter),	  it	  is	  forced	  to	  evolve	  and	  embrace	  and	  integrate	  
the	  stimulus,	  which	  is	  the	  only	  way	  it	  can	  be	  disposed	  of.	  The	  stimulus,	  because	  of	  its	  
hostile	  disposition	  toward	  the	  organism,	  is	  not	  easily	  integrated	  and	  will	  go	  through	  
endless	  repetitions	  until	  it	  can	  be	  integrated,	  which	  is	  when	  the	  organism	  regains	  its	  state	  
of	  rest.	  Shklovsky	  made	  a	  peculiarly	  similar	  comment,	  asserting	  that	  there	  cannot	  and	  will	  
never	  be	  a	  theory	  of	  rhythm	  because	  “a	  violation	  can	  never	  be	  predicted.	  If	  this	  violation	  
enters	  the	  canon,	  then	  it	  loses	  its	  power	  as	  a	  complicating	  device.”158	  
	   Fundamental	  to	  Shklovsky’s	  aesthetics	  is	  an	  ethical	  component	  of	  art	  that	  is	  very	  
often	  overlooked.	  Art	  has	  an	  impact,	  he	  claims,	  that	  is	  transformative	  and	  elevating.	  He	  
argues:	  “If	  we	  examine	  the	  general	  laws	  of	  perception,	  we	  see	  that	  as	  it	  becomes	  habitual,	  it	  
also	  becomes	  automatic.	  So	  eventually	  all	  of	  our	  skills	  and	  experiences	  function	  
unconsciously—automatically.	  If	  someone	  were	  to	  compare	  the	  sensation	  of	  holding	  a	  pen	  
in	  his	  hand	  or	  speaking	  a	  foreign	  tongue	  for	  the	  very	  first	  time	  with	  the	  sensation	  of	  
performing	  this	  same	  operation	  for	  the	  ten	  thousandth	  time,	  then	  he	  would	  no	  doubt	  agree	  
with	  us.”159	  	  The	  inability	  to	  perceive	  a	  mode	  of	  living	  consumed	  by	  automatisms	  has	  
ethical	  implication,	  because	  when	  “held	  accountable	  for	  nothing,	  life	  fades	  into	  
nothingness.	  Automatization	  eats	  away	  at	  things,	  at	  clothes,	  at	  furniture,	  at	  our	  wives,	  and	  
at	  our	  fear	  of	  war”.160	  “And	  so,”	  Shklovsky	  continues,	  “in	  order	  to	  return	  sensation	  to	  our	  
limbs,	  in	  order	  to	  make	  us	  feel	  objects,	  to	  make	  a	  stone	  feel	  stony,	  man	  has	  been	  given	  the	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tool	  of	  art.”161	  In	  this	  context	  experimentation	  in	  the	  arts	  has	  an	  ethical	  component,	  
because	  it	  fights	  apathy,	  complacency.	  This	  comment	  sheds	  a	  unique	  light	  onto	  what	  “status	  
quo”	  or	  “norm”	  during	  war	  may	  feel	  like.	  	  It	  seems	  here	  that	  it	  signals	  the	  numbing	  of	  the	  
senses	  and	  an	  overwhelming	  indifference	  to	  death.	  	  
	   Fear	  of	  the	  norm	  or	  status	  quo	  is	  reflected	  in	  the	  text	  where	  anything	  that	  reaches	  a	  
point	  of	  stability	  and	  rest	  is	  equated	  to	  death.	  Shklovsky	  states:	  “the	  life	  of	  a	  poem	  (and	  of	  
an	  artifact)	  proceeds	  from	  vision	  to	  recognition,	  from	  poetry	  to	  prose,	  from	  concrete	  to	  
general…As	  the	  work	  of	  art	  dies,	  it	  becomes	  broader:	  the	  fable	  is	  more	  symbolic	  than	  a	  
poem	  and	  a	  proverb	  is	  more	  symbolic	  than	  a	  fable.”162	  Shklovsky	  sees	  poetry	  as	  the	  best	  
example	  of	  that	  which	  is	  characteristic	  of	  literary	  language	  use,	  whereas	  he	  sees	  narrative	  
as	  the	  conclusion	  of	  a	  process,	  the	  very	  end	  or	  death	  of	  the	  “vision”	  induced	  into	  ordinary	  
perception	  by	  art.	  Shklovsky’s	  notion	  on	  this	  account	  goes	  against	  the	  assumption	  that	  
narratives	  (of	  retelling)	  are	  essential	  to	  the	  integration	  of	  traumatic	  encounters.	  On	  this	  
account,	  one	  may	  argue	  that	  the	  authentication	  of	  the	  experience	  lies	  not	  in	  the	  telling	  but	  
in	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  stimuli	  (or	  telling	  via	  showing),	  which	  is	  arguably	  the	  case	  made	  
by	  the	  Formalists.	  
The	  fact	  that	  art	  functions	  as	  a	  means	  to	  break	  through	  the	  automatisms	  of	  everyday	  
perception	  is	  linked	  with	  certain	  features	  in	  art	  that	  generate	  this	  effect.	  The	  hallmark	  of	  
the	  artistic	  text,	  according	  to	  Shklovsky,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  an	  artifact	  “that	  has	  been	  intentionally	  
removed	  from	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  automatized	  perception.	  It	  is	  ‘artificially’	  created	  by	  an	  
artist	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  perceiver,	  pausing	  in	  his	  reading,	  dwells	  on	  the	  text.	  This	  is	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when	  the	  literary	  work	  attains	  its	  greatest	  and	  most	  lasting	  impact.	  The	  object	  is	  perceived	  
not	  spatially	  but,	  as	  it	  were,	  in	  its	  temporal	  quality.	  That	  is,	  because	  of	  this	  device	  the	  object	  
is	  brought	  into	  view.”163	  The	  temporal	  quality	  is	  the	  result	  of	  delay	  in	  perception	  which	  can	  
be	  linked	  again	  with	  the	  tension	  between	  regressive	  versus	  progressive	  models	  of	  cultural	  
formation,	  whereby	  regressive	  cultural-­‐formation	  models	  tend	  to	  accelerate,	  while	  
progressive	  cultural-­‐formation	  models	  decelerate	  the	  reaching	  of	  the	  norm	  or	  status	  quo	  
(or	  cognitive	  processing).	  Delay	  occurs	  in	  the	  processing	  when	  the	  body	  is	  not	  able	  to	  
master	  the	  stimulus—in	  the	  context	  of	  trauma,	  when	  the	  mind	  cannot	  comprehend	  what	  
has	  been	  happening.	  Artificially	  induced	  delay	  parallels	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  threatening	  
stimulus	  affects	  the	  body	  and	  mind,	  except	  that	  Shklovsky	  voids	  the	  device	  of	  any	  semantic	  
reference.	  The	  device	  works	  because	  of	  its	  alogicality,	  because	  of	  its	  incompatibility	  with	  
habitual	  ways	  of	  thinking.	  	  
Shklovsky	  lists	  several	  devices	  that	  can	  result	  in	  the	  desired	  effect	  of	  delayed	  
perception	  thus	  introduce	  a	  sensation	  of	  artificiality.	  He	  calls	  these	  the	  devices	  of	  
estrangement	  (priem	  ostraneniia)	  and	  lists	  some,	  such	  as:	  describing	  an	  object	  as	  if	  for	  the	  
first	  time	  (e.g.,	  via	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  horse	  instead	  of	  a	  person),	  replacing	  an	  object	  with	  a	  
part	  of	  the	  object,	  psychological	  parallelism,	  etc.	  All	  these	  devices	  are	  aimed	  at	  interrupting	  
contiguity	  in	  the	  narrative,	  both	  by	  blocking	  the	  return	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  (habitual	  ways	  of	  
thinking)	  and	  by	  delaying	  the	  narrative’s	  entry	  into	  the	  future	  norm/status	  quo.	  	  
	   The	  artificially	  induced	  break	  down	  of	  automatized	  perception	  is	  thus	  central	  in	  art	  
because	  it	  is	  how	  art	  achieves	  its	  effect,	  that	  of	  unsettling	  the	  norm	  and	  introducing	  a	  shift	  
                                                




in	  cognitive	  processing.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  in	  his	  aesthetics,	  Shklovsky	  is	  
advocating	  a	  return	  to	  somatosensory	  perceptions,	  to	  the	  initial	  state	  of	  cognitive	  
processing	  or	  vision	  of	  the	  event,	  as	  opposed	  to	  verbal	  recognition,	  that	  is	  the	  last	  stage	  of	  
narrative	  formation	  when	  the	  particulars	  are	  rendered	  into	  generalities	  and	  integrated	  into	  
ordinary	  memory.	  In	  a	  certain	  regard	  he	  advocates	  for	  an	  extension	  of	  the	  primary	  
encounter	  with	  an	  abnormal	  event	  (in	  the	  literary	  text),	  created	  by	  estranged	  and	  
deformed	  language	  use.	  How	  can	  this	  be	  reconciled	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  trauma	  research	  
and	  according	  to	  trauma	  theories	  in	  literature	  the	  emphasis	  should	  be	  on	  prose	  and	  not	  on	  
the	  primary	  non-­‐verbal	  encounter?	  Why	  would	  he	  advocate	  the	  primacy	  of	  these	  seemingly	  
unaccountable,	  irreconcilable	  elements	  that	  run	  parallel	  with	  the	  seemingly	  coherent	  story	  
(guided	  by	  the	  pleasure	  principle)	  in	  the	  literary	  text?	  	  One	  reason	  is	  that	  Shklovsky	  sees	  
that	  distorted	  speech	  helps	  us	  sustain	  a	  level	  of	  awareness.	  The	  ability	  to	  feel	  is	  somehow	  a	  
higher	  state	  than	  that	  of	  living	  the	  life	  of	  the	  norm.	  When	  speech	  is	  distorted,	  we	  search	  for	  
clues,	  and	  while	  doing	  so,	  we	  see	  new,	  hitherto-­‐unnoticed	  properties.	  By	  doing	  so,	  we	  
enhance	  our	  understanding	  and	  bring	  to	  existence	  a	  life	  which	  “if	  held	  accountable	  for	  
nothing,	  fades	  into	  nothingness.”164	  	  
	   The	  notion	  of	  an	  intentionally	  introduced	  element	  of	  impediment	  to	  perception	  
gains	  increasing	  significance	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  argument	  over	  the	  following	  years	  as	  it	  evolves	  
from	  denoting	  an	  effect	  that	  results	  from	  a	  particular	  arrangement	  of	  material	  by	  the	  artist-­‐
writer	  as	  explicated	  in	  “Art	  as	  Device,”	  to	  encompassing,	  in	  addition,	  the	  extra-­‐literary	  
material	  from	  which	  art	  (or	  an	  author)	  draws,	  and	  for	  which	  it	  evinces	  a	  strong	  preference.	  	  
                                                




This	  evolution	  of	  the	  theme	  of	  impediment	  deserves	  attention,	  because	  it	  supports	  the	  
existence	  of	  an	  overlap	  between	  literary	  and	  extra-­‐literary	  realities.	  	  
Shklovsky	  says	  in	  an	  enigmatic	  statement	  in	  his	  article	  “Collective	  Creativity”:	  “It	  
seems	  to	  us	  that	  the	  so-­‐called	  individual	  creation	  is…a	  result	  of	  impossibility	  or,	  more	  
accurately,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  seeing	  the	  present	  day	  in	  general.”165	  Then	  he	  proceeds	  to	  
explain	  the	  special	  status	  Pushkin	  and	  Gogol	  enjoy	  in	  Russian	  literature	  by	  saying:	  “Pushkin	  
and	  Gogol	  are	  the	  same	  phenomenon	  in	  their	  school,	  just	  as	  is	  an	  ordinary	  writer.	  We	  
isolate	  them	  from	  the	  masses,	  because	  we	  are	  unable	  to	  perceive	  them	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
continuous	  process.	  We	  need	  a	  new	  word.”166	  Shklovsky	  suggests	  that	  new	  words	  or	  
concepts	  evolve	  from	  our	  lack	  of	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  particular	  (new)	  phenomenon	  
relates	  to	  what	  has	  been	  known.	  This	  inexplicability	  (a	  breakdown	  in	  our	  understanding	  of	  
causality	  between	  past	  and	  present	  connections)	  can	  result	  in	  the	  birth	  of	  a	  new	  concept	  
because	  the	  void	  or	  conceptual	  gap	  calls	  for	  and	  needs	  to	  be	  filled	  with	  an	  explanation.	  At	  
first	  this	  statement	  seems	  to	  stand	  in	  contrast	  to	  a	  later	  passage,	  in	  which	  Shklovsky	  states:	  
“Various	  epochs	  are	  capable	  of	  feeling	  various	  things	  and	  every	  epoch	  has	  things	  closed	  to	  
its	  perception.”167	  The	  two	  statements	  may	  seem	  contradictory	  at	  first:	  namely,	  Pushkin	  
and	  Gogol	  are	  assigned	  a	  concept	  (let	  us	  say	  the	  phenomena	  of	  Pushkin	  and	  Gogol)	  because	  
their	  causal	  connection	  with	  the	  past	  could	  not	  be	  explained	  so	  they	  had	  to	  be	  invented	  (as	  
a	  brand),	  whereas	  the	  latter	  statement	  seems	  to	  suggest	  that	  a	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  beyond	  
our	  perception	  cannot	  be	  perceived.	  However,	  there	  is	  no	  contrast	  between	  the	  two	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statements	  if	  one	  considers	  that	  the	  inability	  to	  assign	  a	  word	  for	  (explain	  the	  phenomenon	  
of)	  Pushkin,	  for	  example,	  can	  be	  recognized	  and	  become	  part	  of	  a	  perception	  that	  is	  
available.	  In	  that	  regard	  that	  inability	  to	  see	  the	  world	  or	  rather	  the	  difficulty	  of	  seeing	  the	  
world,	  as	  much	  as	  it	  is	  registered	  as	  a	  deficit,	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  asset,	  because	  it	  poses	  a	  
contradiction	  that	  becomes	  material	  for	  future	  thought.	  The	  key	  to	  Shklovsky’s	  
understanding	  of	  the	  world	  and	  its	  relationship	  with	  art	  is	  that	  art	  thrives	  on	  the	  challenges	  
of	  difficulties	  of	  perception,	  and	  draws	  its	  material	  not	  from	  that	  which	  cannot	  be	  seen	  nor	  
from	  that	  which	  is	  perfectly	  understood,	  but	  from	  what	  is	  on	  the	  threshold	  between	  the	  
two,	  namely	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  what	  can	  be	  perceived	  but	  cannot	  be	  explained	  away.	  The	  
threshold	  that	  Shklovsky	  demarcates	  is	  strangely	  reminiscent	  of	  early	  stages	  of	  traumatic	  
memory	  processing	  mechanisms,	  whereby	  the	  event	  is	  registered	  on	  a	  somatosensory	  level	  
only	  and	  is	  lacking	  a	  verbal	  narrative;	  it	  can	  be	  perceived,	  but	  cannot	  be	  understood.	  This	  is	  
an	  uncanny	  similarity	  considering	  that	  Shklovsky’s	  views	  were	  articulated	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
when,	  so	  to	  speak,	  the	  collective	  processing	  of	  the	  traumatic	  encounter	  with	  war	  and	  terror	  
were	  also	  at	  the	  early	  stage	  of	  traumatic	  processing,	  that	  is,	  before	  the	  event	  gained	  in	  the	  
collective	  consciousness	  a	  verbal	  narrative.	  	  
So	  the	  concept	  of	  cognitive	  impediment,	  by	  1919,	  is	  registered	  both	  as	  an	  external	  
and	  an	  internal	  property	  that	  overlap	  inasmuch	  as	  art	  and	  life	  overlap,	  meaning	  art	  is	  born	  
on	  the	  threshold	  of	  cognitive	  impediment,	  a	  material	  provided	  by	  life,	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  
functions	  because	  its	  material	  is	  infused	  with	  an	  element	  of	  impediment	  The	  parallel	  is	  by	  




The	  concept	  of	  artificially	  induced	  impediment	  (i.e.,	  as	  articulated	  in	  “Art	  as	  Device”)	  
in	  literary	  language	  use,	  which	  until	  now	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  words	  indicated	  intent,	  gains	  a	  new	  
semantic	  dimension,	  that	  of	  the	  element	  of	  compulsion,	  in	  the	  following	  articles,	  written	  in	  
1919.	  In	  the	  first	  preface	  to	  his	  anthology	  The	  Knight’s	  Move	  (Khod	  Konia),	  Shklovsky	  
speaks	  of	  the	  following	  dilemma	  Russians	  faced	  at	  the	  time:	  “Some	  say—in	  Russia	  people	  
are	  dying	  in	  the	  street;	  in	  Russia	  people	  are	  eating,	  or	  are	  capable	  of	  eating,	  human	  
flesh…Others	  say—in	  Russia	  the	  universities	  are	  functioning;	  in	  Russia	  the	  theaters	  are	  full.	  
You	  choose	  for	  yourself	  what	  to	  believe.	  But	  why	  choose?	  It’s	  all	  true.	  In	  Russia	  there	  is	  
something	  else.	  In	  Russia	  everything	  is	  so	  contradictory	  that	  we	  have	  all	  become	  witty	  in	  
spite	  of	  ourselves	  (ostroumny	  ne	  po	  svoei	  vole	  i	  zhelaniia).”168	  To	  become	  witty	  despite	  
oneself	  (despite	  one’s	  will	  and	  wish	  in	  Russian)	  is	  a	  rather	  peculiar	  notion,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  
clear	  explanation	  of	  what	  Shklovsky	  may	  have	  been	  referring	  to,	  but	  this	  statement	  
indicates	  that	  there	  is	  an	  element	  of	  overcoming	  or	  adjustment	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  one’s	  
identity	  to	  accommodate	  the	  inexplicable,	  irreconcilable	  two	  realities,	  two	  conflicting	  faiths	  
and	  beliefs	  the	  current	  situation	  poses.	  	  The	  process	  of	  overcoming	  entails	  a	  twist,	  an	  
element	  of	  distortion	  in	  the	  ego	  that	  is	  a	  reaction	  to	  the	  events;	  an	  adjustment	  to	  the	  path	  
that	  one	  normally	  would	  have	  taken	  had	  one	  not	  been	  faced	  with	  the	  conflicting	  realities.	  
This	  process	  also	  includes	  an	  element	  of	  violation	  (the	  need	  to	  function	  in	  spite	  of	  oneself),	  
and	  an	  element	  of	  brilliance,	  mental	  adjustment,	  almost	  certain	  craftiness,	  and	  an	  ingenious	  
trick	  to	  create	  a	  life	  or	  to	  continue	  living	  based	  on	  and	  out	  of	  this	  violated	  self.	  The	  cognitive	  
impediment	  in	  this	  context	  results	  from	  the	  inability	  to	  reconcile	  two	  different	  realities	  
                                                
168	  Shklovsky,	  “First	  Preface”	  in	  Knight’s	  Move,	  4.	  The	  passage	  in	  Russian	  is	  as	  follows:	  “Odni	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  ulitse,	  v	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  ili	  mogut	  est’	  chelovecheskoe	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  v	  Rossii	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  vo	  chto	  verit’…Ne	  vybiraite.	  –	  Vse	  Pravda.	  V	  Rossii	  ect’	  I	  to,	  I	  




(Russia	  where	  intellectual	  thought	  is	  thriving	  and	  where	  people,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  are	  
capable	  of	  eating	  human	  flesh).	  There	  is	  a	  very	  similar	  passage	  in	  the	  memoir,	  to	  which	  I	  
have	  already	  referred	  in	  previous	  sections,	  where	  Shklovsky	  recalls	  how	  he	  gave	  a	  speech	  
when	  it	  became	  clear	  that	  the	  Bolsheviks	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  countered	  in	  the	  Civil	  War,	  and	  
how	  he	  advocated	  giving	  up	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  Russia	  even	  though	  he	  had	  no	  faith	  in	  the	  
Bolshevik	  regime.	  When	  he	  recalls	  the	  event,	  he	  mentions	  that	  there	  seemed	  to	  be	  no	  other	  
option,	  and	  therefore	  “you	  did	  something	  with	  no	  causal	  connection	  or,	  to	  put	  it	  in	  our	  
philological	  terminology,	  something	  of	  another	  semantic	  form.”169	  The	  gesture	  of	  doing	  
“something	  of	  another	  semantic	  form”	  is	  directly	  linked	  in	  both	  examples	  to	  an	  inability	  to	  
reconcile	  two	  realities,	  a	  common	  feature	  of	  traumatic	  encounters.	  	  
	   In	  the	  same	  preface,	  Shklovsky	  evokes	  the	  image	  of	  the	  knight	  in	  chess,	  whose	  
movement	  he	  often	  likens	  to	  that	  of	  the	  laws	  that	  govern	  the	  arts	  and/or	  artists:	  “This	  book	  
is	  called	  Knight’s	  Move.	  The	  knight	  moves	  in	  an	  L-­‐shaped	  manner,	  like	  this:	  	  
	  
                                                






There	  are	  many	  reasons	  for	  the	  strangeness	  of	  the	  knight’s	  move,	  the	  main	  one	  being	  the	  
conventionality	  of	  art,	  about	  which	  I	  am	  writing.	  The	  second	  reason	  lies	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  
knight	  is	  not	  free—it	  moves	  in	  an	  L-­‐shaped	  manner	  because	  it	  is	  forbidden	  to	  take	  the	  
straight	  road.”170	  	  It	  is	  commonly	  understood	  that	  in	  this	  image	  Shklovsky	  refers	  1.	  to	  the	  
role	  of	  abnormality	  in	  art,	  that	  is	  the	  crooked	  line	  of	  the	  knight’s	  path,	  and	  2.	  less	  explicitly	  
but	  possibly,	  to	  the	  political	  constraints	  or	  lack	  of	  freedom	  of	  Russian	  reality	  and	  the	  effect	  
it	  traditionally	  had	  on	  the	  intelligentsia.	  Because	  of	  the	  juxtaposition	  within	  this	  preface	  of	  
the	  two	  images,	  the	  motion	  of	  the	  knight	  and	  the	  internal	  conflict	  in	  the	  soul	  that	  faces	  
Russia’s	  reality,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  suggest	  a	  third	  possible	  interpretation.	  The	  knight’s	  move	  
may	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  parallel	  image	  of	  the	  twist,	  or	  break	  in	  one’s	  path	  that	  occurs	  when	  one	  
needs,	  so	  to	  speak,	  to	  become	  “witty	  despite	  oneself.”	  In	  that	  regard	  the	  knight’s	  move	  is	  
analogous	  or	  can	  be	  parallel	  to	  a	  move	  a	  human	  being	  makes	  when	  attempting	  to	  adjust	  
                                                




two	  parallel	  and	  conflicting	  realities	  that	  intersect	  his	  or	  her	  life.	  The	  juxtaposition	  of	  the	  
two	  images	  highlight	  what	  they	  have	  in	  common,	  that	  is,	  they	  both	  depict	  a	  break	  in	  a	  linear	  
movement,	  in	  a	  sense	  a	  traumatic	  encounter	  with	  forces	  external	  to	  the	  individual	  that,	  in	  
turn,	  alter	  the	  path	  of	  the	  individual	  and	  become	  the	  hallmark	  of	  that	  individual’s	  move.	  
What	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  is	  that	  Shklovsky	  applies	  the	  very	  same	  dynamic	  to	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  a	  person	  lives	  his	  life,	  an	  artist	  creates,	  and	  a	  work	  of	  art	  fulfills	  its	  role	  
(when	  it	  disrupts	  habitual	  perception).	  This	  is	  one	  point	  where	  the	  connection	  between	  art	  
and	  life	  in	  the	  life	  of	  an	  individual	  becomes	  unseverable	  as	  each	  and	  all	  (the	  person,	  the	  
artist,	  and	  the	  work	  of	  art)	  share	  the	  same	  motivation,	  which	  is	  to	  become	  “witty	  despite	  
oneself.”	  	  Moreover,	  this	  dynamic	  (that	  is	  embodied	  in	  the	  knight’s	  move)	  is	  replicated	  
within	  the	  work	  of	  art,	  whose	  matter	  becomes	  distorted	  by	  the	  numerous	  devices	  that	  aim	  
to	  interrupt	  the	  flow	  of	  the	  text.	  	  
Interestingly,	  much	  as	  a	  person	  makes	  a	  life	  out	  of	  two	  intersecting	  realities,	  as	  
illustrated	  above,	  human	  lives	  can	  also	  be	  viewed,	  according	  to	  Shklovsky,	  as	  
manifestations	  of	  motions,	  which,	  while	  not	  evident	  to	  humans,	  bespeak	  universal	  
connections.	  He	  elaborates	  on	  the	  role	  of	  artists	  in	  his	  article	  “Collective	  Creativity,”	  
indicating	  that	  the	  point	  of	  break	  that	  motivates	  a	  person’s	  life	  shares	  its	  essential	  structure	  
with	  the	  mechanism	  that	  motivates	  life	  in	  general.	  Shklovsky	  says:	  “On	  the	  whole,	  gaining	  
priority	  over	  an	  invention	  or	  discovery	  is	  very	  hard.	  The	  epoch	  has	  prepared	  the	  premises	  
of	  a	  structure	  and	  several	  people,	  having	  no	  connection	  with	  one	  another,	  feel	  themselves	  




geometric	  point	  where	  lines	  of	  collective	  creativity	  intersect.”171	  A	  similar	  thought	  is	  voiced	  
in	  the	  memoir,	  where	  Shklovsky	  claims	  that	  “everything	  that	  organizes	  an	  individual	  is	  
external	  to	  him.	  He	  is	  only	  the	  point	  where	  lines	  of	  force	  intersect.”172	  In	  terms	  of	  meaning-­‐
generation,	  not	  much	  is	  up	  to	  the	  individual	  except	  making	  meaning	  out	  of	  these	  points	  of	  
intersection	  that	  provide	  the	  material	  for	  one’s	  life.	  Shklovsky’s	  response	  to	  such	  
conditions	  was:	  “I’ll	  continue	  making	  a	  cross-­‐section	  of	  my	  life.”173	  In	  the	  context	  of	  trauma,	  
creating	  a	  life	  from	  the	  point	  where	  external	  factors	  intersect	  implies	  that,	  to	  a	  large	  degree	  
for	  Shklovsky,	  creating	  a	  life	  around	  trauma,	  or	  making	  a	  meaning	  out	  of	  the	  encounter	  
with	  trauma	  is	  inescapable.	  	  
Rhea	  A.	  White,	  in	  her	  article	  “Dissociation,	  Narrative	  and	  Exceptional	  Human	  
Experiences,”	  describes	  the	  narrative	  constructs	  of	  patients	  with	  a	  history	  of	  trauma	  as	  
follows:	  “When	  one	  personally	  experiences	  an	  anomaly,	  it	  represents	  an	  encounter	  with	  an	  
entirely	  different	  reality.	  The	  course	  of	  life	  has	  collided	  with	  the	  nonlinear,	  which	  
interrupts,	  if	  not	  disrupts,	  the	  tenor	  of	  one’s	  way.	  Now	  one	  must	  compose	  a	  story	  about	  it	  
out	  of	  certain	  artifacts	  taken	  from	  one’s	  culture.	  The	  narrative	  will	  conclude	  that	  either	  the	  
experience	  did	  not	  happen	  or	  it	  happened	  but	  can	  be	  explained	  away;	  or	  it	  happened	  and	  
cannot	  be	  explained	  away;	  or	  it	  happened	  and	  cannot	  be	  forgotten;	  or	  it	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  
starting	  point	  of	  a	  new	  story.”174	  I	  have	  discussed	  van	  der	  Kolk’s	  notion	  that	  narratives	  can	  
and	  do	  evolve	  over	  time,	  which	  means	  that	  White’s	  suggested	  narrative	  types	  are	  not	  final	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  Shklovsky,	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  Shklovsky,	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  Images,	  Broken	  Selves:	  Dissociative	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constructs,	  but	  rather	  represent	  stages	  of	  thought	  processing.	  However,	  as	  often	  happens	  
with	  trauma	  survivors,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  one	  gets	  stuck	  and	  cannot	  proceed	  to	  heal.	  In	  
terms	  of	  long-­‐term	  viability,	  only	  White’s	  last	  narrative,	  the	  one	  that	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  starting	  
point	  of	  a	  new	  story,	  is	  able	  to	  outlast	  the	  experience	  because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  way	  in	  which	  the	  
personal	  narrative	  can	  transcend	  and	  overcome	  the	  event.	  
White	  proposes	  that	  there	  are	  only	  two	  kinds	  of	  trauma	  narratives:	  a	  life-­‐
depotentiating	  narrative	  or	  a	  life-­‐potentiating	  narrative.	  Life-­‐depotentiating	  narratives	  
bear	  the	  sign	  of	  an	  inability	  to	  integrate	  the	  traumatic	  experience;	  they	  regard	  the	  
experience	  as	  an	  illusion,	  an	  event	  that	  did	  not	  really	  happen	  as	  experienced,	  or	  admit	  that	  
the	  experience	  happened,	  but	  consider	  it	  of	  an	  exceptional	  nature,	  or	  suggest	  it	  may	  have	  
been	  a	  fantasy,	  or	  fraudulently	  fabricated,	  etc.	  Overall,	  these	  narratives	  cannot	  integrate	  the	  
trauma	  and	  therefore	  cannot	  transcend	  it.	  A	  life-­‐potentiating	  narrative,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  
claims	  White,	  offers	  an	  explanation	  for	  an	  anomalous	  experience	  that	  is	  meaningful	  and	  
makes	  a	  start	  at	  showing	  how	  the	  experience	  can	  grow:	  	  
Exceptional	  human	  experience	  narratives,	  in	  particular,	  once	  their	  reality	  is	  granted	  
by	  the	  experiencer,	  appear	  to	  play	  an	  active	  role	  in	  creating	  life	  circumstances	  that	  
promote	  the	  narrative	  in	  ways	  that	  involve	  the	  experiencer,	  but	  it	  seems	  the	  
experiencer	  must	  also	  do	  his	  or	  her	  best	  to	  create	  a	  narrative	  that	  does	  justice	  to	  the	  
impact	  of	  the	  experience	  upon	  him	  or	  her…[T]he	  period	  of	  search	  ends	  when	  the	  
experiencer	  adopts	  a	  life	  narrative	  that	  incorporates	  everything	  he	  or	  she	  has	  
experienced	  or	  learned	  to	  this	  date	  and	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  accommodating	  new	  
experiences	  as	  they	  come	  along…The	  new	  identity	  of	  a	  person	  is	  likely	  to	  involve	  
fostering	  a	  sense	  of	  openness	  to	  the	  experience…accompanied	  by	  a	  corresponding	  
dissociation	  from	  the	  ego-­‐self…What	  is	  likely	  to	  change	  is	  that	  the	  person	  will	  come	  
to	  see	  more	  of	  the	  world	  and	  even	  the	  universe	  as	  belonging	  to	  his	  or	  her	  self.175	  
	  
                                                






As	  White	  points	  out,	  a	  life-­‐potentiating	  narrative	  has	  to	  both	  integrate	  the	  past	  and	  
to	  be	  able	  to	  accommodate	  new	  experiences,	  in	  a	  sense,	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  narrative	  has	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  represent	  both.	  Characteristic	  of	  these	  narratives	  is	  that	  the	  boundary	  between	  the	  
self	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  dissolves,	  as	  well	  as	  boundaries	  between	  various	  objects	  in	  
the	  world.	  This	  is	  because	  a	  particular	  logic	  is	  established	  that	  can	  overcome	  the	  
incongruity	  between	  the	  experience	  prior	  and	  of	  the	  traumatic	  event	  because	  it	  must.	  By	  
means	  of	  establishing	  a	  narrative	  that	  can	  integrate	  a	  breakdown	  of	  two	  lines	  or	  two	  
realities,	  one	  can	  not	  only	  overcome	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  traumatic	  event,	  but	  also	  feel	  more	  
connected,	  more	  part	  of	  a	  universal	  law,	  even	  if	  this	  law	  can	  only	  be	  captured	  by	  its	  trait	  of	  
cognitive	  impediment.	  In	  light	  of	  all	  this,	  perhaps	  it	  is	  safe	  to	  say	  that	  the	  device	  of	  
estrangement	  that	  introduces	  the	  element	  of	  cognitive	  impediment	  	  and	  thus	  forces	  the	  
reader	  to	  perceive	  what	  he	  or	  she	  normally	  would	  not	  notice	  serves	  a	  dual	  purpose.	  It	  
bestows	  art	  with	  the	  ability	  to	  suspend	  the	  automatism	  in	  perception	  and	  thus	  revitalize	  
life,	  and	  can,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  become	  a	  central	  component	  of	  a	  life-­‐potentiating	  narrative.	  
This	  device	  channels	  the	  experience	  with	  wars	  and	  terror	  onto	  the	  fictitious	  reality	  of	  
literature	  (and	  the	  arts	  in	  general),	  which,	  because	  of	  the	  mergence	  that	  occurred	  between	  
art	  and	  life	  can	  help	  the	  author	  absorb	  the	  impact	  of	  trauma	  with	  its	  own	  challenges	  of	  







“The	  Relationship	  between	  Devices	  of	  Plot	  Construction	  and	  General	  Devices	  of	  
Style”’	  
	  
The	  articles	  “Art	  and	  Device”	  and	  “The	  Relationship	  between	  Devices	  of	  Plot	  
Construction	  and	  General	  Devices	  of	  Style”	  were	  written	  two	  years	  apart	  and	  indicate	  a	  
shift	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  scholarly	  style,	  manifested	  in	  an	  elevated	  role	  of	  sensory	  references	  and	  
a	  change	  in	  theoretical	  focus	  from	  larger	  to	  smaller	  structural	  units	  in	  prose.	  While	  the	  
earlier	  article	  outlines	  Shklovsky’s	  stance	  on	  what	  art	  in	  general	  is,	  in	  the	  later	  one	  he	  
focuses	  on	  the	  devices	  that	  mark	  the	  literary	  text	  and	  on	  how	  these	  devices	  accomplish	  
their	  effects.	  Overall,	  a	  shift	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  an	  image	  of	  art	  	  that	  is	  conceived	  to	  an	  image	  
that	  is	  felt,	  and	  from	  interest	  in	  the	  initial	  dialectic	  between	  external	  and	  internal	  realities	  
of	  the	  text	  (seen	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  estrangement)	  to	  a	  dialectic	  within	  the	  text	  as	  outlined	  
in	  the	  workings	  of	  the	  device.	  Two	  motions	  can	  be	  detected:	  	  first,	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  
elevation	  of	  sensory	  elements	  in	  language	  use	  and	  in	  the	  way	  art	  is	  perceived	  to	  be	  felt,	  and	  
second,	  a	  further	  constriction	  of	  the	  importance	  or	  relevance	  of	  the	  reality	  component	  and	  
story	  line	  in	  the	  text	  in	  favor	  of	  material	  functionality.	  
The	  elevated	  use	  of	  sensory	  imagery	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  illustration	  of	  the	  structural	  
realities	  of	  art	  echoes	  Eikhenbaum’s	  comment	  quoted	  by	  Shklovsky	  in	  his	  memoir,	  namely	  
that	  “the	  main	  distinction	  between	  revolutionary	  and	  ordinary	  life	  is	  that	  now	  everything	  
can	  be	  felt,”	  to	  which	  Shklovsky	  commented	  that	  “art	  is	  life,	  life	  is	  spring.”	  	  Shklovsky	  
describes	  art	  in	  the	  article	  as:	  “A	  crooked	  road,	  a	  road	  in	  which	  the	  foot	  feels	  acutely	  the	  




another.	  One	  word	  feels	  another	  word,	  as	  one	  cheek	  feels	  another	  cheek.	  Words	  are	  taken	  
apart	  and,	  instead	  of	  one	  complex	  word	  handed	  over	  like	  a	  chocolate	  bar	  at	  a	  candy	  store	  
we	  see	  before	  us	  a	  word-­‐sound,	  a	  word-­‐movement.	  Dance	  is	  a	  movement	  that	  can	  be	  felt…it	  
is	  a	  movement	  formed	  in	  order	  to	  be	  felt.	  And	  behold,	  we	  dance	  as	  we	  plow.”176	  Kinesthetic,	  
auditory	  and	  visual	  sensations	  and,	  overall,	  metaphoric	  as	  opposed	  to	  metonymic	  
description	  dominate	  Shklovsky’s	  image	  of	  art.	  	  	  There	  is	  a	  slightly	  visual	  reference	  to	  the	  
sensation	  of	  pain	  in	  the	  image	  in	  which	  Shklovsky	  compares	  the	  feelings	  evoked	  in	  us	  by	  art	  
with	  the	  sensation	  of	  walking	  on	  stones	  that	  press	  against	  our	  feet.	  There	  is	  an	  element	  of	  
twist,	  as	  in	  “Art	  as	  Device,”	  whereby	  the	  road	  of	  art	  turns	  against	  itself	  and	  is	  crooked.	  
There	  is	  a	  repeated	  reference	  to	  the	  dismissal	  of	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  in	  our	  appreciation	  
of	  art	  when	  Shklovsky	  says	  that	  art	  is	  not	  a	  chocolate	  bar,	  which	  is	  in	  line	  with	  Shklovsky’s	  
dialectic	  of	  two	  types	  of	  aesthetics,	  one	  that	  operates	  according	  to	  the	  pleasure	  principle	  
and	  one	  that	  acts	  according	  to	  the	  reality	  principle.	  
In	  another	  passage	  Shklovsky	  likens	  the	  sensation	  of	  deviation	  in	  art	  to	  sensual	  
feelings:	  	  
[W]henever	  we	  experience	  anything	  as	  a	  deviation	  from	  the	  ordinary,	  from	  the	  
normal,	  from	  a	  certain	  guiding	  canon,	  we	  feel	  within	  us	  an	  emotion	  of	  a	  special	  
nature,	  which	  is	  not	  distinguished	  in	  its	  kind	  from	  the	  emotions	  aroused	  in	  us	  by	  
sensuous	  form,	  with	  the	  single	  difference	  being	  that	  its	  ‘referent’	  may	  be	  said	  to	  be	  a	  
                                                
176	  Shklovsky,	  “The	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  Devices	  of	  Plot	  Construction	  and	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  Devices	  of	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Theory	  of	  Prose,	  15.	  The	  image	  of	  plowing	  recurs	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  memoir	  A	  Sentimental	  Journey,	  in	  which	  he	  
recalls	  how	  peasants	  kept	  plowing	  between	  two	  fronts.	  The	  image	  in	  The	  Relationship	  serves	  as	  a	  metaphor	  to	  
illustrate	  that	  sustaining	  scholarship	  during	  war	  is	  as	  essential	  as	  bread	  for	  survival.	  Even	  between	  two	  
fronts,	  event	  between	  two	  fires,	  the	  peasants	  continued	  to	  plow	  risking	  their	  lives	  so	  they	  can	  survive	  if	  
tomorrow	  comes.	  In	  a	  similar	  fashion,	  scholars	  continued	  to	  ponder	  over	  “Schiller”	  even	  when	  they	  could	  not	  




perception	  of	  a	  discrepancy.	  What	  I	  mean	  is	  that	  its	  referent	  stands	  for	  something	  
inaccessible	  to	  empirical	  perception.177	  	  
	  
Shklovsky	  connects	  the	  perception	  of	  discrepancy	  (an	  encounter	  whose	  referent	  stands	  for	  
something	  inaccessible)	  or,	  in	  general,	  the	  encounter	  with	  art,	  to	  a	  heightened	  state	  of	  
arousal	  (an	  increase	  in	  sensory	  perceptions)	  that	  is	  on	  a	  par	  with	  the	  feelings	  evoked	  in	  us	  
by	  intrusive	  images	  or	  stimuli	  that	  cannot	  immediately	  be	  integrated	  into	  a	  narrative.	  	  Art	  
and	  life	  in	  the	  article	  “The	  Relations”	  are	  brought	  still	  closer	  together,	  as	  an	  element	  of	  
sensing	  art	  as	  if	  it	  were	  a	  real	  life	  experience	  is	  added.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  while	  in	  
Shklovsky’s	  illustrations	  on	  how	  the	  literay	  text	  works	  the	  gap	  between	  art	  and	  life	  
narrows,	  which	  manifests	  itself	  in	  the	  way	  that	  art	  is	  felt	  (like	  a	  real	  life	  experience),	  the	  
appearance	  of	  life	  in	  the	  material	  of	  the	  literary	  text	  that	  the	  author	  references	  diminishes.	  	  	  
The	  theme	  of	  sensing	  the	  text	  can	  be	  found	  also	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  description	  of	  art,	  in	  
an	  increase	  in	  tension	  between	  and/or	  within	  the	  components	  of	  art,	  e.g.,	  between	  content	  
and	  form,	  or	  within	  devices	  that	  serve	  to	  cancel	  causality,	  real	  time,	  logic,	  etc.	  To	  illustrate	  
the	  tension	  within	  the	  text,	  Shklovsky	  in	  “Relations”	  no	  longer	  conceives	  of	  art	  (as	  in	  “Art	  as	  
Device”)	  as	  a	  differentiated	  or	  deformed	  speech	  wherein	  the	  referential	  role	  of	  everyday	  
language	  use	  is	  still	  visible	  (i.e.,	  art	  is	  “differentiated	  from”),	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  speech	  full	  of	  
violations	  and	  inner	  conflicts,	  speech	  that	  is	  severed	  from	  reality	  or	  voided	  of	  its	  reality	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component.	  As	  Shklovsky	  says,	  the	  content	  of	  literary	  language	  “is	  invariably	  manipulated,	  
isolated,	  ‘silenced’.”178	  	  
Heightened	  sensation	  is	  nearly	  always	  associated	  with	  images	  of	  conflict.	  As	  the	  
sentence	  above	  illustrates,	  Shklovsky	  identifies	  a	  conflict	  between	  content	  and	  structural	  
features	  at	  play,	  in	  which	  conflict	  content	  is	  entirely	  subject	  to	  structural	  laws.	  	  Conflict	  also	  
plays	  a	  dominant	  role	  in	  literary	  evolution,	  which	  Shklovsky	  sees	  as	  a	  perpetual	  deposition	  
of	  old	  forms	  by	  new	  ones.	  Shklovsky	  claims:	  “All	  works	  of	  art,	  and	  not	  only	  parodies,	  are	  
created	  as	  a	  parallel	  or	  an	  antithesis	  to	  some	  model.	  The	  new	  form	  makes	  its	  appearance	  
not	  in	  order	  to	  express	  new	  content,	  but	  rather,	  to	  replace	  an	  old	  form	  that	  has	  already	  
outlived	  its	  artistic	  usefulness.”179	  This	  latter	  example	  emphasizes	  not	  only	  the	  irrelevance	  
of	  content	  in	  literary	  evolution	  but	  also	  the	  dialectic	  between	  a	  form	  and	  its	  replacement	  
that	  occurs	  as	  if	  in	  no	  causal	  connection	  with	  each	  other.	  Forms	  do	  not	  evolve	  from	  one	  
another,	  but	  replace	  each	  other.	  The	  new	  form	  replaces	  the	  old	  form	  when	  the	  latter	  
becomes	  petrified	  and	  is	  no	  longer	  perceivable.	  Shklovsky	  offers	  other	  examples	  of	  conflict	  
in	  the	  literary	  work:	  for	  example,	  between	  meaning	  and	  verse	  in	  poetry.	  Shklovsky	  claims:	  
“there	  is	  the	  opposition	  of	  meaning	  and	  verse.	  The	  verse	  line	  demands	  the	  emphasis	  of	  
certain	  syllables	  on	  which	  the	  main	  stress	  falls,	  while	  the	  sense	  of	  the	  text	  imperceptibly	  
transfers	  onto	  other	  syllables.”180	  Shklovsky	  lists	  several	  instances	  in	  which	  conflict	  
between	  parts	  of	  the	  text	  can	  be	  detected.	  Without	  listing	  them	  all,	  one	  is	  able	  to	  see	  that	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conflict	  is	  the	  primary	  interaction	  between	  parts,	  be	  it	  between	  form	  and	  form,	  between	  
form	  and	  content,	  or	  between	  extra-­‐literary	  and	  textural	  components;	  all	  elements	  strike	  at	  
each	  other,	  which	  creates	  a	  sensation	  of	  rupture,	  twist,	  a	  threshold	  where	  conflicting	  forces	  
clash.	  	  
Because	  of	  the	  heightened	  sense	  of	  conflict	  between	  the	  components	  of	  a	  literary	  
text,	  the	  parts	  become	  polarized	  and	  their	  key	  features	  are	  seen	  in	  what	  marks	  them	  as	  
different	  from	  each	  other.	  People	  tend	  to	  form	  narratives,	  suggests	  Shklovsky,	  that	  proceed	  
cumulatively,	  from	  the	  particular	  to	  the	  general,	  however,	  art	  acts	  in	  a	  contrary	  fashion,	  
and	  proceeds	  from	  the	  general	  to	  the	  particular.	  Shklovsky	  claims	  that	  “the	  practical	  mind	  
seeks	  generalizations	  by	  creating,	  insofar	  as	  possible,	  wide-­‐ranging	  all-­‐encompassing	  
formulas.	  Art,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  with	  its	  ‘longing	  for	  the	  concrete’…	  is	  based	  on	  a	  step-­‐by-­‐
step	  structure	  and	  on	  the	  particularization	  of	  even	  that	  which	  is	  presented	  in	  a	  generalized	  
and	  unified	  form.”181	  Shklovsky	  contrasts	  inductive	  with	  deductive	  thinking,	  which	  is	  
another	  example	  in	  his	  list	  of	  opposing	  phenomena.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  art,	  the	  process	  of	  
proceeding	  from	  the	  general	  to	  the	  particular	  indicates	  a	  transition	  whereby	  the	  reader	  
gradually	  leaves	  behind	  the	  knowledge	  he	  has	  of	  the	  world	  and	  loses	  him	  or	  herself	  in	  the	  
details	  of	  the	  text.	  Therefore,	  in	  art	  there	  is	  a	  visible	  process	  of	  dissociation,	  de-­‐realization	  
and	  depersonalization	  within	  the	  reader’s	  context	  and	  a	  disappearance	  into	  the	  details	  of	  
the	  literary	  text.	  Because	  structural	  properties	  draw	  our	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  content,	  
in	  a	  way,	  the	  process	  of	  dissociation	  can	  be	  traced	  from	  life	  to	  realities	  (particles)	  of	  art	  
voided	  of	  life	  components.	  	  
                                                
181	  Shklovsky,	  “The	  Relationship	  between	  Devices	  of	  Plot	  Construction	  and	  General	  Devices	  of	  Style”	  in	  Theory	  




Central	  to	  the	  article	  is	  an	  exploration	  of	  the	  functioning	  of	  literary	  devices	  that	  
generate	  the	  structural	  scaffolding	  of	  the	  literary	  text.	  In	  Shklovsky’s	  aesthetics	  the	  less	  
reference	  there	  is	  to	  reality	  and	  content	  in	  literary	  work,	  the	  more	  literary	  it	  is,	  and	  the	  
more	  interest	  it	  has	  for	  Shklovsky.	  He	  claims,	  “Tristam	  Shandy	  is	  the	  most	  typical	  novel	  in	  
world	  literature”	  because	  this	  novel	  demonstrates	  to	  the	  fullest	  art’s	  tendency	  to	  reduce	  
the	  story	  line	  to	  nothing	  more	  than	  a	  material	  for	  plot	  formation.182	  
The	  concreteness	  of	  form	  is	  achieved	  by	  means	  of	  devices	  that	  accentuate	  
differentiation	  or	  discrepancy	  in	  the	  material	  realities	  of	  the	  text.	  When	  the	  mind	  
encounters	  a	  breakdown	  in	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  story,	  it	  is	  forced	  to	  ponder	  structural	  
features	  as	  it	  is	  trying	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  description	  that	  does	  not	  follow	  the	  logic	  of	  
common	  sense.	  Shklovsky’s	  article	  is	  a	  scholarly	  effort	  to	  illustrate	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  
which	  automatic	  cognitive	  processes	  can	  be	  disrupted	  by	  various	  devices.	  The	  author	  
proceeds	  from	  smaller	  to	  larger	  structural	  units	  to	  illustrate	  his	  point.	  All	  of	  these	  
structures	  share	  the	  same	  feature;	  they	  are	  not	  in	  the	  story	  to	  generate	  greater	  clarity	  of	  
thought,	  and	  thus	  at	  first	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  superfluous	  elements.	  Shklovsky	  argues	  these	  
elements	  are,	  to	  the	  contrary,	  the	  main	  motivation	  behind	  a	  literary	  work.	  The	  elements	  are	  
there	  to	  create	  their	  own	  meaning,	  which	  is	  to	  keep	  the	  awareness	  of	  artificiality	  alive.	  	  
My	  list	  of	  the	  devices	  Shklovsky	  evokes	  is	  not	  complete,	  but	  here	  are	  some	  of	  the	  
examples	  cited:	  repetition	  of	  words	  that	  have	  synonymous	  meaning	  (“tambourines	  —	  
drums”),	  word	  variants	  (“chudnim	  —	  chudno”),	  and	  repetition	  of	  one	  and	  the	  same	  word	  or	  
phrase	  in	  two	  adjacent	  lines	  (“Of	  this	  stable,	  perhaps,	  from	  abroad	  /	  From	  abroad,	  a	  sable	  
                                                




with	  earflaps”).	  Larger	  units	  can	  be:	  phrases	  that	  cancel	  each	  other	  out,	  phrase	  variants	  
whereby	  a	  phrase	  is	  asserted	  and	  its	  antithesis	  denied	  (“by	  a	  direct	  route,	  not	  a	  circuitous	  
one”),	  phrases	  consisting	  of	  two	  words	  where	  one	  is	  native,	  the	  other	  is	  either	  borrowed	  or	  
is	  from	  a	  dialect	  (“luck	  —	  fate”),	  phrases	  where	  a	  species	  is	  combined	  with	  a	  genus	  concept	  
(“pike	  fish”).	  Particular	  emphasis	  is	  paid	  to	  parallel	  structures,	  for	  example,	  to	  tautological	  
parallelisms	  (“Our	  Yelinochka	  is	  happy	  winter	  and	  summer,	  Our	  Malashka	  is	  wonderful	  
every	  day”).	  Parallelism	  is	  in	  play	  when	  a	  structure	  distorts	  the	  unity	  of	  meaning	  (“On	  the	  
seventh	  night	  she	  passed	  away,	  on	  the	  eighth	  night	  she	  died”),	  or	  one	  line	  is	  used	  in	  three	  
different	  contexts	  (triolets),	  or	  as	  a	  form	  of	  psychological	  parallelism	  (e.g.,	  between	  a	  
human	  and	  a	  tree),	  or	  parallels	  between	  linguistic	  units	  that	  are	  not	  equivalent	  (object	  and	  
object).	  Lastly,	  Shklovsky	  focuses	  on	  structural	  units	  on	  the	  level	  of	  thematic	  tropes,	  such	  as	  
the	  device	  of	  belated	  rescue,	  shipwreck,	  abduction,	  riddles	  and	  so	  on,	  that	  share	  the	  
common	  purpose	  of	  slowing	  down	  the	  processing	  of	  the	  story.	  	  
All	  examples	  supplied	  here	  illustrate	  the	  predominant	  role	  of	  form	  in	  art	  and	  the	  
secondary	  role	  of	  content.	  One	  can	  approach	  the	  examples	  by	  highlighting	  the	  role	  of	  form	  
and	  function;	  however,	  one	  can	  also	  see	  the	  examples	  as	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  content	  is	  
diminished	  or	  eliminated	  from	  the	  text.	  Thematically	  speaking,	  nearly	  all	  of	  the	  largest	  
structural	  units	  that	  Shklovsky	  aim	  at	  some	  form	  of	  resolution	  to	  an	  unresolvable	  situation,	  
most	  commonly,	  to	  avert	  or	  delay	  the	  impending	  death	  of	  the	  protagonist.	  In	  these	  texts	  the	  
goal	  is	  to	  delay	  the	  inevitable	  conclusion,	  which	  is	  death.	  Such	  is	  the	  story	  of	  Perrault’s	  tale	  
“Blue	  Beard,”	  in	  which	  the	  wife	  of	  Blue	  Beard	  is	  about	  to	  perish,	  but	  her	  doom	  is	  delayed	  by	  
the	  possibility	  of	  several	  rescues,	  each	  of	  which	  is	  canceled	  when	  it	  turns	  out	  that	  those	  




according	  to	  the	  same	  model.	  Roland	  is	  dying	  and	  each	  time	  he	  strikes	  the	  stone	  with	  his	  
sword,	  the	  emperor	  wants	  to	  go	  to	  his	  rescue,	  but	  Ganelon	  suggests	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  
worry.	  Because	  no	  one	  comes	  to	  his	  rescue,	  Roland	  dies.	  In	  the	  story	  “Rooster	  and	  Hen”	  the	  
rooster	  is	  choking	  so	  a	  hen	  that	  wants	  to	  help	  him	  goes	  to	  the	  sea	  and	  asks	  for	  water.	  The	  
sea,	  however,	  refuses	  to	  give	  water	  and	  asks	  instead	  for	  a	  tusk	  in	  exchange	  for	  water.	  The	  
hen	  leaves	  to	  obtain	  the	  item	  the	  sea	  wants	  but	  the	  badger	  who	  has	  the	  tusk	  also	  asks	  for	  
something	  else	  that	  the	  hen	  doesn’t	  have.	  There	  begins	  a	  series	  of	  conditions	  whereby	  each	  
possible	  owner	  of	  an	  item	  the	  hen	  needs	  wants	  an	  exchange.	  After	  long	  suspense	  the	  hen	  is	  
able	  to	  find	  a	  pea	  by	  herself,	  thus	  satisfying	  the	  request	  of	  the	  last	  owner	  of	  an	  item,	  and	  she	  
is	  able	  to	  reverse	  the	  story	  whereby	  each	  character	  will	  supply	  what	  the	  other	  needs	  until	  
the	  hen	  is	  able	  to	  secure	  water	  for	  the	  rooster.	  Shklovsky	  mentions	  the	  story	  of	  Ivan	  
Tsarevich,	  who	  is	  near	  death	  as	  Koshchei	  the	  evil	  spirit	  wants	  to	  take	  him,	  but	  as	  death	  
nears,	  his	  animals	  are	  also	  coming	  to	  his	  rescue.	  Similar	  in	  theme	  is	  the	  story	  of	  the	  
Ukrainian	  maid	  kidnapped	  by	  the	  Turk	  who	  is	  begging	  for	  her	  life	  and	  promising	  that	  her	  
family	  will	  pay	  the	  ransom,	  but	  only	  the	  third	  time	  is	  the	  ransom	  paid,	  and	  even	  then,	  it	  is	  
paid	  by	  an	  accidental	  stranger.	  	  
Shklovsky	  ignores	  in	  these	  stories	  the	  correlation	  between	  content	  (the	  impending	  
death)	  and	  form,	  which	  delays	  certainty	  whether	  the	  protagonists	  will	  live	  on	  or	  die.	  
However,	  if	  we	  consider	  the	  examples	  by	  highlighting	  not	  what	  happens	  on	  the	  structural	  
level,	  but	  what	  happens	  to	  the	  content,	  we	  can	  see	  a	  direct	  correlation	  between	  the	  two	  
components.	  Namely,	  the	  more	  a	  structure	  unfolds	  as	  the	  narrative	  progresses,	  the	  more	  
the	  content	  shrinks.	  These	  tales	  are	  not	  only	  about	  denying	  the	  primacy	  of	  content,	  they	  




lead	  to	  the	  death	  of	  the	  protagonist	  serves,	  much	  like	  the	  emphasis	  on	  repeating	  structural	  
features,	  as	  an	  element	  of	  tension	  and	  familiarization	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  death.	  Such	  
stories	  serve	  as	  a	  rehearsal	  of	  the	  traumatic	  event	  until	  it	  can	  be	  integrated.	  It	  is	  peculiar	  
that	  it	  is	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  death	  that	  the	  fear	  of	  death	  is	  overcome,	  when	  the	  fate	  of	  
characters	  overtakes	  their	  will.	  Without	  over-­‐interpreting	  these	  stories,	  one	  can	  make	  an	  
argument	  that	  they	  are	  stories	  in	  which	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  protagonist	  becomes	  a	  structural	  
play	  (meaning,	  the	  characters’	  fate	  is	  significant	  only	  as	  a	  structural	  component),	  the	  
content	  of	  their	  life	  is	  seized	  from	  them	  as	  it	  gradually	  becomes	  external	  to	  them.	  While	  
what	  motivates	  these	  stories	  can	  be	  subject	  to	  interpretation,	  one	  could	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  
aim	  of	  the	  life	  of	  all	  characters	  listed	  is	  their	  death,	  and	  structure	  serves	  the	  purpose	  of	  
leading	  this	  aim	  to	  fulfillment.	  As	  Freud	  states:	  “For	  a	  long	  time,	  perhaps,	  living	  substance	  
was	  thus	  being	  constantly	  created	  afresh	  and	  easily	  dying,	  till	  decisive	  external	  influences	  
altered	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  oblige	  the	  still	  surviving	  substance	  to	  diverge	  ever	  more	  widely	  
from	  its	  original	  course	  of	  life	  and	  to	  make	  ever	  more	  complicated	  détours	  before	  reaching	  
its	  aim	  of	  death.”183	  Freud	  cannot	  offer	  any	  other	  explanation	  as	  to	  why	  a	  living	  organism	  
would	  resist	  dying	  when	  it	  is	  the	  aim	  of	  life,	  other	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  wishes	  to	  die	  only	  in	  
its	  own	  fashion.	  In	  that	  regard	  the	  concept	  of	  delay	  serves	  two	  purposes:	  first,	  it	  can	  serve	  
as	  a	  form	  of	  rehearsal	  of	  and	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  inevitable	  and	  traumatic	  encounter	  
with	  death,	  and	  second,	  it	  can	  delay	  the	  moment	  of	  death	  while	  allowing	  for	  limited	  content	  
in	  the	  story.	  
Sometimes	  motion	  in	  the	  text	  comes	  to	  a	  near	  halt,	  as	  in	  the	  example	  Shklovsky	  
gives	  from	  Gogol’s	  prose,	  which	  proceeds:	  “with	  firmness	  in	  the	  cause	  of	  life,	  with	  
                                                




cheerfulness	  and	  with	  the	  encouragement	  of	  all	  of	  you.”184	  Excessive	  redundancy	  is	  one	  of	  
the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  story	  is	  devalued	  and	  attention	  to	  the	  story	  line	  is	  
fragmented.	  
	   The	  list	  of	  images	  Shklovsky	  discusses	  is	  long,	  and	  I	  cannot	  address	  here	  all	  of	  them.	  
However,	  I	  will	  speak	  of	  the	  role	  of	  tautology	  and	  contradiction,	  as	  most	  of	  Shklovsky’s	  
examples	  of	  parallel	  structures	  fall	  under	  these	  logical	  categories.	  As	  I	  have	  mentioned,	  a	  
tautological	  parallel	  structure	  would	  be:	  “Our	  Yelinochka	  is	  happy	  winter	  and	  summer,	  Our	  
Malashka	  is	  wonderful	  every	  day.”185	  An	  example	  of	  contradiction	  would	  be	  the	  following:	  
“on	  the	  seventh	  night	  she	  passed	  away,	  on	  the	  eighth	  night	  she	  died”	  or	  “He	  finds	  six	  seeds	  
on	  the	  ground,	  seven	  seeds	  he	  raises	  from	  the	  ground.186	  An	  expression	  is	  tautological	  
when,	  if	  simplified,	  it	  represents	  a	  statement	  such	  as	  “it	  is	  raining	  or	  it	  is	  not	  raining”;	  a	  
contradiction,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  would,	  for	  example,	  be	  a	  statement	  like	  this,	  “it	  is	  raining	  
and	  it	  is	  not	  raining.”	  	  They	  present	  in	  logical	  space	  either	  the	  existence	  of	  all	  possibilities,	  
expressed	  in	  endlessly	  repeating	  variants	  that	  are	  of	  the	  same	  semantic	  space,	  or	  none,	  
expressed	  in	  variants	  that	  cancel	  each	  other	  out.	  
Wittgenstein	  explores	  the	  functioning	  of	  these	  two	  kinds	  of	  expressions	  as	  follows:	  
“Among	  all	  possible	  groups	  of	  truth	  conditions	  there	  are	  two	  extreme	  cases.	  In	  the	  one	  case	  
the	  proposition	  is	  true	  for	  all	  the	  truth	  possibilities	  of	  the	  elementary	  propositions.	  We	  say	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  in	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that	  the	  truth	  conditions	  are	  tautological.	  In	  the	  second	  case	  the	  proposition	  is	  false	  for	  all	  
truth-­‐possibilities.	  The	  truth	  conditions	  are	  self-­‐contradictory.	  In	  the	  first	  case	  we	  call	  the	  
proposition	  tautology,	  in	  the	  second	  case	  a	  contradiction.”187	  If	  we	  return	  to	  Shklovsky’s	  
predominant	  use	  of	  tautologies	  and	  contradictions,	  some	  very	  peculiar	  features	  of	  language	  
use	  can	  be	  observed.	  According	  to	  Wittgenstein:	  	  
the	  proposition	  shows	  what	  it	  says,	  the	  tautology	  and	  the	  contradiction	  that	  they	  say	  
nothing.	  The	  tautology	  has	  no	  truth-­‐conditions,	  for	  it	  is	  unconditionally	  true;	  and	  the	  
contradiction	  is	  on	  no	  condition	  true.	  Tautology	  and	  contradiction	  are	  without	  
sense…Tautology	  and	  contradiction	  are,	  however,	  not	  nonsensical;	  they	  are	  part	  of	  a	  
symbolism,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  the	  ‘0’	  is	  part	  of	  the	  symbolism	  of	  Arithmetic.	  
Tautologies	  and	  contradictions	  are	  not	  pictures	  of	  reality.	  They	  present	  no	  possible	  
state	  of	  affairs.	  For	  the	  one	  allows	  every	  possible	  state	  of	  affairs,	  the	  other	  none.	  In	  
tautology	  the	  conditions	  of	  agreement	  with	  the	  world—the	  presenting	  relations—
cancel	  one	  another,	  so	  that	  it	  stands	  in	  no	  presenting	  relation	  to	  reality…Tautology	  
leaves	  to	  reality	  the	  whole	  infinite	  logical	  space;	  contradiction	  fills	  the	  whole	  logical	  
space	  and	  leaves	  no	  point	  to	  reality.	  Neither	  of	  them,	  therefore,	  can	  in	  any	  way	  
determine	  reality.188	  	  
	  
[Insert	  a	  sentence	  or	  two	  here	  that	  explain	  what	  we	  were	  supposed	  to	  get	  from	  the	  above	  
quotation	  (which	  could	  perhaps	  also	  be	  further	  shortened).	  Never	  end	  a	  paragraph	  on	  
someone	  else’s	  words!	  	  Always	  come	  back	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  reader	  has	  picked	  out	  the	  	  
important	  highlights	  of	  the	  quoted	  passage	  and	  interpreted	  them	  correctly]	  
	   While	  Shklovsky’s	  examples	  are	  compelling	  proofs	  of	  the	  primacy	  of	  literary	  form	  
over	  content,	  his	  pronounced	  dependency	  on	  expressions	  that	  negate	  content	  leads	  to	  a	  
logical	  space	  of	  art	  that	  has	  little	  room	  left	  for	  any	  presence	  of	  or	  applicability	  to	  reality.	  
The	  only	  reality	  that	  remains	  is	  the	  form	  that	  is	  felt	  as	  if	  real.	  Content	  and	  form	  are	  in	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inverse	  proportions:	  the	  more	  the	  form	  is	  felt,	  the	  less	  the	  content	  is	  seen	  or	  recognized.	  In	  
his	  article	  on	  Rozanov,	  published	  the	  same	  year	  as	  “The	  Relations,”	  Shklovsky	  summarizes	  
his	  views	  on	  form	  and	  content	  as	  follows:	  “the	  soul	  of	  literary	  work	  is	  none	  other	  than	  its	  





Wittgenstein	  asserts	  that	  “what	  every	  picture,	  of	  whatever	  form,	  must	  have	  in	  
common	  with	  reality	  in	  order	  to	  be	  able	  to	  represent	  it	  at	  all…	  is	  the	  logical	  form,	  that	  is	  the	  
form	  of	  reality	  	  that	  it	  shares	  with	  that	  reality.”190	  To	  illustrate	  a	  logical	  model,	  its	  
systematic	  unity	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time	  its	  nature	  of	  being	  one	  of	  many	  possible	  logical	  
models	  he	  explains	  as	  follows:	  	  
Let	  us	  imagine	  a	  white	  surface	  with	  irregular	  black	  spots.	  We	  now	  say:	  whatever	  
kind	  of	  picture	  these	  make	  I	  can	  always	  get	  as	  near	  as	  I	  like	  to	  its	  description,	  if	  I	  
cover	  the	  surface	  with	  a	  sufficiently	  fine	  square	  network	  and	  now	  say	  of	  every	  
square	  that	  it	  is	  white	  or	  black.	  In	  this	  way	  I	  shall	  have	  brought	  the	  description	  of	  
the	  surface	  to	  a	  unified	  form.	  This	  form	  is	  arbitrary,	  because	  I	  could	  have	  applied	  
with	  equal	  success	  a	  net	  with	  a	  triangular	  or	  hexagonal	  mesh;	  that	  is	  to	  say	  we	  might	  
have	  described	  the	  surface	  more	  accurately	  with	  a	  triangular,	  and	  coarser,	  than	  with	  
the	  finer	  square	  mesh,	  or	  vice	  versa,	  and	  so	  on.	  To	  the	  different	  networks	  
correspond	  different	  systems	  of	  describing	  the	  world.	  Mechanics	  determine	  a	  form	  
of	  description	  by	  saying:	  All	  propositions	  in	  the	  description	  of	  the	  world	  must	  be	  
obtained	  in	  a	  given	  way	  from	  a	  number	  of	  given	  propositions—the	  mechanical	  
axioms.	  It	  thus	  provides	  the	  bricks	  for	  building	  the	  edifice	  of	  science,	  and	  says:	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whatever	  building	  thou	  wouldst	  erect,	  thou	  shalt	  construct	  it	  in	  some	  manner	  with	  
these	  bricks	  and	  these	  alone.191	  	  
	  
If	  we	  consider	  Shklovsky’s	  stance	  on	  art,	  the	  mechanics	  he	  outlines	  that	  play	  a	  part	  in	  the	  
structural	  formations	  and	  functioning	  of	  art	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  a	  system	  such	  as	  that	  which	  
Wittgenstein	  explains	  above,	  except	  that	  it	  is	  a	  system	  whose	  “logical	  form”	  is	  built	  on	  the	  
negation	  of	  experience	  with	  reality.	  If	  combined,	  all	  images	  Shklovsky	  evokes	  would	  
amount	  to	  a	  world	  in	  which	  everything	  is	  possible	  but	  there	  is	  no	  content	  to	  which	  these	  
possibilities	  can	  refer,	  other	  than	  their	  own	  structural	  correlations.	  Thus	  the	  mind	  is	  alert	  
to	  all	  signals	  and	  stimuli,	  but	  cannot	  process	  what	  is	  being	  felt,	  other	  than	  its	  own	  
sensations.	  In	  a	  sense,	  what	  remains	  for	  literature	  to	  supply	  is	  the	  sensation	  of	  the	  reader’s	  
encounter	  with	  the	  material	  components	  of	  the	  text,	  but	  no	  relevant	  meaning-­‐formation	  is	  
left	  open,	  as	  Shklovsky	  suggests,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Tristam	  Shandy.	  	  
Perhaps	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  reality	  component	  can	  be	  explained	  not	  only	  by	  the	  
predominance	  of	  the	  role	  of	  function	  in	  the	  literary	  text,	  but,	  to	  a	  degree,	  also,	  by	  the	  crisis	  
that	  followed	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  Tsarist	  state	  which	  resulted	  in	  a	  disposal	  of	  a	  system	  
of	  beliefs	  and,	  in	  general,	  any	  possible	  point	  of	  orientation,	  knowledge	  base	  that	  one	  could	  
hold	  onto	  or	  refer	  to.	  Literary	  and	  theoretical	  texts	  can	  capture	  tendencies	  in	  an	  epoch	  that	  
that	  the	  authors	  themselves	  were	  not	  even	  aware	  of,	  in	  case	  of	  the	  Formalists	  and	  
Shklovsky,	  for	  example,	  the	  tendency	  to	  diminish	  the	  significance	  of	  semantics	  in	  the	  text	  in	  
favor	  of	  formal	  experiments.	  Shklovsky	  seems	  to	  be	  well	  aware	  of	  this	  phenomenon	  when	  
he	  likens	  the	  process	  of	  creativity	  to	  Brownian	  Motion	  in	  his	  article	  “Collective	  Creativity”:	  	  
                                                




If	  we	  take	  a	  completely	  motionless	  glass	  of	  water	  and	  throw	  some	  fine	  old	  powder	  
into	  it,	  we	  will	  see	  that,	  as	  soon	  as	  the	  water	  grows	  still,	  the	  minute	  particles	  of	  the	  
powder	  suspended	  in	  the	  water	  will	  move,	  as	  a	  swarm	  of	  gnats	  moves	  in	  the	  sun,	  but	  
more	  quietly.	  This	  is	  called	  Brownian	  Motion,	  from	  the	  name	  of	  the	  scientists	  who	  
discovered	  it	  and	  who	  explained	  to	  us	  that	  the	  minute	  particles	  suspended	  in	  the	  
liquid,	  by	  virtue	  of	  the	  insignificance	  of	  their	  mass,	  perceive	  the	  movement	  of	  the	  
molecules	  and	  begin	  to	  vibrate	  under	  the	  action	  of	  their	  jolts.	  The	  creator—be	  it	  the	  
inventor	  of	  international	  combustion	  engine	  or	  a	  poet	  [or	  a	  theoretician]—plays	  the	  
role	  of	  such	  particles,	  which	  make	  motions—invisible	  by	  themselves—visible.	  …It	  
seems	  to	  us	  that	  our	  so-­‐called	  individual	  creation	  is…a	  result	  of	  impossibility	  or,	  
more	  accurately,	  the	  difficulty	  of	  seeing	  the	  present	  day	  in	  general.192	  	  
	  
Shklovsky’s	  model	  of	  art	  is	  particularly	  interesting	  because	  it	  is	  a	  model	  that	  so	  to	  speak	  
turns	  on	  itself.	  It	  is	  a	  model,	  like	  all	  models,	  that	  reflects	  the	  result	  of	  the	  impossibility	  of	  
seeing	  the	  present	  day	  in	  general,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  a	  model	  that	  makes	  the	  impossibility	  of	  
seeing	  more	  valuable	  than	  anything	  else	  in	  art.	  In	  a	  historical	  situation	  that	  is	  void	  of	  
content	  for	  immediate	  processing,	  or	  is	  resistant	  to	  content	  formations	  due	  to	  the	  impact	  of	  
trauma,	  Shklovsky	  with	  a	  sweeping	  gesture	  disposes	  of	  content	  altogether.	  One	  could	  even	  
claim	  that	  during	  the	  Civil	  War	  and	  Red	  terror,	  perhaps	  his	  model	  was	  the	  most	  adequate	  
logical	  proposition	  there	  could	  have	  been,	  namely	  a	  proposition	  that	  proposed	  nothing	  of	  






                                                




Chapter	  4	  	  	  
Daniil	  Kharms	  
	  
I.	  Writing	  under	  Stalinism	  
	  
Daniil	  Ivanovich	  Iuvachev,	  better	  known	  by	  his	  pseudonym	  Daniil	  Kharms,	  was	  only	  
twelve	  years	  younger	  than	  Shklovsky,	  but	  these	  years	  set	  the	  two	  of	  them	  against	  the	  
backdrop	  of	  fast-­‐paced	  historical	  events	  as	  if	  they	  were	  a	  generation	  apart.	  Kharms	  was	  
born	  in	  1905	  into	  a	  family	  that	  had	  close	  ties	  to	  the	  aristocracy	  as	  well	  as	  the	  radical	  
intelligentsia	  of	  Petersburg.	  Because	  of	  his	  younger	  age	  and	  his	  family’s	  efforts	  to	  save	  
Kharms	  from	  the	  cataclysmic	  events,	  Kharms’s	  encounter	  with	  the	  revolution	  was	  not	  as	  
immediate	  as	  Shklovsky’s.	  His	  parents	  sent	  him	  to	  his	  mother’s	  relatives	  in	  Saratov	  in	  the	  
spring	  of	  1918	  to	  escape	  hunger	  and	  the	  upheavals,	  and	  then	  sent	  him	  back	  to	  Petersburg	  
during	  the	  summer	  of	  1919,	  this	  time	  to	  escape	  the	  horrors	  of	  the	  Civil	  War.	  During	  the	  
following	  years	  he	  travelled	  back	  and	  forth	  until	  he	  settled	  down	  in	  Petersburg	  in	  1924	  and	  
began	  to	  establish	  himself	  as	  a	  writer.	  	  Attacks	  on	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  artists	  and	  writers	  
during	  the	  mid-­‐1920s	  became	  increasingly	  prevalent,	  so	  Kharms’s	  aspirations	  as	  an	  avant-­‐
garde	  poet	  from	  the	  onset	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1920s	  conflicted	  with	  and	  moved	  in	  direct	  
contradistinction	  to	  the	  gradual	  emergence	  of	  Proletarian	  literature	  and	  Bolshevik	  literary	  
policies.	  The	  fact	  that	  Kharms	  could	  only	  publish	  two	  poems	  written	  for	  adults	  in	  his	  




“The	  Poem	  of	  Peter	  Iashkin,”	  published	  in	  an	  almanac	  of	  1927-­‐-­‐is	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  the	  
challenges	  he	  faced	  as	  a	  writer	  who	  could	  not	  align	  himself	  with	  the	  Bolshevik	  regime	  and	  
Soviet	  aesthetics.	  
Kharms’s	  biography	  attests	  to	  a	  series	  of	  efforts	  to	  create	  a	  movement	  or	  
organization	  of	  like-­‐minded	  individuals	  in	  a	  climate	  where	  the	  preceding	  major	  avant-­‐
garde	  schools	  were	  on	  the	  decline	  and	  their	  institutional	  support	  diminishing,	  so	  it	  is	  of	  no	  
surprise	  that	  these	  groups	  were	  short-­‐lived	  or	  never	  materialized.	  Shortly	  after	  his	  return	  
to	  Petersburg	  in	  the	  fall	  of	  1924	  to	  pursue	  his	  studies	  at	  the	  Electro-­‐Technical	  College	  in	  
Petersburg,	  Kharms	  with	  a	  few	  like-­‐minded	  individuals	  (philosophers	  Yakov	  Druskin	  and	  
Leonid	  Lipavsky	  and	  poet	  Nikolai	  Oleinikov)	  created	  a	  group	  called	  Chinari	  (the	  title	  of	  the	  
group	  originated	  from	  the	  word	  “chin”	  or	  “rank”).	  	  They	  were	  participants	  and	  organizers	  
of	  several	  overlapping	  events	  that	  members	  of	  other	  artistic	  circles	  like	  the	  “Left	  Flank”	  
(Levyi	  flang)	  and	  “Radiks”	  attended	  as	  well.	  	  
Facing	  the	  challenges	  of	  publishing,	  Kharms	  became	  increasingly	  preoccupied	  with	  
the	  creation	  of	  a	  union	  of	  artists	  (writers,	  painters,	  musicians)	  and	  theoreticians	  under	  the	  
title	  of	  “Academy	  of	  Left	  Classics”	  (Akademiia	  levykh	  klassikov)	  hoping	  that	  by	  joining	  ranks,	  
the	  movement	  would	  receive	  greater	  recognition.	  This	  group	  planned	  to	  list	  amongst	  its	  
members	  writers	  and	  poets	  like	  Kharms,	  Zabolotsky,	  Lev	  Savelev	  and	  Nikolai	  Oleinikov,	  
artists	  like	  Kazimir	  Malevich	  and	  Pavel	  Filonov,	  and	  theoreticians	  of	  art	  and	  literature	  such	  
as	  Shklovsky	  and	  Lydia	  Ginzburg.	  However,	  the	  group	  never	  materialized.	  	  
The	  same	  year	  (1927)	  Kharms,	  with	  	  a	  group	  of	  experimental	  writers	  including	  




its	  name	  the	  acronym	  of	  Ob’edinenie	  real’nogo	  iskusstva	  (Association	  of	  Real	  Art).	  As	  the	  
pressure	  of	  Stalinism	  increased,	  the	  group	  met	  stronger	  and	  stronger	  resistance,	  and	  its	  
public	  activities	  	  ceased	  by	  1930.	  From	  1928	  on	  Kharms	  could	  only	  publish	  works	  of	  
children’s	  literature,	  which	  he	  considered	  of	  little	  literary	  merit	  and	  only	  a	  source	  of	  
income,	  yet	  he	  was	  arrested	  even	  so	  in	  December	  1931	  for	  “deflecting”	  the	  people	  (in	  the	  
children’s	  sphere)	  from	  the	  building	  of	  socialism	  by	  means	  of	  his	  trans-­‐sense	  verses.	  	  He	  
was	  sentenced	  to	  three	  years	  in	  prison	  camp.	  His	  sentence	  eventually	  was	  reduced	  to	  six	  
months	  in	  detention	  and	  several	  months	  of	  exile	  in	  Kursk.	  Kharms	  returned	  to	  Petersburg	  
in	  1932,	  but	  by	  then	  even	  publishing	  children’s	  literature	  became	  increasingly	  difficult	  for	  
him.	  	  
During	  1939	  he	  was	  admitted	  for	  treatment	  to	  the	  psycho-­‐neurological	  hospital	  in	  
Leningrad.	  In	  the	  same	  year	  he	  put	  together	  one	  of	  his	  most	  essential	  works,	  a	  collection	  of	  
short	  prose	  under	  the	  title	  Incidents	  (Sluchai).	  These	  texts	  are	  the	  primary	  sources	  on	  
which	  my	  argument	  in	  the	  following	  sections	  will	  depend.	  Throughout	  the	  1930s,	  Kharms	  
spent	  most	  of	  his	  time	  playing	  music,	  composing	  short	  philosophical	  treatises	  and	  prose	  
miniatures,	  but	  writing	  almost	  no	  poems.	  And	  when	  he	  did	  write	  poems,	  he	  advocated	  the	  
principles	  of	  prose.	  Kharms	  says	  in	  a	  diary	  fragment	  dating	  from	  1933:	  “Of	  course,	  poems	  
have	  their	  own	  laws	  but	  it	  would	  be	  even	  better	  if	  the	  poem	  sounded	  good	  while	  at	  the	  
same	  time	  preserving	  the	  laws	  of	  prose.”193	  	  This	  is	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  earlier	  years	  of	  
the	  avant-­‐garde,	  when	  aesthetics	  was	  modeled	  primarily	  after	  poetry	  and	  reader-­‐	  and	  
penmanship	  focused	  on	  poetic	  forms.	  While	  it	  would	  be	  hard	  to	  infer	  what	  specifically	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  Anemone,	  Anthony	  and	  Peter	  Scotto,	  “I	  am	  a	  Phenomenon	  Quite	  Out	  of	  the	  Ordinary,”	  The	  Notebooks,	  




Kharms	  had	  in	  mind	  regarding	  the	  laws	  of	  prose,	  it	  can	  be	  safely	  assumed	  that	  the	  laws	  of	  
prose	  generally	  enable	  a	  text	  to	  sustain	  a	  systemic	  and	  complex	  unity	  of	  thought	  that	  a	  
more	  metaphoric	  application	  of	  language,	  i.e.,	  in	  poetry,	  could	  accomplish	  only	  in	  a	  limited	  
fashion.	  The	  combination	  of	  poetry	  and	  prose	  indicates,	  in	  my	  view,	  a	  possible	  authorial	  
preference	  for	  a	  combination	  of	  dominant	  features	  of	  both,	  namely,	  an	  intent	  to	  combine	  
the	  ability	  of	  poetry	  to	  evoke	  traditionally	  elusive	  subject	  matters	  via	  the	  larger	  semantic	  
units	  characteristic	  of	  prose,	  in	  other	  words,	  to	  merge	  the	  symbolism	  inherent	  in	  poetry	  
with	  elements	  of	  realism	  more	  indicative	  of	  prose.	  If	  Mayakovsky	  was	  right	  that	  during	  the	  
time	  of	  the	  revolution	  “prose	  was	  destroyed	  because	  of	  the	  absence	  of	  time	  for	  writing	  and	  
reading,	  because	  of	  the	  skepticism	  toward	  fictional	  events,	  and	  because	  of	  the	  pallor	  of	  
these	  fictions	  as	  compared	  to	  life,”194	  the	  preference	  for	  prose	  in	  the	  1930s	  in	  general,	  
including	  the	  case	  of	  Kharms,	  could	  possibly	  indicate	  a	  reversed	  mechanism	  in	  place.	  The	  
shift	  from	  poetry	  to	  prose	  would	  then	  signal	  that	  the	  pace	  of	  events	  slowed	  down	  and	  there	  
was	  more	  time	  to	  reflect,	  and	  skepticism	  shifted	  back	  from	  fiction	  to	  reality	  that	  manifested	  
itself	  in	  a	  preference	  for	  fiction	  over	  life.	  All	  this	  would	  indicate	  a	  shift	  from	  direct	  
engagement	  to	  gradual	  dissociation	  from	  the	  events	  and	  the	  losing	  of	  oneself	  in	  the	  world	  
of	  fiction.	  
On	  the	  23rd	  of	  August	  1941,	  Kharms	  was	  arrested	  again	  for	  the	  third	  time.	  The	  arrest	  
documents	  indicate	  that	  he	  was	  accused	  of	  having	  counter-­‐revolutionary	  sympathies,	  
disseminating	  slanderous	  and	  defeatist	  sentiments,	  attempting	  to	  cause	  panic	  and	  create	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dissatisfaction	  with	  the	  Soviet	  government	  among	  the	  populace.195	  	  From	  the	  24th	  of	  August	  
to	  the	  7th	  of	  December	  he	  was	  held	  in	  the	  NKVD’s	  inner	  prison	  in	  Leningrad.	  After	  
undergoing	  mental	  health	  evaluation	  he	  was	  diagnosed	  with	  schizophrenia,	  absolved	  of	  
criminal	  responsibility	  and	  confined	  for	  treatment	  in	  the	  psychiatric	  wing	  of	  the	  prison	  
hospital.	  Kharms’s	  psychological	  condition	  is	  described	  in	  the	  prison	  records	  as	  follows:	  
[He]	  thinks	  clearly,	  correctly	  oriented	  with	  respect	  to	  time,	  place	  and	  surroundings.	  
Expresses	  floridly	  delusional	  notions	  concerning	  his	  inventions.	  Believes	  that	  he	  has	  
invented	  a	  method	  of	  correcting	  ‘flaws,’	  the	  so-­‐called	  peccatum	  parvum.	  Considers	  
himself	  a	  special	  person	  with	  a	  delicate	  and	  highly	  developed	  nervous	  system,	  
capable	  of	  eliminating	  “a	  disrupted	  equilibrium”	  by	  a	  creation	  of	  his	  own	  means.196	  
	  
Kharms	  died	  on	  February	  2,	  1942,	  in	  the	  NKVD	  prison	  hospital;	  his	  cause	  of	  death	  is	  
unknown.	  The	  quoted	  passage	  indicates	  that	  he	  viewed	  himself	  as	  someone	  capable	  of	  
restoring	  the	  disrupted	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  world	  via	  means	  he	  created.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  
entirely	  clear	  from	  the	  transcripts	  what	  he	  understood	  as	  his	  “means,”	  excerpts	  I	  will	  
introduce	  from	  other	  writings	  indicate	  that	  he	  was	  referring	  to	  his	  literary	  work.	  	  
	   All	  the	  texts	  of	  Kharms	  that	  I	  have	  chosen	  for	  discussion	  are	  prose	  works	  and	  all	  
were	  written	  between	  the	  late	  1920s	  and	  1940,	  the	  majority	  during	  the	  1930s,	  which,	  given	  
the	  biographical	  data,	  can	  be	  considered	  to	  represent	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  Kharms’s	  
development	  both	  as	  a	  writer	  and	  as	  a	  theoretician.	  A	  biographical	  review	  of	  Kharms’s	  life	  
during	  the	  1930s	  reveals	  a	  gradual	  process	  of	  exclusion	  from	  the	  main	  literary	  scene,	  and	  
his	  diary	  notes	  reflect	  a	  growing	  sense	  of	  isolation.	  As	  early	  as	  1930,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	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dissolution	  of	  the	  OBERIU	  group,	  Kharms	  felt	  unimportant,	  and	  his	  notes	  testify	  to	  his	  
constant	  struggle	  with	  inertia	  and	  increasing	  spiritual	  and	  artistic	  decline.	  By	  1937	  
Kharms’s	  isolation	  was	  so	  complete	  that	  he	  no	  longer	  showed	  his	  works	  to	  anyone.	  His	  
desolation	  can	  be	  heard	  in	  the	  following	  imaginary	  dialogue	  with	  his	  imaginary	  reader:	  
“Reader,…let	  me	  take	  a	  good	  look	  at	  you.	  …Maybe	  there	  is	  no	  mind	  in	  you,	  maybe	  you	  are	  
simply	  scum?	  Then	  hop	  along,	  laugh	  and	  do	  everything	  you	  want	  because	  I	  have	  another	  
reader,	  better	  than	  you…and	  that	  reader	  is	  I,	  myself.”197	  Kharms’s	  diminishing	  publishing	  
opportunities	  lead	  to	  his	  impoverishment	  to	  a	  point	  where	  the	  last	  decade	  of	  his	  life	  was	  
marked	  by	  ongoing	  starvation	  and	  destitution.	  	  The	  author’s	  diaries	  attest	  to	  nearly	  daily	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II.	  On	  the	  Role	  of	  Method	  in	  Kharms’s	  Aesthetics	  
	   	  
	   Over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  creative	  years	  (1925-­‐1940)	  Kharms,	  like	  the	  members	  of	  
most	  if	  not	  all	  artistic	  and	  theoretical	  schools	  in	  the	  tradition	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde,	  was	  
preoccupied	  with	  the	  role	  of	  method	  in	  the	  literary	  construct.	  In	  the	  Oberiu	  Manifesto,	  
dated	  1927	  and	  signed	  by	  Igor	  Bakhterev,	  Boris	  Levin	  and	  Kharms,	  a	  direct	  call	  is	  made	  by	  
the	  artists	  to	  focus	  on	  art’s	  “modus	  vivendi.”	  The	  emphasis	  on	  method	  implies	  that	  the	  
Oberiuty,	  too,	  questioned	  the	  legacy	  of	  representative	  art	  and	  its	  focus	  on	  subject	  matter.	  
They	  claim	  “Oberiu	  does	  not	  concern	  itself	  with	  only	  the	  subject	  matter	  and	  the	  high	  points	  
of	  artistic	  work;	  it	  seeks	  an	  organically	  new	  concept	  of	  life	  and	  approach	  to	  things.”198	  A	  
couple	  of	  lines	  further	  along	  they	  conclude	  that	  “the	  new	  concept	  of	  life	  and	  approach”	  to	  
things	  (or	  objects)	  is	  contained	  precisely	  in	  their	  method	  and	  add:	  “The	  new	  artistic	  
method	  of	  Oberiu	  is	  universal.	  It	  finds	  a	  way	  to	  represent	  any	  subject.	  Oberiu	  is	  
revolutionary	  precisely	  by	  virtue	  of	  this	  method.”199	  The	  method	  the	  Oberiuty	  seek	  is	  a	  
system	  that	  provides	  a	  logical	  construction	  of	  an	  understanding,	  an	  approach	  to	  things	  or	  
objects	  (to	  the	  “world”	  in	  Kharms’s	  later	  terminology),	  and	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  it	  is	  in	  itself	  a	  
representation	  (mirror-­‐image)	  of	  these	  things	  or	  the	  world	  that	  these	  things	  add	  up	  to.	  It	  is	  
critical	  to	  note	  that	  method	  functions	  both	  as	  an	  approach	  to	  and	  as	  a	  model	  of	  the	  world.	  
This	  is	  a	  markedly	  different	  stance	  from	  that	  articulated	  by	  Shklovsky	  inasmuch	  as	  
Shklovsky,	  while	  identifying	  life	  and	  art	  (and	  survival),	  denies	  any	  importance	  of	  real	  life	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elements	  or	  presence	  of	  new	  concepts	  of	  life	  within	  a	  literary	  work.	  This	  is	  not	  the	  same	  for	  
Kharms,	  and	  the	  Oberiuty,	  who	  from	  the	  outset	  are	  interested	  in	  representation.	  If	  I	  were	  to	  
draw	  a	  comparison	  between	  Shklovsky’s	  and	  Kharms’s	  writings	  on	  the	  connection	  of	  art	  
and	  life,	  for	  Shklovsky	  life	  transforms	  art	  (when	  real	  life	  experience	  such	  as	  trauma	  enters	  
the	  text),	  whereas	  for	  Kharms,	  art	  is	  transforms	  life	  (when	  the	  text	  takes	  on	  the	  role	  or	  
purpose	  of	  living	  out	  a	  life).	  The	  difference	  between	  the	  two	  models	  is	  that	  in	  the	  former,	  
the	  premise	  is	  life,	  in	  the	  second,	  it	  is	  art.	  This	  shift	  indicates	  that	  there	  is	  a	  progression	  in	  
the	  processing	  of	  the	  traumatic	  encounter.	  At	  first,	  the	  external	  events	  enter	  the	  literary	  
text	  and	  become	  internalized	  in	  the	  language	  use	  of	  early	  avant-­‐garde	  authors	  (as	  is	  the	  
case	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  example).	  Then	  at	  the	  next	  stage,	  the	  very	  same	  works	  provide	  a	  
context	  of	  identification	  for	  the	  2nd	  or	  3rd	  generation	  of	  avant-­‐garde	  authors,	  who	  
appropriate	  the	  legacy	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  and	  transform	  it	  to	  meet	  their	  own	  needs.	  
Externalization	  in	  this	  regard	  means	  not	  only	  disposal	  of	  the	  traumatic	  encounter	  but	  also	  
the	  creation	  of	  a	  new	  framework	  within	  which	  the	  once	  foreign	  traumatic	  encounter	  
becomes	  integrated	  into	  a	  cultural	  model	  and	  becomes	  part	  of	  a	  normative	  thinking.	  	  
	   In	  terms	  of	  representation,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  concerns	  of	  the	  Oberiuty	  was	  not	  to	  be	  
discredited	  by	  their	  audience	  based	  on	  the	  impression	  that	  their	  art	  lacked	  sense.	  They	  
were	  self-­‐conscious	  and	  drew	  attention	  to	  the	  difference	  between	  nonsensical	  and	  lacking	  
sense,	  and	  defended	  themselves	  in	  the	  following	  argument:	  
Some	  people	  even	  now	  call	  us	  zaumniki.	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  decide	  whether	  this	  is	  
because	  of	  complete	  misunderstanding	  or	  a	  hopeless	  failure	  to	  grasp	  the	  principles	  
of	  literary	  art.	  No	  school	  is	  more	  hostile	  to	  zaum.	  We,	  people	  who	  are	  real	  and	  




word	  and	  make	  it	  into	  a	  powerless	  and	  senseless	  mongrel.	  In	  our	  work	  we	  broaden	  
the	  meaning	  of	  the	  object	  and	  of	  the	  word,	  but	  we	  do	  not	  destroy	  it	  in	  any	  way.200	  
	  
Given	  the	  fact	  that	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  manifesto	  literary	  groups	  that	  showed	  affiliation	  with	  
the	  tradition	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  came	  increasingly	  under	  attack	  for	  “lacking	  relevance”	  in	  
content	  and	  being	  out	  of	  sync	  with	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  times,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  argue	  that	  the	  
Oberiuty	  shaped	  their	  manifesto	  with	  the	  intent	  to	  address	  possible	  criticism,	  and	  hence	  
paid	  larger	  than	  due	  attention	  to	  the	  subject	  of	  content.	  To	  support	  their	  argument,	  the	  
Oberiuty	  describe	  their	  method	  of	  artistic	  creation,	  emphasizing	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  negation	  
of	  the	  representative	  value	  of	  words	  on	  which	  they	  base	  their	  art,	  but	  the	  juxtaposition	  of	  
words,	  which	  creates	  a	  poetic	  effect.	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  do	  not	  want	  to	  remove	  the	  
conventional	  meaning	  from	  words;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  effect	  is	  based	  on	  the	  actual	  meaning	  of	  
the	  word	  projected	  onto	  another	  word	  via	  a	  collision	  of	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  two.	  The	  
Oberiuty	  describe	  their	  process	  of	  linguistic	  experiment	  and	  the	  result	  as	  follows:	  “The	  
concrete	  object,	  once	  its	  literary	  and	  everyday	  skin	  is	  peeled	  away,	  becomes	  the	  property	  of	  
art.	  In	  poetry	  the	  collision	  of	  verbal	  meaning	  expresses	  that	  object	  with	  the	  exactness	  of	  
mechanical	  technology.”201	  The	  idea	  of	  collision	  is	  not	  unfamiliar,	  Shklovsky	  too,	  
highlighted	  its	  importance	  and	  made	  it	  a	  central	  purpose	  of	  the	  various	  literary	  devices	  that	  
aimed	  to	  defamiliarize	  the	  literary	  text	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  enhancing	  the	  literariness	  of	  the	  text	  
and	  thus	  increase	  its	  impact	  on	  the	  reader.	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To	  the	  accusations	  that	  their	  art	  was	  not	  representational	  or	  true	  to	  life,	  the	  
Oberiuty	  responded,	  defending	  art’s	  integrity	  in	  the	  spirit	  of	  their	  avant-­‐garde	  forbears	  in	  
words	  that	  echo	  Shklovsky’s	  outlook	  on	  art	  and	  even	  style	  of	  writing:	  
Are	  you	  beginning	  to	  complain	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  same	  object	  you	  see	  in	  life?	  Come	  
closer	  and	  touch	  it	  with	  your	  fingers.	  Look	  at	  the	  object	  with	  naked	  eyes,	  and	  you	  
will	  see	  it	  cleansed	  for	  the	  first	  time	  of	  decrepit	  literary	  gilding.	  Maybe	  you	  will	  
insist	  that	  our	  subjects	  are	  “unreal”	  and	  “illogical”?	  But	  who	  said	  that	  the	  logic	  of	  life	  
is	  compulsory	  in	  art?	  We	  marvel	  at	  the	  beauty	  of	  a	  painted	  woman	  despite	  the	  fact,	  
that	  contrary	  to	  anatomical	  logic,	  the	  artist	  twisted	  out	  the	  shoulder	  blade	  of	  his	  
heroine	  and	  moved	  it	  sideways.	  Art	  has	  a	  logic	  of	  its	  own,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  destroy	  the	  
object	  but	  helps	  us	  to	  know	  it.202	  	  
	   	  
Objects	  in	  the	  works	  of	  the	  Oberiuty,	  due	  to	  their	  instant	  collision,	  which	  disrupts	  the	  
language	  flow	  and	  interrupts	  the	  relationship	  between	  signifier	  and	  signified,	  have	  been	  
deprived	  of	  their	  representational	  characteristics,	  and	  thus,	  as	  seemingly	  randomly	  
juxtaposed	  fragments	  of	  the	  projected	  world,	  produce	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  nonsensical	  reality	  as	  a	  
whole.	  The	  logical	  reduction	  by	  which	  objects	  become	  deprived	  of	  their	  content	  is	  very	  
similar	  to	  the	  workings	  of	  literature	  Shklovsky	  describes	  and	  is	  done	  on	  the	  same	  premise,	  
namely,	  that	  the	  world	  of	  objects	  (words)	  is	  subordinate	  to	  the	  composition.	  	  Second,	  the	  
Oberiuty	  claim	  that	  the	  method	  of	  the	  arrangement	  of	  objects,	  described	  as	  colliding,	  has	  
the	  effect	  of	  precision	  like	  that	  of	  “mechanical	  technology.”	  The	  analogy	  of	  mechanical	  
technology	  in	  the	  language	  of	  artistic	  expression	  reveals	  	  the	  scientific,	  experimental	  nature	  
of	  the	  method	  to	  us	  readers—which	  falls	  within	  the	  argument	  of	  the	  Formalists	  and	  
Shklovsky	  himself.	  	  
                                                




	   Within	  the	  Manifesto,	  under	  the	  subtitle	  “The	  Oberiu	  Theater,”	  Bakhterev,	  Levin	  and	  
Kharms	  define	  the	  method	  of	  handling	  the	  plot	  in	  Kharms’s	  drama,	  Elizaveta	  Bam,	  which	  
description	  of	  method	  suits	  Kharms’s	  other	  writings	  as	  well:	  
The	  dramatic	  plot	  is	  replaced	  by	  a	  scenic	  plot,	  which	  arises	  spontaneously	  from	  all	  
the	  elements	  of	  our	  spectacle.	  The	  center	  of	  our	  attention	  is	  on	  it.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  
time,	  separate	  elements	  of	  the	  spectacle	  are	  equally	  valuable	  and	  important	  to	  us.	  
They	  live	  their	  separate	  lives	  without	  subordinating	  themselves	  to	  the	  ticking	  of	  the	  
theatrical	  metronome.	  Here	  a	  corner	  of	  a	  gold	  frame	  sticks	  out	  –	  it	  lives	  as	  an	  object	  
of	  art;	  there	  a	  fragment	  of	  a	  poem	  is	  recited	  –	  it	  is	  autonomous	  in	  its	  significance,	  
and	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  independent	  of	  its	  will,	  it	  advances	  the	  scenic	  plot	  of	  the	  play.	  
The	  scenery,	  the	  movement	  of	  an	  actor,	  a	  bottle	  thrown	  down,	  the	  train	  of	  a	  costume	  
–	  they	  are	  actors,	  just	  like	  those	  who	  shake	  their	  heads	  and	  speak	  various	  words	  and	  
phrases.203	  
	  
For	  the	  Oberiuty,	  as	  we	  see	  from	  the	  quoted	  passage,	  all	  objects	  become	  equal	  in	  
significance,	  and	  due	  to	  their	  mechanical	  arrangement,	  they	  not	  only	  lose	  their	  semantic	  
status,	  but	  become	  autonomous	  from	  one	  another.	  This	  perspective	  on	  the	  objects	  in	  or	  
elements	  of	  composition	  is	  similar	  if	  not	  identical	  to	  that	  advocated	  by	  the	  Formalists,	  
which	  indicates	  that	  the	  importance	  attributed	  to	  method	  at	  least	  in	  its	  inception	  for	  
Kharms	  is	  embedded	  in	  the	  legacy	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde.	  	  
	   Five	  years	  after	  the	  Manifesto	  and	  two	  years	  following	  his	  first	  arrest,	  in	  his	  letter	  to	  
K.V.	  Pugacheva	  dated	  1933,	  Kharms	  takes	  up	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  role	  of	  method	  in	  his	  art,	  
but	  as	  we	  shall	  see,	  method	  by	  then	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  collective	  endeavor	  to	  create	  “an	  
organically	  new	  concept	  of	  life”	  but	  a	  personal	  and	  private	  matter	  with	  a	  metaphysical	  
dimension	  and	  existential	  significance.	  By	  1933	  Kharms	  saw	  that	  the	  world	  has	  no	  a	  priori	  
order	  (or	  structural	  characteristics	  and	  laws)	  that	  a	  particular	  approach	  or	  method	  in	  art	  
                                                




could	  mirror.	  He	  writes	  in	  his	  letter	  that	  “[t]he	  world	  started	  to	  exist	  as	  soon	  as	  I	  allowed	  it	  
to	  enter	  into	  me.	  	  Granted	  still	  in	  chaos,	  but	  none	  the	  less	  it	  exists.”204	  In	  light	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  
the	  world	  no	  longer	  seems	  to	  be	  based	  on	  a	  logical,	  universal	  principle,	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  how	  
things	  are	  in	  the	  world	  that	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  exclamation,	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  world	  exists	  
contrary	  to	  its	  chaotic	  nature.	  Kharms	  took	  the	  following	  stance:	  “However	  I	  began	  to	  put	  
the	  world	  in	  order.	  And	  at	  that	  moment	  Art	  appeared.	  Only	  then	  did	  I	  realize	  the	  true	  
difference	  between	  the	  sun	  and	  a	  comb,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  learned	  that	  they’re	  one	  and	  
the	  same.”205	  The	  reader	  is	  familiar	  with	  this	  theme	  of	  equation	  of	  objects	  in	  terms	  of	  
significance	  from	  the	  Oberiu	  Manifesto	  (which	  idea	  recurs	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  theoretical	  
writings	  as	  well),	  but	  here	  in	  the	  letter	  what	  once	  was	  part	  of	  a	  device	  to	  enhance	  
literariness	  or	  differentiate	  literary	  from	  ordinary	  language	  use	  gains	  a	  philosophical	  
dimension.	  On	  these	  premises	  Kharms	  defines	  his	  position	  on	  life	  and	  art	  as	  follows:	  
Now	  my	  concern	  is	  to	  create	  the	  correct	  order.	  I’m	  fascinated	  by	  this	  and	  can’t	  think	  
of	  anything	  else.	  I	  speak	  about	  it,	  attempt	  to	  tell,	  describe,	  draw,	  dance,	  build	  it.	  I	  am	  
the	  creator	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  most	  important	  thing	  within	  me…Into	  
everything	  I	  do	  I	  put	  in	  the	  consciousness	  that	  I	  am	  the	  creator	  of	  the	  world.	  But	  I’m	  
not	  simply	  making	  a	  boot,	  but	  first	  of	  all,	  I’m	  creating	  a	  new	  thing.	  It’s	  not	  enough	  for	  
me	  that	  the	  boot	  turn	  out	  comfortable,	  sturdy	  and	  that	  it	  look	  good.	  It’s	  important	  
for	  me	  that	  the	  order	  in	  the	  boot	  be	  the	  same	  as	  that	  of	  the	  entire	  world:	  that	  the	  
order	  of	  the	  world	  not	  suffer,	  not	  be	  polluted	  by	  coming	  into	  contact	  with	  leather	  
and	  nails,	  that,	  whatever	  the	  form	  of	  the	  boot,	  it	  (the	  order)	  preserve	  its	  own	  form,	  
that	  it	  remain	  the	  same	  as	  it	  ever	  was,	  that	  it	  stay	  pure.	  
This	  is	  the	  same	  purity	  that	  runs	  through	  all	  the	  arts.	  When	  I	  write	  poetry,	  the	  main	  
thing,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  is	  not	  the	  idea,	  not	  the	  content,	  not	  the	  form,	  and	  not	  the	  hazy	  
concept	  of	  “quality,”	  but	  something	  even	  hazier	  and	  less	  comprehensible	  to	  me	  and,	  
I	  hope,	  to	  you,	  sweet	  Klavdia	  Vasilievna.	  This	  is	  the	  purity	  of	  order.	  	  
                                                
204	  Neil	  Cornwell,	  The	  Plummeting	  Old	  Women,	  intro.	  and	  trans.	  by	  Neil	  Cornwell	  (Dublin:	  The	  Lilliput	  Press),	  
89.	  
	  




This	  purity	  is	  one	  and	  the	  same	  in	  the	  sun,	  grass,	  man	  and	  poems.	  True	  art	  stands	  
together	  with	  the	  first	  reality,	  it	  creates	  the	  world	  and	  is	  its	  first	  reflection.	  It	  is	  
necessarily	  real.	  206	  
	  
The	  excerpt	  gives	  a	  concise	  view	  of	  Kharms’s	  worldview	  and	  aesthetics	  in	  the	  year	  1933,	  
which	  year,	  according	  to	  Yakov	  Druskin,	  a	  close	  friend	  of	  Kharms,	  marked	  the	  apotheosis	  of	  
the	  crisis	  in	  Kharms’s	  life	  that	  had	  begun	  in	  1931	  (the	  year	  of	  Kharms’s	  first	  arrest)	  and	  
continued	  throughout	  the	  year	  1932.207	  As	  Kharms	  saw	  it,	  the	  world	  was	  in	  a	  state	  of	  
complete	  indifference	  to	  any	  order	  that	  is	  higher	  or	  beyond;	  all	  that	  was	  left	  was	  to	  create	  a	  
world	  within	  that	  is	  in	  line	  with	  a	  purity	  of	  order	  which,	  while	  not	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
state	  of	  the	  world,	  somehow	  still	  is	  the	  way	  the	  world	  ought	  to	  be	  captured	  or	  represented.	  
This	  is	  different	  from	  modernist	  endeavors	  that	  seek	  out	  “invariance	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  
variation”	  as	  Jakobson	  referred	  to	  his	  own	  quest	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Formalists’	  desire	  to	  
understand	  the	  underlying	  mechanisms	  of	  the	  various	  devices	  in	  play	  in	  a	  literary	  work.	  
While	  one	  can	  say	  that	  there	  was	  an	  inequilibrium	  between	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
content	  in	  favor	  of	  method	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  theoretical	  writings,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  study	  
of	  the	  literary	  text	  did	  take	  on	  a	  grand	  narrative	  where	  all	  devices	  acted	  in	  concert	  in	  
                                                
206Anemone	  and	  Scott,	  “I	  am	  a	  Phenomenon	  Quite	  Out	  of	  the	  Ordinary,”	  415-­‐416.	  The	  original	  text	  is	  as	  follows:	  
“Teper’	  moia	  zabota	  sozdat’	  pravel’nyi	  poriadok.	  Ia	  uvlechen	  etim	  I	  tol’ko	  ob	  etom	  dumaiu.	  Ia	  govoriu	  ob	  
etom,	  pytaius’	  eto	  rasskazat’,	  opicat’,	  narisovat’,,	  protantsovat’,	  postroit’.	  Ia	  tvorets	  mira,	  I	  eto	  samoe	  glavnoe	  
vo	  mne…Vo	  vse,	  chto	  ia	  delaiu,	  ia	  vkladyvaiu	  soznanie,	  chto	  ia	  tvorets	  mira.	  I	  ia	  delaiu	  ne	  prosto	  sapog,	  no,	  
ran’she	  vsego,	  ia	  sozdaiu	  novuiu	  veshch’.	  Mne	  vazhno,	  chtoby	  v	  nem	  byl	  tot-­‐zhe	  poriadok,	  chto	  I	  vo	  vsem	  
mire;	  chtoby	  poriadok	  mira	  ne	  postradal,	  ne	  zagriaznilsia	  ot	  soprikosnoveniia	  c	  kozhei	  I	  gvozdiami,	  chtoby	  ne	  
smotria	  na	  formu	  sapoga,	  on	  sokhranil	  by	  svoiu	  formu,	  ostalsia	  by	  tem	  zhe,	  chem	  byl,	  ostalsia	  chistym.	  
Eta	  te	  samaia	  chistota,	  kotoraia	  pronizyvaet	  vse	  iskusstva.	  Kogda	  ia	  pishu	  stikhi,	  to	  samym	  glavnym,	  kazhetsia	  
mne,	  ne	  ideia,	  ne	  soderzhanie	  I	  ne	  forma,	  I	  ne	  tumannoe	  poniatie	  ‘kachestvo’,	  a	  nechto	  eshche	  bole	  tumannoe	  
I	  neponiatnoe	  ratsionalisticheskomu	  umu,	  no	  poniatnoe	  mne	  I,	  nadeius’	  ,	  Vam,	  milaia	  Klavdiia	  Vasil’evna,	  
eto—chistota	  poriadka.	  
Eto	  chistota	  poriadka	  odna	  I	  tazhe	  v	  solntse,	  trave,	  cheloveke	  I	  stikhakh.	  Istinnoe	  iskusstvo	  stoit	  v	  riadu	  
pervoi	  real’nosti,	  ono	  sozdaet	  mir	  I	  iavliaetsiaego	  pervym	  otrazheniem.	  Ono	  obiazatel’no	  real’no.	  in	  Daniil	  
Kharms,	  Sobranie	  sochinenia	  v	  dvukh	  tomakh,(ACT:	  Zebra,	  2010),	  37-­‐38.	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obtaining	  what	  “literature”	  quintessentially	  embodied.	  	  In	  Kharms’s	  case	  even	  intra-­‐literary	  
realities	  are	  arbitrary	  as	  he	  no	  longer	  seeks	  to	  deduce,	  but,	  instead,	  wants	  to	  “artificially”	  
induce	  a	  concept,	  here	  of	  “purity	  of	  order.”	  His	  world	  (manifested	  in	  literature)	  is	  an	  anti-­‐
world,	  for	  it	  is	  created	  against	  the	  chaos	  manifested	  in	  the	  external	  world,	  on	  the	  principle	  
of	  “purity	  of	  order”	  that	  is	  relevant	  only	  to	  him.	  If	  we	  consider	  this	  line	  of	  thought	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  personal	  crisis	  and	  traumatic	  encounter,	  there	  is	  a	  visible	  shift	  from	  the	  efforts	  
manifested	  in	  Shklovsky’s	  writings	  to	  render	  a	  model	  (of	  literature	  and	  life)	  adequate	  to	  
early	  stages	  of	  traumatic	  processing	  where	  content	  is	  markedly	  absent	  due	  to	  the	  clash	  of	  
pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐traumatic	  experiences,	  to	  later	  stages,	  when	  the	  irreconcilability	  between	  the	  
external	  world	  and	  one’s	  inner	  world	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  matter	  of	  conflict	  to	  be	  worked	  
through,	  but	  an	  understood	  and	  integrated	  fact.	  In	  the	  latter	  case	  any	  chance	  for	  
reconciliation	  between	  external	  and	  internal	  experience	  is	  ruled	  out,	  and	  there	  remains	  
only	  one	  choice,	  which	  is	  to	  further	  retreat	  into	  one’s	  personal	  world	  and	  complete	  
elimination	  of	  the	  chaos	  or	  inequilibrium	  that	  is	  so	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  
traumatic	  encounter.	  Judith	  Herman	  observes:	  	  
As	  intrusive	  symptoms	  diminish,	  numbing	  or	  constrictive	  symptoms	  come	  to	  
predominate.	  The	  traumatized	  person	  may	  no	  longer	  seem	  frightened	  and	  may	  
resume	  the	  outward	  forms	  of	  her	  previous	  life.	  But	  the	  severing	  of	  events	  from	  their	  
ordinary	  meanings	  and	  the	  distortion	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  reality	  persists.	  She	  may	  
complain	  that	  she	  is	  going	  through	  the	  motion	  of	  living,	  as	  if	  she	  were	  observing	  the	  
events	  of	  daily	  life	  from	  a	  great	  distance.208	  
	  
Kharms,	  in	  my	  view,	  exhibits	  very	  similar	  symptoms	  to	  what	  Herman	  describes	  in	  
the	  passage,	  and	  I	  would	  suggest	  that	  it	  may	  not	  be	  far	  fetched	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  
revolution	  whose	  effects	  were	  felt	  by	  several	  generations	  may	  have	  reached	  in	  the	  1930s	  a	  
                                                




point	  in	  the	  collective	  conscience	  where	  life	  resumed	  as	  if	  normal,	  but	  the	  range	  of	  
activities	  became	  limited	  to	  inner	  life.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  task	  is	  no	  longer	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  
original	  experience,	  but	  to	  cope	  with	  its	  long-­‐term	  consequences,	  i.e.,	  with	  the	  lack	  of	  trust	  
in	  the	  world	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  alienation	  and	  chaos,	  all	  indicators	  of	  a	  crisis	  of	  faith.	  	  The	  
question	  by	  the	  1930s	  for	  Kharms	  is	  no	  longer	  how	  to	  create	  or	  externalize	  art	  (substitute	  
art	  for	  life)	  but	  how	  to	  internalize	  his	  art	  (substitute	  life	  for	  art).	  	  As	  Iakov	  Druskin	  notes	  in	  
his	  recollections:	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1920s,	  Vvedensky	  said	  that	  Kharms	  does	  not	  create	  art,	  but	  is	  
himself	  art.	  Kharms,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1930s,	  used	  to	  say	  that	  the	  important	  thing	  for	  
him	  was	  not	  art	  but	  life:	  to	  make	  his	  life	  art.	  This	  was	  not	  aestheticism;	  “the	  creation	  
of	  life	  like	  art”	  was	  for	  Kharms	  a	  category	  not	  of	  an	  aesthetic	  order	  but	  what	  would	  
now	  be	  called	  an	  existential	  one.209	  
	  
The	  idea	  of	  making	  art	  out	  of	  one’s	  life	  as	  Druskin	  points	  out	  is	  an	  existential	  matter;	  
however,	  once	  again,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  Kharms’s	  choice	  to	  create	  a	  life	  according	  
to	  the	  principles	  of	  art,	  that	  is,	  according	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  “purity	  of	  order,”	  implies	  that	  
the	  author	  embraces	  fiction	  (harmony)	  over	  reality	  (chaos),	  and	  that	  his	  existence	  is	  linked	  
with	  non-­‐existence	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  a	  collectively	  validated	  experience/existence.	  
Druskin	  in	  his	  essay	  “On	  Daniil	  Kharms”	  recalls	  that:	  
Kharms	  used	  to	  say	  to	  me	  that	  art	  for	  him	  took	  second	  place,	  second	  place	  to	  making	  
his	  life;	  that	  is	  to	  say,	  making	  it	  just	  as	  poetry	  and	  music	  is	  made…In	  1932	  the	  sense	  
of	  failure	  set	  in:	  he	  began	  to	  understand	  that	  he	  would	  never	  achieve	  his	  ideal.	  Then	  
he	  said,	  “I	  am	  not	  as	  stupid,	  and	  not	  as	  talented	  as	  it	  seems.”	  And	  the	  nonrealization	  
of	  his	  ideal	  was	  more	  interesting	  and	  better	  than	  the	  ideal.	  From	  the	  wreck	  he	  did	  
create	  his	  life	  as	  art.210	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Central	  to	  Druskin’s	  passage	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  “the	  nonrealization	  of	  an	  ideal”	  and	  what	  that	  
possibly	  could	  entail.	  While	  at	  this	  point	  it	  is	  too	  soon	  to	  see,	  the	  idea	  points	  again	  to	  the	  
assumption	  outlined	  in	  my	  introduction	  that	  argues	  for	  the	  validity	  of	  a	  cultural	  model	  that	  
is	  based	  on	  deficit,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Kharms,	  the	  idea	  that	  the	  “nonrealization	  of	  an	  ideal”	  
mode	  of	  living	  can	  create	  a	  foundation	  or	  material	  for	  one’s	  artistic	  oeuvre	  and	  somehow	  















III. Registration	  of	  the	  world	  via	  “purity	  of	  order”	  
	  
“Verbosity	  –	  it	  is	  the	  mother	  of	  untalentedness,”	  writes	  Kharms	  in	  his	  diary	  in	  1930,	  
indicating	  the	  writer’s	  interest	  in	  logically	  reducing	  his	  text	  to	  the	  minimum,	  but	  it	  was	  not	  
only	  the	  brevity	  visible	  in	  his	  prose	  that	  he	  sought,	  but	  the	  ultimate	  semantic	  reduction	  to	  
an	  a	  priori,	  universal	  form	  (or	  pure	  order).	  Kharms	  in	  his	  search	  for	  the	  a	  priori	  form	  
invokes	  three	  key	  categories:	  “zero”	  (nol’),	  “circle”	  (krug)	  and	  “nothing”	  (nichto),	  drawn	  
from	  the	  worlds	  of	  algebra,	  geometry	  and	  language,	  respectively.	  These	  three	  categories	  
are	  interrelated;	  moreover,	  they	  overlap	  as	  three	  different	  aspects	  of	  Kharms’s	  
investigation	  of	  the	  infinite	  and	  its	  registration	  in	  the	  world.	  My	  suggestion	  that	  I	  wish	  to	  
explore	  below	  is	  that	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  zero	  form	  recurs	  in	  the	  theme	  of	  the	  “circle”	  in	  
Kharms’s	  theoretical	  writings	  and,	  taken	  a	  step	  further,	  resurfaces	  as	  the	  central	  theme	  of	  
Kharms’s	  method	  at	  work.	  	  
In	  his	  theoretical	  essay	  “Nought	  and	  zero”	  (Nul	  i	  nol’)	  dated	  June	  9,	  1931,	  Kharms	  
writes:	  “I	  suggest,	  even	  dare	  to	  emphasize,	  that	  the	  study	  of	  the	  infinite	  will	  be	  the	  study	  of	  
zero	  (nol’).	  I	  call	  it	  nol’,	  in	  differentiation	  from	  nul’,	  in	  order	  to	  indicate	  that	  I	  am	  thinking	  
about	  this.”211	  Eleven	  days	  later	  he	  continues	  his	  topic	  by	  introducing	  the	  element	  of	  the	  
circle:	  “The	  symbol	  of	  nul’	  is	  0.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  will	  consider	  the	  symbol	  of	  nol’	  the	  circle	  
(krug).	  I	  must	  say,	  that	  even	  our	  conceptual	  solar	  system,	  if	  it	  wants	  to	  correspond	  to	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reality,	  has	  to	  stop	  being	  straight,	  and	  has	  to	  bend.	  The	  ideal	  bend	  will	  be	  regular	  and	  
continuous	  and	  given	  infinite	  continuity	  the	  solar	  system	  turns	  into	  a	  circle.”212	  	  
During	  his	  exile	  in	  Kursk	  in	  1932,	  Kharms	  spent	  most	  of	  his	  time	  writing	  theoretical	  
essays	  on	  mathematics.	  Once	  again,	  the	  theme	  of	  infinity	  recurs.	  In	  a	  longer	  theoretical	  
sketch	  dated	  August	  2,	  1932,	  he	  wonders	  about	  the	  notion	  of	  infinity	  (beskonechnoe).	  He	  
reflects:	  “Infinity,	  this	  is	  the	  answer	  to	  all	  questions.	  All	  questions	  have	  one	  answer.	  
Therefore	  there	  aren’t	  many	  questions,	  but	  only	  one.	  This	  is:	  what	  is	  infinity?”213	  Kharms	  
outlines	  his	  theory	  as	  follows:	  “Infinity,	  it	  seems	  to	  us,	  has	  a	  direction,	  because	  we	  are	  used	  
to	  understanding	  everything	  graphically…Infinity	  is	  a	  line,	  without	  an	  end	  either	  to	  the	  left,	  
or	  to	  the	  right.	  …[Yet]	  to	  imagine,	  that	  something	  never	  began	  and	  never	  ends,	  we	  can	  only	  
do	  with	  a	  distorted	  image.	  This	  image	  is	  as	  such:	  something	  that	  never	  began,	  therefore	  
never	  will	  end.	  This	  image	  of	  something	  [eternal]	  is	  an	  image	  of	  nothing.”214	  
Kharms’s	  notion	  of	  the	  infinite	  is	  ontologically	  derived	  from	  his	  notion	  of	  balance	  
between	  opposite	  phenomena	  in	  nature.	  He	  sets	  as	  a	  premise	  that	  only	  what	  is	  in	  balance	  
can	  exist.	  He	  states:	  
We	  do	  not	  know	  a	  phenomenon	  with	  one	  direction.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  movement	  to	  the	  
right,	  there	  must	  also	  be	  a	  movement	  to	  the	  left.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  movement	  upwards,	  
this	  logically	  includes	  in	  itself	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  direction	  downwards.	  This	  is	  the	  
rule	  of	  symmetry,	  the	  rule	  of	  equilibrium.	  And	  if	  one	  pole	  of	  the	  direction	  were	  to	  
lose	  the	  other	  pole,	  then	  the	  equilibrium	  would	  be	  destroyed	  and	  the	  universe	  
would	  be	  overturned.	  Every	  phenomenon	  has	  for	  itself	  an	  opposite	  phenomenon.	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Every	  thesis	  has	  –	  an	  antithesis.	  What	  is	  infinitely	  upwards	  is	  infinitely	  downward,	  
what	  is	  finitely	  upward	  is	  finitely	  downward.215	  	  
	  
Equilibrium	  is	  embodied	  in	  algebra	  by	  the	  concept	  of	  numerical	  order.	  Kharms	  reasons	  as	  
follows:	  
We	  have	  balanced	  an	  infinite	  series	  of	  numbers	  with	  another	  infinite	  series	  of	  
numbers,	  based	  on	  the	  same	  principle	  as	  the	  first	  one,	  but	  located	  from	  the	  
beginning	  of	  the	  first	  in	  the	  opposite	  direction.	  The	  point	  of	  connection	  of	  these	  two	  
series,	  one	  natural	  and	  incomprehensible,	  the	  other	  clearly	  invented	  but	  explaining	  
the	  first,	  -­‐-­‐	  we	  term	  the	  point	  of	  their	  connection	  zero	  (nul’).	  And	  so	  the	  numerical	  
order	  begins	  and	  ends	  nowhere.	  It	  has	  become	  nothing.	  It	  sees	  it	  is	  so,	  but	  it	  violates	  
the	  “nul’.”	  It	  stands	  somewhere	  in	  the	  middle	  of	  the	  infinite	  order	  and	  differs	  in	  
quality	  from	  it.	  That	  which	  we	  have	  called	  “nothing”	  includes	  in	  itself	  something	  in	  
addition,	  that	  in	  comparison	  with	  the	  first	  nothing,	  is	  a	  new	  nothing.	  Two	  nothings?	  
Two	  nothings	  and	  the	  opposites	  of	  each	  other?	  Then	  one	  nothing	  is	  something.	  Then	  
the	  something,	  that	  begins	  nowhere	  and	  ends	  nowhere,	  is	  something	  that	  contains	  
in	  itself	  nothing	  (nichto).216	  
	  
The	  image	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  numbers	  lined	  up	  around	  the	  axis	  of	  zero	  parallel	  the	  
image	  in	  the	  previous	  passage	  in	  which	  Kharms	  speaks	  of	  opposite	  phenomena	  which	  and	  
only	  which	  can	  sustain	  the	  concept	  of	  equilibrium.	  	  The	  two	  quoted	  passages	  above	  suggest	  
that	  the	  both	  infinity	  and	  zero	  stand	  for	  a	  threshold	  between	  two	  opposing	  forces,	  elements	  
that	  are	  arranged	  in	  binaries.	  	  In	  this	  regard	  the	  role	  of	  infinity	  and	  zero	  is	  identical	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  place	  in	  a	  structure	  these	  concepts	  can	  be	  located	  at.	  	  	  
Given	  the	  fact	  that	  Kharms	  used	  the	  image	  of	  circle	  to	  substitute	  the	  letter	  “u”	  in	  the	  
word	  “zero”	  (nul)	  and	  that	  he	  referred	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  circle	  as	  another	  manifestation	  of	  
the	  concept	  of	  infinity,	  it	  can	  be	  asserted	  that	  in	  the	  author’s	  theoretical	  writings,	  infinity	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took	  on	  three	  faces	  –	  the	  “zero,”	  the	  “circle,”	  and	  the	  “nothing”	  –	  yet,	  all	  share	  the	  same	  
essence.	  If	  we	  consider	  that	  to	  Kharms	  the	  answer	  to	  all	  questions	  lay	  in	  grasping	  the	  
essence	  of	  infinity,	  it	  seems	  to	  follow	  that	  the	  quest	  to	  find	  the	  “purity	  of	  order”	  in	  the	  
created	  world	  of	  fiction	  and	  life,	  which	  “should	  contain	  the	  same	  order	  obtaining	  in	  the	  
world	  as	  a	  whole,”	  is	  connected,	  if	  not	  identified,	  with	  the	  quest	  to	  understand	  and	  replicate	  
infinity	  in	  the	  artistic	  method.	  If	  one	  takes	  this	  as	  a	  premise,	  the	  validity	  of	  which	  I	  aim	  to	  
demonstrate	  as	  my	  argument	  continues,	  one	  can	  assume	  that	  the	  “purity	  of	  order”	  Kharms	  
sought	  to	  create	  in	  his	  theoretical	  writings	  resembles	  infinity	  as	  characterized	  here.	  After	  
all	  “art	  is	  on	  par	  with	  primary	  reality.”	  One	  of	  the	  characteristics	  given	  to	  infinity	  is	  that	  it	  
resides	  in	  the	  center	  of	  equilibrium.	  From	  Kharms’s	  statement	  that	  “every	  thesis	  has	  an	  
antithesis,	  what	  is	  infinitely	  upwards	  is	  infinitely	  downwards,”	  one	  can	  justly	  infer	  that	  
every	  thesis	  may	  ultimately	  be	  equated	  with	  its	  antithesis,	  for	  it	  is	  not	  so	  much	  the	  context	  
of	  the	  thesis	  and	  the	  antithesis	  that	  matters,	  but	  finding	  the	  point	  of	  zero	  or	  nothing	  –the	  
phenomenon	  in	  which	  infinity	  reveals	  itself	  –	  an	  artistic	  form	  along	  which	  these	  theses	  or	  
movements	  can	  be	  arranged.	  In	  my	  understanding,	  if	  one	  is	  to	  find	  a	  logic	  to	  the	  Kharmsian	  
text	  based	  on	  these	  premises,	  this	  logic	  has	  to	  be	  connected	  with	  a	  structural	  movement	  
that	  is	  mobilized	  around	  the	  point	  of	  “zero	  form,”	  or,	  radically	  speaking,	  that	  is	  reduced	  to	  
the	  point	  of	  “zero	  form.”	  
Finding	  the	  right	  method	  was	  an	  existential	  matter	  for	  Kharms,	  and	  the	  
metaphorical	  positioning	  of	  the	  Kharmsian	  method	  is	  visible	  if	  one	  bears	  in	  mind	  that	  
Kharms	  viewed	  life	  as	  art	  that	  took	  place	  on	  two	  levels:	  first,	  on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  
“registration	  of	  the	  world”	  (registratsiia	  mira)	  along	  principles	  that	  create	  a	  purity	  of	  order,	  




reflection”)	  which	  construct	  manifests	  the	  purity	  of	  order.217	  	  Yet,	  apart	  from	  the	  fact	  of	  this	  
metaphorical	  positioning,	  which	  results	  in	  the	  suspension	  of	  referential	  value,	  nonsense	  in	  
semantic	  terms,	  Kharms’s	  work	  contains	  a	  symbolic	  twist,	  for	  the	  incorporated	  unknown	  
element	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  contextual	  change	  open	  to	  a	  semantic	  field	  for	  possible	  
interpretations,	  but	  is	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  enigma	  or	  miracle.218	  There	  is	  a	  hidden	  “Logos”	  in	  
the	  notion	  of	  “nothing,”	  “zero,”	  “circle,”	  that	  provokes	  interpretation,	  yet	  retains	  the	  secrecy	  
of	  the	  untold	  which	  due	  to	  its	  ironic	  nature,	  readers	  of	  Kharms	  term	  absurd	  instead	  of	  
symbolic.	  The	  essence	  of	  the	  text	  is	  inexpressible	  and	  ineffable,	  for	  it	  is	  centered	  in	  the	  
notion	  of	  “zero”	  or	  “nothing.”	  
In	  1940,	  shortly	  before	  his	  final	  arrest,	  Kharms	  contemplates	  the	  following:	  	  
At	  its	  root,	  existence	  has	  3	  elements:	  there,	  the	  “obstacle”	  and	  there.	  Thus	  we	  see	  
that	  for	  the	  formation	  of	  existence,	  the	  presence	  of	  three	  elements,	  which	  we	  call	  
this,	  the	  obstacle	  and	  that,	  are	  necessary…[A]	  unified	  void	  encountering	  the	  obstacle	  
splits	  into	  two	  [sic]	  parts,	  forming	  the	  trinity	  of	  existence.	  The	  obstacle	  is	  like	  the	  
creator	  who	  makes	  something	  out	  of	  nothing.	  …If	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  elements	  
of	  existence	  were	  to	  disappear,	  then	  the	  whole	  world	  would	  also	  disappear.	  For	  
                                                
217	  I	  use	  the	  term	  metaphor	  as	  defined	  by	  Ricoeur	  in	  his	  book	  The	  Conflict	  of	  Interpretation.	  According	  to	  
Ricoeur,	  metaphor	  sets	  up	  a	  dichotomy	  between	  the	  sense	  and	  the	  reference	  or	  the	  signifier	  and	  signified,	  it	  
offers	  a	  narrative	  theme,	  a	  conceived	  “Topos,”	  which	  poses	  difficulties	  to	  be	  understood	  within	  the	  text.	  It	  has	  
a	  literal	  meaning,	  but	  we	  cannot	  connect	  it.	  The	  metaphorical	  meaning	  of	  the	  word	  cannot	  be	  found	  in	  a	  
dictionary,	  its	  referential	  value	  is	  suspended.	  Metaphor	  is	  a	  contextual	  change	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  lexical	  one.	  
Therefore	  we	  are	  compelled	  to	  search	  for	  parallels	  in	  our	  world,	  for	  suggestions	  of	  interpretations.	  The	  
created	  text	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  mirror-­‐image	  of	  the	  world.	  The	  story	  is	  not	  understood	  in	  itself,	  but	  is	  rather	  
seen	  as	  a	  model	  of	  a	  fragment	  of	  the	  world.	  Metaphor	  hence	  does	  not	  point	  at	  something,	  but	  merely	  
incorporates	  the	  unknown	  element.	  
218	  Here	  under	  the	  term	  “symbol”	  I	  adhere	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  Ricoeur	  given	  in	  his	  essay	  “The	  Hermeneutics	  of	  
Symbols	  and	  Philosophical	  Reflection.”	  According	  to	  Ricoeur,	  symbol	  is	  based	  on	  signs,	  which	  already	  had	  
literal	  meanings,	  and	  which	  through	  their	  literal	  meaning	  refer	  to	  another	  meaning.	  It	  is	  a	  particular	  
characteristic	  of	  the	  symbol	  that	  it	  provokes	  the	  reader,	  that	  it	  does	  not	  yield	  easily,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  understood,	  it	  
contains	  something	  that	  has	  to	  be	  revealed.	  In	  every	  symbol	  there	  is	  a	  hidden	  “Logos,”	  that	  is	  waiting	  to	  be	  
deciphered.	  Yet	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  symbol,	  as	  it	  provokes,	  retains	  the	  secrecy	  of	  the	  untold,	  and	  poses	  a	  taboo	  





example,	  if	  the	  “obstacle”	  were	  to	  disappear,	  then	  this	  and	  that	  would	  become	  one	  
and	  the	  same	  and	  would	  cease	  to	  exist.219	  	  
	  
The	  quoted	  passage	  adds	  a	  new	  concept	  to	  the	  triad	  concepts	  of	  zero,	  circle,	  and	  
nothingness.	  It	  is	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  “obstacle”	  whose	  purpose	  is	  to	  split	  the	  void	  into	  parts	  and	  
generate	  the	  elements	  of	  binaries	  that	  the	  universe	  rests	  on.	  Thus	  the	  element	  of	  “obstacle”	  
is	  essential	  because	  it	  is	  through	  fracture	  (the	  impact	  of	  obstacle)	  that	  parts	  of	  the	  binaries	  
are	  generated	  which	  parts,	  in	  turn,	  are	  essential	  in	  ensuring	  equilibrium	  in	  the	  world.	  	  
As	  I	  have	  mentioned,	  Druskin	  suggested	  that	  Kharms	  drew	  his	  material	  for	  his	  art	  
from	  the	  nonrealization	  of	  his	  ideal,	  so	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  in	  author’s	  work	  the	  concept	  
of	  	  “nothingness”	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  and	  provides	  the	  material	  essence	  of	  	  life	  and	  art.	  The	  
quoted	  passage	  further	  indicates	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  balancing	  objects,	  rendering	  order	  into	  the	  
world	  around	  the	  concept	  of	  “nothingness”	  or	  “zero”	  had,	  in	  addition,	  strong	  religious	  
connotations	  for	  Kharms	  and	  is	  directly	  linked	  with	  the	  image	  of	  the	  trinity	  or	  the	  images	  of	  
God	  the	  Father,	  the	  Son,	  and	  the	  Holy	  Spirit.	  There	  is	  no	  further	  explanation	  as	  to	  how	  
Kharms	  envisioned	  the	  connection	  between	  his	  art	  and	  the	  world	  other	  than	  the	  fact	  that	  
he	  envisioned	  that	  both	  reflect	  and	  are	  arranged	  according	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  purity	  of	  
order,	  thus	  are	  essentially	  and	  structurally	  the	  same.	  Based	  on	  the	  passage	  quoted	  above	  I	  
propose	  that	  the	  image	  Kharms	  projects	  of	  the	  world	  is	  as	  follows.	  Our	  world	  of	  existence	  
lies	  in	  the	  world	  of	  non-­‐existence	  or	  void,	  in	  other	  words,	  in	  our	  non-­‐materialization.	  The	  
obstacle	  or	  clashing	  point	  (that	  I	  identify	  with	  the	  traumatic	  encounter)	  splits	  the	  
archetypal	  unity	  into	  parts	  (here	  dialectically	  opposing	  parts,	  which	  opposition	  is	  also	  
characteristic	  of	  the	  traumatic	  model	  that	  reflects	  irreconcilability)	  and	  thereby	  creates	  a	  
                                                




world	  with	  objects	  that	  are	  recognizable.	  Conflict	  is	  thus	  necessary	  to	  break	  up	  the	  
nonmaterialization	  or	  void	  as	  well	  as	  to	  reassure	  us	  that	  the	  parts	  can	  be	  arranged	  around	  
a	  point	  of	  equilibrium	  and	  thus	  the	  purity	  of	  order	  can	  be	  recreated.	  In	  our	  registration	  of	  
the	  world,	  our	  creation	  of	  an	  order	  that	  is	  a	  replica	  of	  what	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is	  conceived	  
according	  to	  Kharms,	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  true	  to	  the	  “purity	  of	  the	  world’s	  order”	  that	  is	  
centered	  in	  the	  notion	  of	  equilibrium,	  we	  arrange	  the	  world	  in	  pairs	  of	  this	  and	  that,	  in	  
pairs	  of	  theses	  and	  anti-­‐theses,	  around	  the	  impediment	  between	  the	  two,	  around	  the	  
“none”	  of	  the	  two,	  around	  the	  “nothing”	  of	  the	  two.	  Therefore	  the	  registration	  of	  the	  world	  
successfully	  occurs,	  for	  the	  “purity	  of	  order”	  of	  our	  existence	  arranged	  around	  the	  principle	  
of	  “nothing”	  shares	  in	  its	  essence	  the	  principle	  of	  non-­‐existence,	  which	  is	  also	  “nothing.”	  













IV. An	  Experimental	  Outline	  of	  the	  “Modus	  Vivendi”	  of	  Kharms’s	  Method	  
	  
You	  have	  to	  go	  right	  to	  the	  
edge,	  to	  the	  abyss,	  to	  look	  





Central	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  nothingness	  in	  Kharms’s	  world,	  which	  is	  envisioned	  as	  the	  
axis	  of	  equilibrium,	  is	  the	  understanding	  that	  all	  else	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  disorder	  or	  chaos	  where	  
randomness	  is	  the	  general	  state	  of	  affairs.	  Kharms	  gives	  to	  his	  last	  collection	  of	  short	  
stories	  the	  title	  “Sluchai”	  (Incidents),	  a	  word	  that	  has	  no	  adequate	  counterpart	  in	  English,	  
but	  could	  be	  best	  described	  as	  incidents,	  occasions	  or	  events	  that	  happen	  by	  chance.	  This	  
sense	  of	  randomness	  in	  the	  chain	  of	  events	  that	  form	  the	  plot	  is	  present	  throughout	  
Kharms’s	  writings,	  and	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  the	  short	  story	  “Incidents”	  from	  his	  cycle	  of	  the	  
same	  name:	  
Once	  Orlov	  stuffed	  himself	  with	  mashed	  peas	  and	  died.	  Krylov,	  having	  heard	  the	  
news,	  also	  died.	  And	  Spiridonov	  died	  regardless.	  And	  Spiridonov’s	  wife	  fell	  from	  the	  
cupboard	  and	  also	  died.	  And	  the	  Spiridonov	  children	  drowned	  in	  a	  pond.	  
Spiridonov’s	  grandmother	  took	  to	  the	  bottle	  and	  wandered	  the	  highways.	  And	  
Mikhailov	  stopped	  combing	  his	  hair	  and	  came	  down	  with	  mange.	  And	  Kruglov	  
sketched	  a	  lady	  holding	  a	  whip	  and	  went	  mad.	  And	  Perekhryostov	  received	  four	  
hundred	  rubles	  wired	  over	  the	  telegraph	  and	  was	  so	  uppity	  about	  it	  that	  he	  was	  
forced	  to	  leave	  his	  job.	  
                                                





All	  good	  people	  but	  they	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  hold	  to	  their	  ground.221	  
	  
The	  only	  logic	  one	  can	  infer	  in	  this	  story	  is	  a	  formal	  one.	  The	  events	  happen	  in	  
succession	  not	  based	  on	  some	  inner	  causality,	  but	  dictated	  by	  the	  logic	  of	  authorial	  
juxtaposition,	  which	  conveys	  an	  increasing	  sense	  of	  randomness.	  Initially	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  
some	  vague	  connection	  between	  the	  characters,	  i.e.,	  Orlov	  died	  and	  Krylov	  having	  found	  
out	  about	  Orlov’s	  death	  (Orlov	  serving	  as	  a	  point	  of	  connection)	  also	  died.	  There	  is	  a	  further	  
connection	  among	  the	  Spiridonovs,	  however,	  none	  of	  these	  connections	  can	  justify	  the	  
evolution	  of	  the	  chain	  of	  deaths	  and	  the	  misfortunes	  of	  the	  characters.	  What	  connects	  the	  
characters	  is	  that	  they	  all	  fade	  out	  and	  either	  have	  reached	  or	  are	  on	  the	  way	  to	  their	  non-­‐
existence	  as	  if	  pulled	  by	  some	  sort	  of	  force	  of	  gravity.	  When	  comparing	  the	  theme	  of	  death	  
in	  Shklovsky’s	  and	  Kharms’s	  oeuvres,	  one	  can	  make	  a	  claim	  that	  they	  are	  depicted	  in	  an	  
antithetical	  fashion.	  Shklovsky,	  with	  his	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  retardation	  in	  texts	  that	  
speak	  of	  the	  protogonists’	  impeding	  deaths,	  seem	  to	  associate	  death	  with	  the	  reality	  
principle,	  according	  to	  which,	  while	  the	  purpose	  of	  living	  is	  death,	  the	  progress	  toward	  
death	  is	  delayed.	  Kharms,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  seems	  to	  reverse	  this	  paradigm	  when	  he	  
accelerates	  the	  pace	  of	  progression	  toward	  dying.	  It	  is	  as	  if	  he	  linked	  death	  not	  with	  the	  
reality	  principle,	  but	  with	  the	  pleasure	  principle,	  whereby	  the	  theme	  of	  death	  provides	  
immediate	  or	  near	  gratification.	  Another	  explanation	  for	  this	  difference	  could	  be	  that	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  trauma	  narratives,	  for	  Shklovsky,	  in	  order	  to	  accommodate	  the	  theme	  of	  death,	  
one	  needs	  to	  travel	  away	  from	  the	  status	  quo	  that	  has	  been	  disrupted	  by	  the	  wars	  and	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subsequent	  traumatic	  encounters.	  However,	  for	  Kharms,	  who	  is	  building	  upon	  a	  post-­‐
traumatic	  encounter,	  or	  rather	  an	  encounter	  that	  to	  a	  degree	  has	  familiarized	  the	  
experience	  with	  death,	  the	  return	  to	  the	  status	  quo	  or	  state	  of	  rest	  is	  possible	  and	  desirable.	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  in	  Kharms’s	  case	  one	  cannot	  speak	  of	  a	  breakdown	  or	  breach	  of	  the	  
protective	  shield,	  to	  use	  Freud’s	  term,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  Shklovsky.	  However,	  there	  seems	  
to	  be	  a	  slight	  difference	  between	  relatively	  long-­‐term	  and	  relatively	  short-­‐term	  exposure	  to	  
trauma.	  It	  seems	  that	  long	  term	  encounter	  with	  trauma	  may	  create	  a	  condition	  for	  stability	  
or	  return	  to	  the	  point	  of	  status	  quo,	  if	  only	  to	  the	  alternative	  reality	  of	  those	  who	  have	  been	  
affected	  by	  long-­‐term	  exposure	  and	  who	  have	  no	  pre-­‐traumatic	  memories.	  	  
Because	  the	  objects	  or	  elements	  of	  reality	  do	  not	  yield	  to	  a	  coherent	  understanding	  
in	  the	  eye	  of	  a	  person	  exposed	  to	  trauma,	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  world	  is	  inseparable	  from	  
its	  non-­‐recognition	  and	  vice	  versa.	  Because	  of	  the	  flux	  between	  these	  two	  values	  (between	  
the	  values	  of	  recognition	  and	  non-­‐recognition),	  one	  is	  never	  able	  to	  capture	  any	  stance,	  any	  
reaching	  of	  understanding.	  There	  is	  only	  one	  location	  that	  is	  constant,	  and	  this	  is	  the	  
turning	  point	  around	  which	  the	  two	  opposing	  values,	  like	  a	  seesaw,	  are	  set	  in	  motion.	  
Everything	  else	  other	  than	  this	  motion,	  progressing	  from	  one	  proposition	  to	  its	  opposite	  
and	  back,	  is	  irrelevant	  and	  inconclusive.	  This	  lack	  of	  orientation	  is	  manifested	  in	  the	  story	  
“The	  Werld”	  (Myr):	  
I	  told	  myself	  that	  I	  see	  the	  world.	  But	  the	  whole	  world	  was	  not	  accessible	  to	  my	  gaze,	  
and	  I	  saw	  only	  parts	  of	  the	  world.	  And	  everything	  that	  I	  say	  I	  called	  parts	  of	  the	  
world.	  And	  I	  examined	  the	  properties	  of	  these	  parts	  and,	  examining	  these	  
properties,	  I	  wrought	  science.	  I	  understood	  that	  the	  parts	  have	  intelligent	  properties	  
and	  that	  the	  same	  parts	  have	  unintelligent	  properties…	  
And	  there	  were	  such	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  which	  could	  think.	  …And	  all	  these	  parts	  




…And	  suddenly	  I	  ceased	  seeing	  them	  and,	  soon	  after,	  other	  parts	  as	  well….	  
But	  then	  I	  understood	  that	  I	  do	  not	  see	  the	  parts	  independently,	  but	  I	  see	  it	  all	  at	  
once.	  At	  first	  I	  thought	  that	  it	  was	  NOTHING.	  But	  then	  I	  understood	  that	  this	  was	  the	  
world	  and	  what	  I	  had	  seen	  before	  was	  NOT	  the	  world.	  	  
And	  I	  had	  always	  known	  what	  the	  world	  was,	  but	  what	  I	  had	  seen	  before	  I	  do	  not	  
know	  even	  now.	  	  
And	  when	  the	  parts	  disappeared	  their	  intelligent	  properties	  ceased	  being	  intelligent,	  
and	  their	  unintelligent	  properties	  ceased	  being	  unintelligent.	  And	  the	  whole	  world	  
ceased	  to	  be	  intelligent	  and	  unintelligent.	  	  
But	  as	  soon	  as	  I	  saw	  the	  world,	  I	  ceased	  seeing	  it.	  …And	  I	  watched,	  looking	  for	  the	  
world,	  but	  not	  finding	  it.	  	  
And	  soon	  after	  there	  wasn’t	  anywhere	  to	  look.	  	  
Then	  I	  realized	  that	  since	  before	  there	  was	  somewhere	  to	  look—there	  had	  been	  a	  
world	  around	  me.	  And	  now	  it’s	  gone.	  There’s	  only	  me.	  	  
And	  then	  I	  realized	  I	  am	  the	  world.	  	  
But	  the	  world—is	  not	  me.	  	  
Although	  at	  the	  same	  time	  I	  am	  the	  world.	  	  
But	  the	  world’s	  not	  me.	  	  
And	  I’m	  the	  world.	  	  
But	  the	  world’s	  not	  me.	  	  
And	  I’m	  the	  world.	  	  
But	  the	  world’s	  not	  me.	  	  
And	  I’m	  the	  world.	  	  
And	  after	  that	  I	  didn’t	  think	  anything	  more.222	  
	  
The	  short	  story	  “The	  Werld”	  can	  be	  read	  as	  a	  narrative	  of	  Kharms’s	  theoretical	  
journey	  as	  he	  tries	  to	  pin	  down	  what	  existence	  is.	  Interestingly,	  in	  mathematical	  
terminology,	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  story	  could	  be	  described	  as	  follows	  “I	  am	  the	  world”	  (a=b)	  and	  
                                                




“the	  world	  is	  not	  me	  (b=-­‐a).”	  The	  symbol	  “-­‐a”	  serves	  as	  the	  binary	  of	  “a”	  much	  like	  positive	  
and	  negative	  numbers,	  according	  to	  Kharms,	  serve	  as	  equivalent	  but	  structurally	  opposite	  
parts	  of	  a	  binary.	  	  When	  equated	  (upheld)	  both	  as	  true,	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  propositions	  comes	  
to	  (a=b)=(b=-­‐a),	  which	  would	  result	  in	  (a=-­‐a)	  that	  is	  in	  the	  equation	  of	  “I	  am”	  and	  “I	  am	  
not.”	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  story	  not	  only	  illustrates	  an	  example	  of	  how	  for	  Kharms	  in	  the	  
world	  non-­‐existence	  is	  inseparable	  from	  existence,	  but	  also	  highlights	  his	  effort	  to	  express	  
his	  existence	  through	  his	  non-­‐existence	  or	  equate	  the	  two.	  In	  the	  story	  the	  narrator	  tells	  us	  
about	  having	  contemplated	  the	  connection	  of	  the	  world,	  he	  created	  a	  theory	  (“nauka”	  in	  
Russian	  can	  be	  translated	  as	  “theory”	  or	  “science”),	  how	  he	  registered	  the	  world	  in	  terms	  of	  
the	  sense	  he	  introduced	  into	  it,	  and	  how	  this	  sense	  he	  introduced	  had	  no	  (verifiable)	  
relevance	  to	  the	  world	  as	  it	  is,	  since	  the	  world	  constantly	  eludes	  his	  understanding.	  There	  
is	  also	  a	  hint	  that	  perhaps	  all	  this	  world	  amounts	  to	  “NOTHING,”	  as	  the	  narrator	  tells	  us	  that	  
“as	  soon	  as	  I	  understood	  that	  I	  saw	  the	  world,	  I	  ceased	  seeing	  it.”	  
As	  I	  have	  noted,	  for	  Kharms	  the	  main	  purpose	  of	  his	  work	  (implying	  the	  theoretical	  
foundation	  of	  his	  text)	  was	  to	  aid	  his	  effort	  of	  “registering	  the	  world”	  the	  activity	  via	  which	  
he	  envisioned	  restoring	  the	  purity	  of	  order	  to	  a	  world	  that	  is	  currently	  in	  a	  state	  of	  chaos.	  In	  
his	  sketches	  called	  “Saber”	  (Sablia),	  written	  in	  1929,	  he	  speaks	  of	  the	  task	  of	  registration	  of	  
the	  world	  in	  the	  following	  terms:	  	  
Question:	  Has	  our	  work	  begun?	  And	  if	  it	  has,	  of	  what	  does	  it	  consist?	  
Answer:	  Our	  work	  will	  begin	  soon	  and	  consists	  of	  the	  registration	  of	  the	  world,	  
because	  now	  we	  are	  no	  longer	  the	  world.	  
Q:	  But	  if	  we	  are	  not	  the	  world,	  then	  what	  are	  we?	  
A:	  No,	  we	  are	  the	  world.	  That	  is,	  I	  did	  not	  express	  myself	  correctly.	  It’s	  not	  that	  we	  





Q:	  Alright,	  but	  how	  are	  we	  going	  to	  go	  about	  registering	  the	  world?	  
A:	  The	  same	  way	  one	  registers	  the	  other	  numbers,	  that	  is,	  by	  fitting	  into	  them	  and	  
observing	  what	  comes	  of	  it.	  	  
…	  
The	  one,	  registering	  the	  two,	  does	  not	  fit	  its	  sign	  into	  the	  sign	  of	  two.	  The	  one	  
registers	  numbers	  by	  means	  of	  its	  quality.	  And	  we	  should	  do	  the	  same.	  
Q:	  But	  what	  is	  quality?	  
A:	  Death	  of	  the	  ear—	  
Loss	  of	  hearing,	  
Death	  of	  the	  nose—	  
Loss	  of	  nearing,	  
Death	  of	  the	  throat—	  
Loss	  of	  speech,	  
Death	  of	  the	  eye—	  
Loss	  of	  seech.223	  
	  
The	  text	  is	  ambiguous	  as	  are	  most	  of	  Kharms’s	  writings,	  but	  it	  can	  be	  safely	  said	  that	  
Kharms	  infers	  that,	  first,	  you	  register	  the	  world	  by	  the	  unit,	  the	  simplest	  form	  of	  an	  object	  
(and	  its	  variables);	  second,	  you	  void	  the	  object	  of	  any	  properties	  by	  voiding	  the	  process	  of	  
observation	  of	  all	  property-­‐bestowing	  functions.	  	  The	  best	  form	  of	  registration	  can	  be	  
reached	  when	  the	  registered	  form	  is	  in	  its	  purest	  form	  (i.e.,	  without	  any	  properties).	  This	  
again	  leads	  back	  to	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  ultimate	  form	  either	  resides	  in	  or	  is	  “nothingness”	  or	  
both.	  Restoring	  the	  purity	  of	  order	  is	  thus	  directly	  linked	  with	  removing	  all	  attributes	  or	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properties	  in	  place	  in	  the	  world,	  which	  is	  why	  the	  notions	  of	  “zero,”	  “circle”	  and	  “nothing”	  
are	  so	  essential	  for	  Kharms.	  
If	  there	  is	  chaos	  in	  the	  world	  that	  hinders	  the	  recognition	  of	  pure	  order,	  how	  is	  one	  
to	  understand	  or	  conceive	  the	  world?	  The	  answer	  for	  Kharms,	  while	  it	  seems	  random,	  is	  to	  
create	  a	  feasible	  order,	  which	  at	  the	  same	  time	  corresponds	  to	  the	  invisible	  but	  real	  form	  of	  
being	  of	  that	  world.	  The	  idea	  is	  somewhat	  similar	  to	  what	  Wittgenstein	  proposes,	  namely	  
that	  reality	  be	  pictured	  not	  on	  the	  level	  of	  objects	  and	  their	  representatives,	  signs,	  that	  
cannot	  be	  trusted,	  but	  via	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  objects	  line	  up	  in	  a	  system	  of	  thought.	  	  
Wittgenstein	  concludes:	  “for	  signs	  are	  unalterable	  and	  subsistent	  entities,	  they	  only	  name	  
things,	  they	  form	  the	  substance	  of	  the	  world,	  but	  do	  not	  represent	  the	  being	  of	  the	  
world.”224	  “What	  objects	  fail	  to	  express	  as	  representatives,”	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  view,	  “their	  
application	  shows.	  It	  is	  the	  configuration	  of	  the	  objects	  that	  is	  changing	  and	  unstable.	  
Objects	  contain	  the	  possibility	  of	  all	  situations	  and	  their	  configurations	  produce	  ‘states	  of	  
affairs’.”225	  The	  form	  of	  these	  states	  of	  affairs	  is	  captured	  in	  propositions.	  Propositions	  are	  
pictures	  representing	  possible	  situations	  in	  logical	  space.	  However,	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  
picture	  (or	  a	  proposition)	  is	  independent	  of	  its	  truth	  and	  falsity,	  for	  the	  terms	  “true”	  or	  
“false”	  have	  no	  validity	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  philosophy	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  way	  the	  world	  is.	  
What	  is	  essential	  about	  propositions	  is	  that	  by	  disclosing	  the	  possibility	  of	  each	  individual	  
state	  of	  affairs,	  they	  disclose	  something	  about	  the	  essence,	  the	  being	  of	  the	  world.	  In	  other	  
words,	  the	  way	  a	  system	  of	  thought	  is	  upheld	  or	  operates	  tells	  us	  more	  about	  the	  world	  
than	  its	  units.	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In	  his	  “Eleven	  Assertions	  of	  Daniil	  Ivanovich	  Kharms,”	  dated	  1930,	  Kharms	  makes	  
the	  following	  categorical	  statements:	  “The	  object	  is	  disarmed.	  It	  has	  been	  repudiated.	  The	  
law	  of	  single	  ones	  is	  false,	  there	  is	  no	  such	  law.	  There	  is	  only	  the	  law	  of	  the	  masses.”226	  
Whether	  the	  passage	  is	  a	  hint	  at	  the	  contemporary	  political	  situation	  and	  the	  loss	  of	  value	  
attributed	  to	  the	  individual	  can	  be	  questioned;	  however,	  Kharms’s	  statement	  no	  doubt	  
echoes	  Wittgenstein’s	  perceptions	  regarding	  the	  fact	  that	  objects	  have	  surrendered	  to	  their	  
combination	  and	  lost	  their	  inherent	  value.	  If	  there	  is	  any	  law,	  it	  is	  the	  law	  of	  the	  masses,	  the	  
body	  that	  counts.	  
A	  similar	  lack	  of	  concern	  for	  objects	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  letter	  Kharms	  wrote	  to	  a	  doctor	  
(an	  unknown	  acquaintance	  of	  his)	  dated	  1932:	  “for	  [me],	  what	  is	  a	  table,	  a	  cupboard,	  a	  
building,	  a	  meadow,	  a	  grove,	  a	  butterfly,	  a	  grasshopper—is	  all	  the	  same.”227	  The	  author’s	  
lack	  of	  interest	  in	  properties	  is	  also	  visible	  in	  the	  way	  he	  portrays	  his	  characters,	  who	  
exhibit	  very	  few	  traces	  of	  human	  psychology	  and	  strike	  the	  reader	  as	  very	  object-­‐like.	  
Consider	  the	  short	  story	  “Blue	  Notebook,	  No.	  10,”	  which	  I	  quoted	  in	  my	  introduction,	  or	  the	  
story	  of	  “Tumbling	  Old	  Women”	  in	  the	  Incidents	  cycle:	  
Because	  of	  her	  excessive	  curiosity,	  one	  old	  woman	  tumbled	  out	  of	  her	  window,	  fell	  
and	  shattered	  to	  pieces.	  
Another	  old	  woman	  leaned	  out	  to	  look	  at	  the	  one	  who’d	  shattered	  but,	  out	  of	  
excessive	  curiosity,	  also	  tumbled	  out	  of	  her	  window,	  fell	  and	  shattered	  to	  pieces.	  
Then	  a	  third	  old	  woman	  tumbled	  from	  her	  window,	  and	  a	  fourth,	  and	  a	  fifth.	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When	  the	  sixth	  old	  woman	  tumbled	  out	  of	  her	  window,	  I	  got	  sick	  of	  watching	  them	  
and	  walked	  over	  to	  the	  Maltsev	  Market	  where,	  they	  say,	  a	  blind	  man	  had	  been	  given	  
a	  knit	  shawl.228	  
	  
The	  short	  story	  illustrates	  that	  the	  characters	  (the	  old	  women)	  are	  reduced	  almost	  to	  
nonentities,	  they	  succeed	  each	  other	  as	  numbers	  succeed	  in	  the	  numerical	  sequence	  1,	  2,	  3,	  
4,	  5,	  6…and	  the	  sequence	  could	  continue	  eternally	  had	  the	  viewer	  not	  gotten	  fed	  up	  seeing	  
them	  fall	  out	  of	  the	  window.	  Needless	  to	  point	  out,	  this	  story,	  too,	  ends	  in	  the	  disintegration	  
of	  the	  object-­‐character	  as	  they	  each	  fall	  into	  pieces	  (die,	  in	  humanistic	  language).	  The	  fate	  
of	  the	  blind	  man	  (who	  perhaps	  implies	  the	  coveted	  quality	  of	  lacking	  sight)	  in	  the	  end	  
outweighs	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  falling	  women,	  at	  least	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  onlooker-­‐
narrator.	  
	   As	  objects	  lost	  their	  representative	  value,	  it	  became	  more	  interesting,	  even	  
necessary,	  to	  experiment	  not	  with	  their	  referential	  value,	  but	  with	  their	  application.	  This	  
approach	  had	  been	  prevalent	  in	  the	  works	  of	  the	  avant-­‐garde	  and	  was	  the	  focal	  point	  of	  
Shklovsky’s	  theoretical	  work	  as	  well.	  Shklovsky	  in	  his	  literary	  theory	  emphasizes	  the	  
importance	  of	  colliding	  elements	  of	  speech	  to	  obtain	  the	  greatest	  impact	  on	  the	  reader.	  
Kharms’s	  interest	  in	  colliding	  forms	  was	  present	  from	  early	  on.	  The	  importance	  of	  collision	  
in	  the	  representative	  value	  of	  a	  sign	  can	  be	  seen,	  for	  example,	  in	  the	  aesthetics	  of	  the	  
Oberiuty,	  who	  claimed	  in	  their	  manifesto	  to	  express	  the	  object	  by	  collision	  of	  verbal	  
meaning.	  Collision	  for	  Kharms	  remained	  until	  the	  end	  of	  his	  life	  the	  main	  organizational	  
principle	  of	  his	  method	  and,	  as	  I	  hope	  to	  show,	  gains	  increasing	  dimensions	  and	  
importance.	  	  
                                                




	   In	  Kharms’s	  texts,	  although	  objects	  and	  object-­‐like	  human	  characters	  have	  few	  or	  no	  
properties,	  they	  are	  indispensible	  as	  atomic	  units	  of	  configuration.	  They	  form	  the	  substance	  
or	  the	  atomic	  units	  of	  the	  world,	  the	  same	  way	  Wittgenstein	  imagines	  objects.	  They	  become	  
distinguishable	  and	  determinate	  as	  they	  enter	  into	  relation	  or	  into	  combination;	  what	  they	  
fail	  to	  express	  as	  signs	  (or	  semantic	  units)	  comes	  to	  light	  in	  their	  application.	  In	  a	  way,	  the	  
fewer	  attributes	  they	  have,	  the	  more	  visible	  their	  application	  is,	  the	  better	  they	  fulfill	  their	  
purpose	  as	  signs.	  What	  they	  signify	  is	  external	  to	  them,	  and	  in	  that	  regard	  they	  are	  not	  even	  
signs	  or	  objects	  according	  to	  customary	  understanding.	  	  This	  theme	  is	  well	  illustrated	  by	  
Kharms’s	  stories	  of	  fighting	  men.	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  the	  story	  “Mashkin	  Killed	  Koshkin”	  
(Mashkin	  ubil	  Koshkina)	  from	  the	  Incidents	  cycle.	  
Comrade	  Koshkin	  danced	  around	  Comrade	  Mashkin.	  
Com.	  Mashkin	  followed	  Com.	  Koshkin	  with	  his	  eyes.	  	  
Com.	  Koshkin	  waved	  his	  arms	  in	  an	  insulting	  way	  and	  made	  disgusting	  contortions	  
with	  his	  legs.	  
Com.	  Mashkin	  furrowed	  his	  brow.	  
Com.	  Koshkin	  wiggled	  his	  belly	  and	  added	  a	  stomp	  with	  his	  right	  foot.	  
Com.	  Mashkin	  let	  out	  a	  yelp	  and	  threw	  himself	  at	  Com.	  Koshkin.	  	  
Com.	  Koshkin	  tried	  to	  flee,	  but	  he	  tripped	  and	  was	  caught	  up	  with	  by	  Com.	  Mashkin.	  
Com.	  Mashkin	  punched	  Com.	  Koshkin	  in	  the	  head.	  
Com.	  Koshkin	  yelped	  and	  dropped	  to	  his	  hands	  and	  knees.	  	  
Com.	  Mashkin	  whopped	  Com.	  Koshkin	  with	  a	  kick	  under	  the	  stomach	  and	  punched	  
him	  once	  more	  in	  the	  back	  of	  the	  head.	  
Com.	  Koshkin	  sprawled	  out	  on	  the	  floor	  and	  died.	  
Mashkin	  killed	  Koshkin.229	  
	  
                                                




In	  this	  story	  the	  characters’	  individuality	  is	  entirely	  subordinated	  to	  their	  participation,	  
their	  movement	  in	  the	  process	  of	  the	  plot,	  almost	  to	  the	  point	  of	  becoming	  indifferentiable.	  
The	  recurring	  repetition	  of	  their	  names	  Koshkin	  and	  Mashkin	  over	  time	  merges	  whereby	  
what	  differentiates	  the	  two,	  the	  “Ko”	  and	  “Ma”	  syllables	  become	  “Koma,”	  a	  term	  for	  a	  
related	  man	  or	  friend	  in	  Russian.	  Upon	  a	  careful	  look,	  the	  body	  parts	  mentioned	  in	  
connection	  with	  Mashkin	  and	  Koshkin	  while	  each	  associated	  with	  one	  or	  the	  other	  
character,	  when	  combined	  make	  one	  body.	  Consider	  the	  list	  of	  body	  parts	  mentioned	  in	  
connection	  with	  each:	  Koshkin	  has	  arms,	  legs,	  belly,	  foot,	  head,	  hands,	  knees,	  stomach,	  
head,	  Mashkin	  has	  eyes,	  brow,	  fist;	  it	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  there	  is	  not	  one	  body	  part	  that	  
is	  mentioned	  in	  connection	  with	  both,	  because	  that	  would	  eliminate	  the	  possibility	  of	  
merging	  the	  two	  characters,	  even	  if	  on	  a	  conceptual	  level,	  into	  one.	  So	  even	  if	  within	  the	  
plot	  Mashkin	  excels	  by	  defeating	  Koshkin,	  the	  indeterminacy	  of	  the	  two	  prevents	  the	  
reader	  from	  sensing	  a	  certain	  picture	  of	  reality	  inherent	  to	  them	  as	  individuals,	  or	  as	  
distinct	  signifiers.	  	  
	   In	  light	  of	  Kharms’s	  treatment	  of	  his	  characters	  and	  of	  objects	  in	  general,	  it	  can	  be	  
said	  that	  what	  matters	  to	  Kharms	  is	  not	  the	  story,	  not	  the	  plot,	  but	  the	  structural	  realities	  of	  
the	  text.	  Nearly	  every	  structure	  in	  the	  1930s,	  in	  my	  view,	  represents	  an	  experiment	  of	  
trying	  to	  register	  the	  “purity	  of	  order”	  constructed	  to	  create	  equilibrium.	  I	  would	  also	  argue	  
that	  equilibrium	  is	  conceived	  (and	  depicted)	  when	  the	  story	  reaches	  a	  zero	  form	  which	  is	  
when	  it	  restores	  balance	  and	  participates	  in	  existence,	  the	  essence	  of	  which,	  according	  to	  
Kharms	  lies	  in	  nothingness.	  My	  list	  of	  the	  various	  structural	  realities	  that	  Kharms	  explores	  
in	  his	  quest	  of	  representation	  of	  the	  “zero”	  point	  is	  not	  complete,	  but	  here	  are	  some	  of	  the	  




1. circular	  stories	  (where	  often	  the	  last	  and	  first	  line	  of	  the	  story	  are	  identical	  and	  the	  
events	  in	  the	  story	  complete	  a	  full	  circle,	  literally	  read	  as	  a	  circle)	  
2. stories	  in	  which	  the	  characters	  cancel	  each	  other	  out,	  or	  in	  which	  the	  character	  or	  
characters	  are	  canceled	  out	  by	  the	  narrator	  
3. Stories	  that	  are	  built	  on	  contradictory	  statements	  (usually	  indicating	  parallel	  
realities	  that	  cancel	  each	  other	  out),	  here	  the	  narrator	  or	  protagonists	  sway	  back	  
and	  forth	  between	  two	  realities	  and	  the	  discrepancy	  between	  each	  is	  never	  
resolved;	  a	  subsection	  of	  these	  stories	  are	  stories	  based	  on	  illusions	  or	  
hallucinations	  
4. Unfinished	  narratives,	  in	  which	  the	  author	  makes	  several	  attempts	  to	  start	  his	  story	  
and	  aborts	  them	  all	  
5. Stories	  in	  which	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  story	  breaks	  down	  due	  to	  a	  cognitive	  stumbling-­‐
block	  that	  is	  introduced	  and	  prevents	  further	  processing	  	  
6. Stories	  based	  on	  series	  of	  parallels	  that	  suspend	  the	  story	  as	  if	  in	  infinity	  
7. Stories	  in	  which	  plot	  and	  story	  cancel	  each	  other	  out	  
8. Stories	  in	  which	  objects	  keep	  getting	  lost	  or	  characters	  change	  to	  the	  point	  of	  non-­‐
recognition,	  usually	  indicating	  that	  the	  narrator	  has	  no	  control	  over	  his	  own	  text	  
	  
An	  example	  of	  a	  circular	  story	  would	  be	  the	  following	  excerpt	  from	  a	  letter	  Kharms	  wrote	  




I	  read	  a	  very	  interesting	  book	  about	  a	  young	  man	  who	  fell	  in	  love	  with	  a	  
young	  woman,	  but	  this	  young	  person	  loved	  another	  young	  man,	  and	  this	  
young	  man	  loved	  another	  young	  person,	  and	  this	  young	  person	  loved	  still	  
another	  young	  man,	  who	  loved	  not	  her,	  but	  yet	  another	  young	  person.	  
And	  suddenly	  this	  young	  person	  stumbles	  into	  an	  open	  manhole	  and	  breaks	  
her	  spine.	  But	  when	  she’s	  quite	  healed,	  she	  suddenly	  catches	  cold	  and	  dies.	  
And	  then	  the	  young	  man	  who	  loves	  her	  does	  himself	  in	  with	  a	  shot	  from	  a	  
revolver.	  Then	  the	  young	  person	  who	  loves	  this	  young	  man	  throws	  herself	  
under	  a	  train.	  Then	  the	  young	  man	  who	  loves	  this	  young	  person	  out	  of	  grief	  
climbs	  up	  a	  power	  line,	  touches	  the	  wire	  and	  dies	  from	  the	  electric	  shock.	  
Then	  the	  young	  person	  who	  loves	  this	  young	  man	  stuffs	  herself	  with	  ground	  
glass	  and	  dies	  from	  a	  wound	  in	  her	  guts.	  Then	  the	  young	  man	  who	  loves	  this	  
young	  person	  flees	  to	  America	  and	  becomes	  such	  a	  drunk	  that	  he	  sells	  his	  last	  
suit	  and,	  for	  lack	  of	  suit,	  has	  to	  stay	  in	  bed	  and	  he	  gets	  bedsores	  and	  from	  
these	  bedsores	  he	  dies.230	  
	  
The	  story	  is	  structured	  to	  complete	  a	  full	  circle	  whereby	  the	  character	  who	  set	  the	  entire	  
story	  in	  motion	  dies	  in	  the	  end,	  therefore,	  the	  story	  too	  comes	  to	  completion	  and	  
disintegration.	  In	  addition,	  each	  character	  dies	  within	  the	  story,	  in	  other	  words,	  each	  of	  the	  
characters	  is	  also	  liquidated	  one	  by	  one.	  Within	  the	  entire	  story	  or	  circle	  of	  events,	  there	  
are	  two	  sub-­‐circles,	  first,	  the	  circle	  of	  people	  who	  love	  someone	  else	  other	  than	  who	  loves	  
them	  (a>b>c>d..),	  second,	  	  the	  circle	  of	  people	  are	  loved	  by	  someone	  else	  (…d<c<b<a)	  
separated	  by	  an	  additional	  circle	  (the	  manhole)	  whose	  function	  is	  to	  halt	  the	  process	  and	  
reverse	  it.	  
	   The	  story	  “Mashkin	  Killed	  Koshkin”	  fits	  well	  the	  type	  of	  story	  where	  the	  characters	  
cancel	  each	  other	  out.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  well-­‐known	  of	  Kharms’s	  stories	  is	  the	  “Blue	  
Notebook	  #10”	  also	  listed	  in	  the	  Incidents	  cycle.	  The	  story	  goes	  as	  follows:	  
                                                




There	  was	  a	  redheaded	  man	  who	  had	  no	  eyes	  or	  ears.	  He	  didn’t	  have	  hair	  either,	  so	  
he	  was	  called	  a	  redhead	  arbitrarily.	  
He	  couldn’t	  talk	  because	  he	  had	  no	  mouth.	  He	  didn’t	  have	  a	  nose	  either.	  
He	  didn’t	  even	  have	  arms	  or	  legs.	  He	  had	  no	  stomach,	  he	  had	  no	  back,	  no	  spine,	  and	  
he	  didn’t	  have	  any	  insides	  at	  all.	  There	  was	  nothing!	  So,	  we	  don’t	  even	  know	  who	  
we’re	  talking	  about.	  
We’d	  better	  not	  talk	  about	  him	  anymore.231	  
	  
Here	  again	  the	  narrator	  aims	  at	  reaching	  the	  zero	  form,	  the	  form	  preceding	  any	  narrative,	  
perhaps	  the	  form	  of	  “purity	  of	  order”	  or	  “nothingness”	  by	  gradually	  eliminating	  from	  our	  
perception	  all	  attributes	  that	  the	  reader	  would	  hold	  when	  envisioning	  a	  protagonist.	  As	  we	  
read,	  the	  further	  the	  plot	  advances	  the	  further	  the	  story	  regresses	  to	  its	  point	  of	  inception.	  	  
	   Given	  the	  constraints	  of	  space,	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  list	  all	  types	  of	  stories	  that	  
register	  the	  zero	  form	  in	  their	  structure.	  I	  will	  only	  list	  a	  few	  that	  suggest	  some	  form	  of	  
impact	  of	  trauma.	  One	  type	  that	  falls	  under	  this	  criterion	  is	  a	  story	  that	  is	  built	  on	  an	  
illusion	  or	  parallel	  existence	  of	  two,	  antithetical	  realities.	  Consider	  the	  short	  story	  “Optical	  
Illusion”	  from	  the	  Incident	  cycle.	  	  
Semyon	  Semyonovich,	  having	  put	  on	  his	  spectacles,	  looks	  at	  a	  pine	  tree	  and	  this	  is	  
what	  he	  sees:	  In	  the	  pine	  tree	  sits	  a	  man	  showing	  him	  his	  fist.	  
Semyon	  Semyonovich,	  taking	  off	  his	  spectacles,	  looks	  at	  the	  pine	  and	  sees	  that	  no	  
one	  is	  sitting	  in	  the	  tree.	  
Semyon	  Semyonovich,	  putting	  on	  his	  spectacles,	  looks	  at	  the	  pine	  tree	  and	  again	  he	  
sees	  that	  a	  man	  is	  sitting	  in	  the	  tree,	  showing	  him	  his	  fist.	  
Semyon	  Semyonovich,	  taking	  off	  his	  spectacles,	  again	  sees	  that	  there	  is	  no	  one	  
sitting	  in	  the	  pine	  tree.	  
                                                





Semyon	  Semyonovich,	  putting	  his	  spectacles	  on	  again,	  looks	  at	  the	  pine	  tree,	  and,	  as	  
previously,	  he	  sees	  that	  in	  the	  pine	  tree	  sits	  a	  man	  showing	  him	  his	  fist.	  
Semyon	  Semyonovich	  does	  not	  wish	  to	  believe	  this	  phenomenon	  and	  deems	  this	  
phenomenon	  an	  optical	  illusion.232	  
	  
Kharms’s	  stories	  of	  illusion	  resemble	  the	  fighting	  scenes,	  governed	  by	  the	  technique	  of	  
collision,	  but	  not	  between	  two	  objects	  or	  object-­‐like	  characters,	  but	  within	  the	  self.	  The	  self	  
in	  this	  story	  is	  split	  in	  two	  halves:	  Semyon	  Semyonovich	  I,	  who	  sees	  in	  the	  pine	  tree	  a	  
peasant	  showing	  him	  a	  fist,	  and	  his	  opposite,	  Semyon	  Semyonovich	  II,	  who	  sees	  no	  one	  
sitting	  in	  the	  pine	  tree.	  They	  are	  arranged	  antithetically.	  It	  can	  equally	  well	  be	  argued	  that	  
the	  self	  may	  be	  one,	  but	  the	  external	  reality	  split	  into	  two	  irreconcilable	  parts.	  In	  either	  
case,	  there	  is	  an	  element	  of	  impediment	  to	  cognitive	  processing	  characteristic	  of	  traumatic	  
encounters	  which	  result	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  person’s	  reality	  is	  canceled	  out	  by	  an	  alternate,	  
imposed	  reality.	  Because	  of	  this	  impediment,	  there	  is	  a	  delay	  in	  cognitive	  processing,	  until	  
the	  protagonist	  settles	  on	  denying	  his	  experience	  the	  reality	  component.	  If	  we	  were	  to	  
contrast	  the	  treatment	  of	  the	  possible	  content	  of	  experience	  in	  Kharms	  and	  Shklovsky,	  
there	  is	  a	  visible	  shift	  from	  omission	  to	  denial,	  the	  former	  characteristic	  of	  Shklovsky,	  the	  
latter	  of	  Kharms’s	  work	  or	  aesthetics.	  	  
From	  the	  reader’s	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  two	  states	  of	  Semyon	  Semyonovich	  convey	  the	  
arbitrariness	  of	  an	  experience,	  and	  without	  taking	  sides,	  we	  submit	  to	  the	  magic	  of	  the	  
energy	  that	  the	  composition	  of	  the	  whole	  releases.	  Kharms’s	  plot	  exhausts	  itself	  before	  the	  
repetitive	  course	  of	  collisions	  becomes	  monotonous,	  and	  the	  rhythm	  and	  tempo	  dies	  out.	  
Besides	  illustrating	  yet	  another	  example	  of	  a	  story	  where	  the	  character	  or	  his	  experience	  is	  
                                                




canceled	  out	  and	  the	  story	  is	  thereby	  voided	  of	  reality	  content,	  the	  story	  has	  other	  
important	  traits,	  such	  as	  the	  compulsion	  to	  repeat	  to	  exhaustion	  a	  scenario	  that	  is	  
irreconcilable	  and	  the	  split	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  protagonist.	  The	  unstable	  sense	  of	  self	  is	  
often	  a	  visible	  trait-­‐-­‐perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  few	  humanistic	  traits	  that	  one	  can	  detect	  in	  in	  
Kharms’s	  characters	  despite	  their	  object-­‐like	  functioning.	  	  
A	  similar	  paralysis	  and	  split	  of	  the	  self	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  stories	  where	  the	  protagonists	  
are	  not	  able	  to	  follow	  through	  with	  what	  they	  want	  because	  there	  is	  some	  force	  (within	  or	  
external	  to	  them)	  that	  cancels	  out	  what	  they	  intend	  to	  do.	  These	  are	  examples	  of	  works	  in	  
which	  the	  story	  the	  character	  would	  like	  to	  write	  is	  canceled	  out	  by	  the	  plot	  that	  is	  
superimposed	  on	  him.	  An	  excerpt	  from	  the	  short	  story	  “Sleep	  Mocks	  Man”	  from	  the	  
Incidents	  cycle	  illustrates	  well	  this	  type	  of	  dilemma:	  	  
Markov	  took	  off	  his	  boots	  and,	  sighing,	  lay	  down	  on	  the	  couch.	  He	  wanted	  to	  sleep,	  but	  as	  
soon	  as	  he	  closed	  his	  eyes,	  his	  desire	  to	  sleep	  instantly	  vanished.	  Markov	  would	  open	  his	  
eyes	  and	  grope	  for	  a	  book.	  But	  drowsiness	  would	  come	  over	  him	  again	  and,	  without	  
reaching	  the	  book,	  Markov	  would	  lie	  back	  down	  and	  close	  his	  eyes	  again.	  But	  just	  as	  his	  
eyes	  closed,	  sleep	  would	  drift	  away	  from	  him	  again,	  and	  his	  consciousness	  would	  become	  
so	  clear	  that	  Markov	  could	  solve	  algebraic	  equations	  with	  two	  tables	  in	  his	  head…233	  
	  
There	  is	  no	  peace	  in	  the	  soul	  of	  the	  character,	  who	  in	  the	  end	  runs	  out	  of	  the	  apartment	  and	  
disappears	  in	  the	  direction	  of	  a	  local	  garden.	  	  The	  inner	  struggle	  of	  the	  character	  becomes	  
nearly	  banal	  when	  considering	  that	  the	  character’s	  name	  evokes	  the	  image	  of	  a	  carrot	  
(morkov’	  in	  Russian)	  running	  to	  a	  local	  garden	  to	  find	  inner	  peace.	  
While	  it	  seems	  that	  Kharms	  intentionally	  introduced	  to	  his	  text	  violence	  as	  a	  form	  of	  
collision,	  and	  that	  violence	  (violating	  and	  being	  violated,	  or	  in	  a	  milder	  form	  being	  
                                                




eliminated)	  is	  central	  to	  obtaining	  the	  greatest	  affect,	  it	  would	  seem	  that	  utilitarianism	  
alone	  is	  not	  all	  that	  is	  in	  play.	  	  From	  Kharms’s	  biography,	  we	  know	  that	  during	  the	  1930s	  he	  
often	  talked	  about	  his	  own	  elimination	  and	  slow	  death.	  His	  liquidation	  of	  his	  characters	  
who	  are	  “[a]ll	  good	  people	  but	  they	  don’t	  know	  how	  to	  hold	  their	  ground”	  parallels	  the	  
physical	  destruction	  of	  those	  whom	  the	  Bolshevik	  regime	  condemned	  to	  silence	  or	  death.	  
One	  could	  argue	  that	  Kharms’s	  characters	  are	  as	  atomized	  (stripped	  from	  their	  
individuality)	  and	  vulnerable	  as	  those	  living	  in	  a	  totalitarian	  Bolshevik	  state.	  Or,	  that	  the	  
organized	  violence	  within	  the	  text	  tames	  the	  fear	  of	  random	  violence	  in	  the	  outside	  reality	  
and	  that	  the	  inevitability	  of	  dissolution	  of	  characters	  and	  plot	  provides	  a	  feeling	  of	  security	  
and	  predictability,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  world	  of	  literature.	  Most	  likely,	  however,	  the	  key	  to	  
understanding	  Kharms’s	  texts	  does	  not	  lie	  in	  literal	  reading,	  but	  in	  the	  function	  they	  
fulfilled	  in	  Kharms’s	  oeuvre.	  	  
Kharms,	  like	  Shklovsky,	  emphasizes	  structural	  features	  over	  content.	  For	  Shklovsky,	  
content	  was	  eliminated	  altogether,	  whereas	  for	  Kharms,	  content,	  which,	  I	  believe,	  is	  the	  
“purity	  of	  order”	  that	  is	  the	  structural	  core	  of	  the	  work	  manifested	  in	  the	  work	  sharing	  an	  
essence	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  nothingness,	  returns	  by	  bestowing	  method	  with	  a	  semantic	  
dimension	  or	  a	  meaning.	  Fundamentally,	  both	  authors	  shy	  away	  from	  the	  content	  real	  life	  
has	  to	  offer	  to	  the	  point	  of	  dissociation,	  where	  real	  life	  becomes	  irrelevant	  as	  material	  to	  
the	  work.	  At	  least,	  so	  it	  seems	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  realism	  in	  both	  writers’	  works.	  On	  the	  
account	  of	  dissociation,	  	  one	  feature	  that	  is	  often	  overlooked	  in	  Kharms	  is	  how	  hypnotic	  his	  
texts	  are	  despite	  the	  amount	  of	  violence	  that	  takes	  place	  in	  them.	  The	  repetitions,	  parallels,	  
circular	  motions,	  even	  the	  back-­‐and-­‐forth	  shifts	  have	  a	  soothing	  effect.	  The	  fact	  that	  realism	  




external	  events,	  perhaps	  self-­‐introduced,	  much	  as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Shklovsky’s	  
theoretical	  writing.	  The	  characters	  of	  Kharms	  often	  oscillate	  between	  complete	  submission	  
and	  domination,	  thus	  replicate	  the	  victim-­‐abuser	  paradigm,	  merging	  the	  boundaries	  
between	  the	  two.	  	  
I	  suggest	  that	  we	  consider	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  “purity	  of	  order”	  and	  restoration	  of	  the	  
world	  from	  the	  state	  of	  chaos	  to	  that	  of	  equilibrium	  be	  considered	  not	  only	  as	  a	  theoretical	  
enterprise	  or	  a	  vision	  of	  a	  delusional	  man	  in	  a	  psychiatric	  ward,	  but	  as	  a	  need	  for	  
stabilization,	  a	  process	  through	  which	  chaos	  (the	  randomness	  of	  the	  external	  world	  that	  
tested	  Kharms’s	  life	  to	  the	  point	  of	  struggle	  for	  survival)	  is	  transformed	  into	  order	  that	  
stands	  for	  harmony,	  predictability,	  safety	  and	  control.	  Integration	  of	  the	  traumatic	  
encounter	  with	  marginalization	  and	  persecution	  leads	  Kharms	  to	  believe	  that	  his	  life	  
cannot	  be	  realized	  and	  is	  possibly	  on	  the	  path	  of	  destruction.	  In	  response,	  he	  registers	  in	  
his	  work	  the	  non-­‐realization	  of	  an	  ideal	  life	  he	  would	  have	  lived	  under	  different	  
circumstances,	  which	  leads	  him	  to	  anchor	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  universe	  and	  his	  own	  life	  in	  
the	  concept	  of	  “nothingness.”	  All	  efforts	  to	  recreate	  the	  ideal	  state	  via	  literature,	  that	  is,	  to	  
manifest	  “nothingness”	  in	  the	  text,	  can	  be	  viewed	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  integrate	  one’s	  life	  
experience	  into	  one’s	  work	  and	  endow	  it	  with	  meaning	  that	  can	  transcend	  the	  constraints	  
of	  one’s	  limiting	  circumstances	  and	  mitigate	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  trauma.	  If	  recovery	  from	  a	  
traumatic	  encounter	  follows	  the	  following	  stages:	  trauma,	  stabilization,	  integration	  of	  
memories,	  development	  of	  self,	  and	  integration	  of	  pre-­‐	  and	  post-­‐traumatic	  memories;	  then	  
Kharms’s	  work	  would	  make	  sense	  from	  a	  medical	  point	  of	  view,	  as	  far	  as	  it	  allows	  for	  




elimination	  and	  finally,	  a	  development	  of	  the	  self	  that	  is	  based	  on	  a	  realization	  of	  the	  self	  on	  





















What	  sets	  Kharms’s	  enterprise	  apart	  from	  Shklovsky’s	  is	  that	  the	  chance	  for	  the	  
reconciliation	  of	  the	  external	  world	  seems	  in	  Kharms’s	  case	  even	  more	  removed,	  and	  
because	  there	  is	  already	  a	  cognitive	  processing	  and	  formation	  of	  narrative	  around	  the	  
event	  of	  trauma	  (circumstances	  introduced	  by	  the	  revolution)	  in	  place,	  a	  need	  for	  an	  
content	  (or	  anti-­‐content)	  can	  no	  longer	  be	  bypassed.	  In	  Kharms’s	  case,	  because	  the	  
revolution	  was	  already	  seen	  in	  hindsight	  and	  the	  Bolshevik	  rule	  was	  consolidated,	  the	  
traumatic	  processing	  of	  events	  entered	  its	  narrative	  stage	  from	  the	  earlier	  stage	  where	  
Shklovsky	  and	  the	  Futurists	  for	  the	  most	  part	  were	  still	  living	  through	  and	  feeling	  the	  
immediate	  effects.	  I	  do	  not	  deny	  that	  Kharms	  was	  personally	  and	  severely	  affected	  by	  the	  
terror	  of	  the	  1930s;	  what	  I	  suggest	  is	  that	  his	  engagement	  with	  his	  time	  reflects	  a	  greater	  
need	  and	  ability	  to	  provide	  a	  system	  of	  thought	  that	  functioned	  as	  an	  alternate	  and	  anti-­‐
reality,	  whereas	  Shklovsky	  was	  still	  preoccupied	  with	  overcoming	  the	  impact	  and	  pain	  of	  
the	  revolution,	  i.e.,	  by	  writing	  a	  memoir	  that	  would	  serve	  as	  a	  testimony	  to	  the	  events	  he	  
lived	  through.	  To	  Kharms,	  external	  reality	  was	  largely	  irrelevant	  and	  shut	  off,	  and	  it	  is	  
rather	  tragic	  if	  one	  thinks	  that	  his	  method	  of	  spiritual	  protection	  is	  what	  actually	  caused	  his	  
physical	  death,	  for	  the	  same	  anti-­‐reality	  he	  created	  for	  himself	  as	  a	  safe	  haven	  is	  what	  in	  the	  
end	  caused	  his	  arrest	  and	  premature	  death.	  	  
Judith	  Herman	  states:	  “Trauma	  is	  redeemed	  only	  when	  it	  becomes	  the	  source	  of	  a	  
survivor	  mission.”234	  Perhaps	  this	  can	  be	  said	  of	  Kharms,	  who,	  while	  he	  was	  never	  able	  to	  
                                                




overcome	  the	  confines	  of	  his	  personal	  life	  imposed	  by	  the	  times,	  still	  managed	  to	  create	  a	  
personal	  narrative	  which	  he	  merged	  with	  his	  literary	  work,	  that	  transcended	  these	  
limitations	  and,	  like	  Shklovsky,	  turned	  his	  deficits	  into	  assets	  by	  transforming	  the	  traumatic	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